Showing posts with label Muslims. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muslims. Show all posts

Friday, November 6, 2009

"Lone Wolf" Attack Strikes Fort Hood


We have talked about the dangers of the Lone Wolf terrorist before in "American Ranger". We had another post (link here) following a previous such incident.

Scattered throughout America, in our small towns and in the big cities, are Islamic extremists plotting to attack Americans. Some of these self-described "holy warriors" may be acting on behalf of Al Qaeda. Others are Al Qaeda "wannabees" who have created their own little terrorist "clubs". A few are individuals who believe they are creating plots inspired by God. When they are ready, or when some type of emotional crisis sets them off, they execute their attacks on innocent men, women, or children.

The incident at Fort Hood will be investigated, and we will eventually learn whether or not there were signs or warnings that this Army officer was preparing his own "jihad". So far, it sounds like he had expressed his fundamentalist feelings in arguments with his military peers. Such sympathies with our enemies should have triggered some type of investigation, but we do not yet know if that happened.

All of us must remember that the war on terror has no front lines. The fanatics who want to destroy us are the ultimate guerrillas. They are not only in Iraq and Afghanistan; they live and work among us here in the United States and within the borders of our allies around the world.

Their agenda is not a pretty one, so we must use our eyes, ears, and common sense when we see, hear, or learn about something that doesn't seem right. Then we must contact authorities. Every police agency in this country has someone who is designated to handle such complaints.

Whether it is a burglary in progress, a suspicious person, a questionable package, or some other unusual event, Americans have done a good job with their "neighborhood watch" programs. Community oriented policing has enhanced the communication between citizens and law enforcement.

We must extend this cooperation to the prevention of terrorist attacks. The American spirit will not permit these Islamic thugs to destroy our way of life. We will work together to protect our homes, families, and businesses.

If by chance YOU are a "Lone Wolf", or the member of a terrorist cell, or part of a group of "wannabees", understand this - we are looking for you, and we will hunt you down like the animals you are.....

Charles M. Grist
www.MyLastWar.com

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

The Dangers of the Lone Wolf Terrorist


Here is another great article from Stratfor:

* * * *

LONE WOLF LESSONS

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton

At approximately 10:30 a.m. on June 1, as two young U.S. soldiers stood in front of the Army Navy Career Center in west Little Rock, Ark., a black pickup pulled in front of the office and the driver opened fire on the two, killing one and critically wounding the other.

Eyewitnesses to the shooting immediately reported it to police, and authorities quickly located and arrested the suspect as he fled the scene. According to police, the suspect told the arresting officers that he had a bomb in his vehicle, but after an inspection by the police bomb squad, the only weapons police recovered from the vehicle were an SKS rifle and two pistols.

At a press conference, Little Rock Police Chief Stuart Thomas identified the suspect as Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, a 21-year-old African-American man who had changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe after converting to Islam. In Arabic, the word mujahid is the singular form of mujahideen, and it literally means one who engages in jihad. Although Mujahid is not an uncommon Muslim name, it is quite telling that a convert to Islam would choose such a name -- one who engages in jihad -- to define his new identity. Muhammad was originally from Memphis, Tenn., but according to news reports was living and working in Little Rock.

Chief Thomas said Muhammad admitted to the shootings and told police that he specifically targeted soldiers. During an interrogation with a Little Rock homicide detective, Muhammad reportedly said that he was angry at the U.S. Army because of their attacks against Muslims overseas, that he opened fire intending to kill the two soldiers and that he would have killed more if they had been in the parking lot. These statements are likely what Chief Thomas was referring to when he noted in his press conference that Muhammad appears to have had political and religious motives for the attack and that it was conducted in response to U.S. military operations.

Chief Thomas also stated that the initial police investigation has determined that Muhammad acted alone and was not part of a wider conspiracy, but given that the shooting was an act of domestic terrorism directed against U.S military personnel, a thorough investigation has been launched by the FBI to ensure that Muhammad was not part of a larger group planning other attacks.

ABC News has reported that Muhammad had traveled to Yemen after his conversion, though the date of that travel and its duration were not provided in those reports. ABC also reported that while in Yemen, Muhammad was apparently arrested for carrying a fraudulent Somali passport and that upon his return from Yemen, the FBI opened a preliminary investigation targeting him.

The fact that the FBI was investigating Muhammad but was unable to stop this attack illustrates the difficulties that lone wolf militants present to law enforcement and security personnel, and also highlights some of the vulnerabilities associated with using law enforcement as the primary counterterrorism tool.

Challenges of the Lone Wolf

STRATFOR has long discussed the threat posed by lone wolf militants and the unique challenges they pose to law enforcement and security personnel. Of course, the primary challenge is that, by definition, lone wolves are solitary actors and it can be very difficult to determine their intentions before they act because they do not work with others. When militants are operating in a cell consisting of more than one person, there is a larger chance that one of them will get cold feet and reveal the plot to authorities, that law enforcement and intelligence personnel will intercept a communication between conspirators, or that law enforcement authorities will be able to introduce an informant into the group, as was the case in the recently foiled plot to bomb two Jewish targets in the Bronx and shoot down a military aircraft at a Newburgh, N.Y., Air National Guard base.

Obviously, lone wolves do not need to communicate with others or include them in the planning or execution of their plots. This ability to fly solo and under the radar of law enforcement has meant that some lone wolf militants such as Joseph Paul Franklin, Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph were able to operate for years before being identified and captured.

Lone wolves also pose problems because they can come from a variety of backgrounds with a wide range of motivations. While some lone wolves are politically motivated, others are religiously motivated and some are mentally unstable. Even among the religiously motivated there is variety. In addition to Muslim lone wolves like Muhammad, Mir Amal Kansi, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet and John Allen Muhammad, we have also seen anti-Semitic/Christian-identity adherents like Buford Furrow and Eric
Rudolph, radical Roman Catholics like James Kopp and radical Protestants like Paul Hill. Indeed, the day before the Little Rock attack, Scott Roeder, an anti-abortion lone wolf gunman, killed prominent abortion doctor George Tiller in Wichita, Kan.

In addition to the wide spectrum of ideologies and motivations among lone wolves, there is also the issue of geographic dispersal. As we've seen from the lone wolf cases listed above, they have occurred in many different locations and are not just confined to attacks in Manhattan or Washington, D.C. They can occur anywhere.

Moreover, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between those extremists who intend to commit attacks from those who simply preach hate or hold radical beliefs (things that are not in themselves illegal due to First Amendment protections in the United States). Therefore, to single out likely lone wolves before they strike, authorities must spend a great deal of time and resources looking at individuals who might be moving from radical beliefs to radical actions. With such a large universe of potential suspects, this is like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack.

Limitations on Both Sides

Due to the challenges lone wolf militants present, the concept of leaderless resistance has been publicly and widely embraced in both the domestic terrorism and jihadist realms. However, despite this advocacy and the ease with which terrorist attacks can be conducted against soft targets, surprisingly few terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by lone wolf operatives. In fact, historically, we have seen more mentally disturbed lone gunmen than politically motivated lone wolf terrorists. A main reason for this is that it can be somewhat difficult to translate theory into action, and as STRATFOR has frequently noted, there is often a disconnect between
intent and capability.

Because of the difficulty in obtaining the skills required to conduct a terrorist attack, many lone wolves do not totally operate in a vacuum, and many of them (like Muhammad) will usually come to somebody's attention before they conduct an attack. Many times this occurs as they seek the skills or materials required to conduct a terrorist attack, which Muhammad appears to have been doing in Yemen.

However, in this case, it is important to remember that even though Muhammad had been brought to the FBI's attention (probably through information obtained from the Yemeni authorities by the CIA in Yemen), he was only one of the thousands of such people the FBI opens a preliminary inquiry on each year. A preliminary inquiry is the basic level of investigation the FBI conducts, and it is usually opened for a limited period of time (though it can be extended with a supervisor's approval). Unless the agents assigned to the inquiry turn up sufficient indication that a law has been violated, the inquiry will be closed.

If the inquiry indicates that there is the likelihood that a U.S. law has been violated, the FBI will open a full-field investigation into the matter. This will allow the bureau to exert significantly more investigative effort on the case and devote more investigative resources toward solving it. Out of the many preliminary inquiries opened on suspected militants, the FBI opens full-field investigations only on a handful of them. So, if the information reported by ABC News is correct, the FBI was not conducting surveillance on Muhammad because to do so it would have had to have opened a full-field investigation.

Of course, now that Muhammad has attacked, it is easy to say that the FBI should have paid more attention to him. Prior to an attack, however, intelligence is seldom, if ever, so black and white. Sorting out the individuals who intend to conduct attacks from the larger universe of people who hold radical thoughts and beliefs and assigning law enforcement and intelligence resources to monitor the activities of the really dangerous people has long been one of the very difficult tasks faced by counterterrorism authorities.

This difficulty is magnified when the FBI is looking at a lone wolf target because there is no organization, chain of command or specific communications channel on which to focus intelligence resources and gather information. Lacking information that would have tied Muhammad to other militant individuals or cells, or that would have indicated he was inclined to commit a crime, the FBI had little basis for opening a full-field investigation into his activities. These limitations, and the FBI's notorious bureaucracy (as seen in its investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui and the 9/11 hijackers), are the longstanding shortfalls of the law-enforcement element of counterterrorism policy (the other elements are diplomacy, financial sanctions, intelligence and military).

However, politics have proved obstructive to all facets of counterterrorism policy. And politics may have been at play in the Muhammad case as well as in other cases involving Black Muslim converts. Several weeks ago, STRATFOR heard from sources that the FBI and other law enforcement organizations had been ordered to "back off" of counterterrorism investigations into the activities of Black Muslim converts. At this point, it is unclear to us if that guidance was given by the White House or the Department of Justice, or if it was promulgated by the agencies themselves, anticipating the wishes of President Barack Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder.

As STRATFOR has previously noted, the FBI has a culture that is very conservative and risk-averse. Many FBI supervisors are reluctant to authorize investigations that they believe may have negative blow-back on their career advancement. In light of this institutional culture, and the order to be careful in investigations relating to Black Muslim converts, it would not be at all surprising to us if a supervisor refused to authorize a full-field investigation of Muhammad that would have included surveillance of his activities. Though in practical terms, even if a full-field investigation had been authorized, due to the caution being exercised in cases related to Black Muslim converts, the case would most likely have been micromanaged to the point of inaction by the special agent in charge of the office involved or by FBI headquarters.

Even though lone wolves operate alone, they are still constrained by the terrorist attack cycle, and because they are working alone, they have to conduct each step of the cycle by themselves. This means that they are vulnerable to detection at several different junctures as they plan their attacks, the most critical of which is the surveillance stage of the operation. Muhammad did not just select that recruiting center at random and attack on the spot. He had cased it prior to the attack just as he had been taught in the militant training camps he attended in Yemen. Law nforcement officials have reported that Muhammad may also have researched potential
government and Jewish targets in Little Rock, Philadelphia, Atlanta, New York, Louisville and Memphis.

Had the FBI opened a full-field investigation on Muhammad, and had it conducted surveillance on him, it would have been able to watch him participate in preoperational activities such as conducting surveillance of potential targets and obtaining weapons.

There is certainly going to be an internal inquiry at the FBI and Department of Justice -- and perhaps even in Congress -- to determine where the points of failure were in this case. We will be watching with interest to see what really transpired. The details will be extremely interesting, especially coming at a time when the Obama administration appears to be following the Clinton-era policy of stressing the primacy of the FBI and the law enforcement aspect of counterterrorism policy at the expense of intelligence and other elements.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com.

Copyright 2009 Stratfor.


* * * *

One of the biggest dangers facing Americans in the years to come will be the homegrown, lone wolf terrorist. This is the guy who was born in America, but who embraces radical Islam and who is willing to kill innocent men, women, and children.

Radical Islam IS the new fascism....

Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, May 5, 2009

Taliban Moves Closer to Pakistan's Nukes


Other than the ominous march of Iran toward nuclear weapons, the next greatest fear is that the Taliban - who were run out of Afghanistan in 2003 by the United States - will someday get hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Sadly, the Pakistani leadership still believes their greatest threat is India, when the disease within their borders is the bigger danger.

Here is a good article from David Ignatius:

* * * *

Moment of Truth in Pakistan

By David Ignatius
Sunday, May 3, 2009

President Obama convened a crisis meeting at the White House last Monday to hear a report from Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had just returned from Pakistan. Mullen described the worrying situation there, with Taliban insurgents moving closer to the capital, Islamabad.

"It had gotten significantly worse than I expected as the Swat deal unraveled," Mullen explained in an interview. He was referring to a truce brokered in February in the Swat Valley, about 100 miles north of Islamabad. The Pakistani military had expected that the cease-fire would subdue Taliban fighters in Swat. Instead, the Muslim militants surged south into the district of Buner, on the doorstep of the capital.

Listening to Mullen's report at the White House were two senior officials -- Defense Secretary Bob Gates and special envoy Richard Holbrooke -- who were serving in government back in 1979, when a Muslim insurgency toppled the Iranian government, with harmful consequences that persist to this day. The two policy veterans "made the argument that it's worth studying the Iran model," recalls a senior official who took part in the White House meeting.

This was Pakistan week for the administration's foreign policy team, behind the self-congratulatory hubbub over the first 100 days. At a news conference Wednesday, Obama said that he was "gravely concerned about the situation in Pakistan." He said his biggest worry was that "the civilian government there right now is very fragile."

The challenge in Pakistan is eerily similar to what the Carter administration faced with Iran: how to encourage the military to take decisive action against a Muslim insurgency without destroying the country's nascent democracy.

And there's a deeper psychological factor, too: how to exercise U.S. power effectively without triggering a backlash from a proud and prickly Muslim population that is scarred by what it sees as a history of American meddling.

"My experience is that knocking them [the Pakistani government and military] hard isn't going to work," said Mullen. "The harder we push, the further away they get." For the crackdown on the Taliban to be successful, he said, "it has to be their will, not ours."

What encourages U.S. officials is that recent events have been a wake-up call for a Pakistani elite in denial about the Taliban threat. One top civilian official said that he was less worried now than three weeks ago, because the military and civilian leaders in Islamabad have realized the danger they face. The Pakistani military has begun an effort to push back the Taliban, with mixed results. The Taliban responded fiercely to an assault Tuesday in Buner and seized three police stations, kidnapping dozens of police and paramilitary troops.

"My biggest concern is whether [the Pakistani government] will sustain it," Mullen said. He has told his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, that "we are prepared to assist whenever they want." During his recent visit, Mullen toured two Pakistani counterinsurgency training camps and came away impressed.

Mullen said that he hopes the Pakistanis will adopt a classic three-part counterinsurgency strategy -- clearing areas of Taliban control, holding those areas with enough troops so that the local population feels secure and then building through economic development, with U.S. help.

Politically, the United States is looking increasingly to former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whose Muslim League dominates the crucial Punjab region. Officials note that 60 percent of the Pakistani population lives in Punjab and that Sharif's popularity rating there is over 80 percent.

President Asif Ali Zardari is far weaker, politically, and that worries the administration. He'll visit Washington this week to discuss the crisis with Obama.

U.S. officials are exploring ways to reduce the political strain on Zardari caused by U.S. drone attacks on al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the tribal areas. Pakistanis protest these attacks as violations of sovereignty, even though they had been blessed in secret by Zardari's government. This tension could be eased by some public formula for dual control. Explains a senior Obama administration official: "We're looking at how we might find some common way ahead where utilization of the asset could benefit the Pakistanis."

The growing crisis mentality in Washington poses its own threat to a sound Pakistan policy. It could produce red-hot American rhetoric and a corresponding U.S. impatience -- and that, in turn, would only make the Pakistanis more uneasy. Success depends on Islamabad's recognition that it's their problem and that they must act decisively.

The writer is co-host of PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues. His e-mail address is davidignatius@washpost.com.


* * * *

As all these fundamentalist Muslims inch their way toward nuclear weapons, the world gets a little scarier every day.

Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Opinions Vary on Iraq Troop Withdrawal Options


I know it's been awhile since my last posting (sorry about that). I have been traveling again, but it looks like that is slowly coming to an end. My pre-retirement medical exams, etc. may keep me in the Orlando area until I begin my terminal leave. We shall see.

Both Americans and Iraqis are debating when and under what circumstances American troops will begin to withdraw from Iraq. The following New York Times article offers some interesting perspectives, but some of the Iraqis who were interviewed have political agendas for their groups:

* * * *

New York Times
September 9, 2008
Pg. 6

Should U.S. Forces Withdraw From Iraq?

By Stephen Farrell

BAGHDAD — As Iraqi and American diplomats negotiate how long and under what circumstances American troops will remain in Iraq, Iraqis are also debating the issue.

For Iraqis, as for Americans, the answer is far more complex than a simple “stay” or “go.” For both it is about blood, treasure, pride, dignity and a nation’s sense of itself and its place in the world.

But a lot more Iraqi blood than American has already been spilled, and stands to be spilled again, if the politicians get it wrong.

On the streets of Iraq, the questions being asked about the continuing American presence are about sovereignty, stability and America’s intentions in Iraq’s past, present and future: How many American troops will stay? How quickly will they go? If they stay, where will they be based? To do what? With what powers? And under what restrictions?

For the most part, Iraqis’ views fall into three categories. One group, which includes many followers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and some intensely nationalist Sunni Arabs in parts of the country that have suffered the worst since the invasion, simply want the Americans to leave, period. They say no amount of American effort now can make up for the horrors of the occupation, including the destruction of society and the killing of innocent civilians.

A second group takes a similarly dim view of the occupation, but worries that the brief period this year of improving security in Iraq will be vulnerable if the Americans abruptly withdraws. They say that the United States has a moral obligation to remain, and that continued presence of the occupiers is preferable to a return to rule by gangs and militias.

A third group worries that without a referee, Iraq’s dominant powers — Kurds in the far north and Shiites in the center and south — will brutally dominate other groups.

The Americans are not the first to face such quandaries in Iraq. In August 1920, only two years after his declining colonial power had emerged from the devastation of World War I, the British secretary of war, Winston Churchill, wrote (but did not send) a letter to his prime minister that contained this assessment of Mesopotamia:

“It seems to me so gratuitous that after all the struggles of war, just when we want to get together our slender military resources and re-establish our finances and have a little in hand in case of danger here or there, we should be compelled to go on pouring armies and treasure into these thankless deserts.”

A millennium and a half earlier, in A.D. 694, the Umayyad provincial governor Al-Hajjaj also faced a fractious Baghdad. His response to one angry crowd was a speech learned by all Iraqi schoolchildren: “I see heads before me that are ripe and ready for the plucking, and I am the one to pluck them, and I see blood glistening between the turbans and the beards.” The turbans melted away.

Five years later, Al-Hajjaj faced a rebellion in a troublesome region to his east, which forced him to move troops from Iraq. That rebellion was in Kabulistan, now part of Afghanistan, a historical parallel that drew a wry smile from Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Iraq, when it was pointed out to him last month. General Petraeus will soon move up the chain of command to take over the Central Command region, making him responsible for an area that covers both Iraq and what was Kabulistan.

Names and governments change, but there is nothing new under the Mesopotamian sun.

The debate goes on. Following are some Iraqi perspectives on whether and how American troops should stay in their country.

Opinions of the Iraqis

The Choice Is Not Ours: America Wants to Stay

I don’t expect that the Americans will leave Iraq because they reached the maximum level of political influence in the region. America is controlling the future of energy, so I believe it’s not to America’s benefit for it to leave Iraq. -- ISMAIL KABABCHI, 38, a restaurant worker in central Baghdad

America will not leave Iraq. I think my grandsons’ grandsons will watch Uncle Sam and his blue jeans. The idea that America will depart is a kind of delusion because America came for its interests in Iraq. Iraq represents the most important treasure in the struggle among the superpowers for it includes plenty of wealth in addition to its important geographic location. In the long run, America will not leave Iraq because it reached the treasure of the world. -- SAID AL-MAJMAYI, 50, a painter in Baquba

Or Maybe It Doesn’t

I expect that the Americans will leave Iraq sooner or later because they can’t control the security situation. I expect their departure within the next few months because of the achievements of the Iraqi security forces and the Awakening in terms of security and stability. That will help the American forces leave Iraq and save the rest of their dignity before the situation turns bad again like between 2004 and 2005. -- ABU ABDUL QADER AL-JUMAYLI, 60, a retired army officer in Falluja

The withdrawal is coming, no doubt. America has lost its influence in Iraq to a very great and dangerous degree. The No. 1 country in the world didn’t imagine that it would become a toy in the hand of radical parties and armed groups, or some powers which will ally with America at daytime and conspire against it at night. -- MATEEN OMAR OJI, 32, a teacher in Kirkuk

America Must Leave Iraq Now

We want to push them out immediately. We don’t need them, and we don’t want them. We have two governments, the Iraqi and American governments. We are confused about who we need to obey, the Americans or Iraqis. And both the American and Iraqi governments are hurting the Iraqi people. -- ABDUL RAHMAN HAMED HUSSEIN, a social worker in Abu Dshir, south of Baghdad, who follows the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr

I want them to leave because they caused destruction for us, they have robbed us and they never gave us any of what they had promised to give us. If a civil war breaks out after their departure, it would be their doing. It’s going on now because of them. They are inflaming it. Iraqis have proved that they are not being seduced by the American actions. Their departure is the beginning of the road toward stability. What ever happens after their withdrawal, it will be finished within a year. -- MUHAMMAD SNAD, 36, an electrical technician in Mosul

We Don’t Love the Americans, But Withdrawal Is Worse

I am not with the coalition forces’ withdrawal from Iraq currently, because chaos and destruction will be all over Iraq. Even before the Americans came, we used to have genocide, destruction and wars. We know that the Americans came for their own benefit, yet they are our only solution. -- NISREEN HASSAN, 25, a teacher in Sulaimaniya

The presence of the American forces will make Iraq a regional and international power. If the Americans withdraw, Iraq will be subject to domination from neighboring countries which support terrorism in Iraq to protect their interests, so the departure of the American forces doesn’t serve Iraq’s interest. -- ABD MUHAMMAD AL-BEDEER, Samawa

If It’s Not the Americans, Someone Else Will Take Over

The coalition forces are the best solution to Iraq’s situation, they are just like a strong dam against the outside and the inside enemies and even the neighboring countries. They are all wolves — the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks. -- JALEEL MAHMOOD, 31, Sulaimaniya

Staying is the best thing for Iraq. If the Americans depart, half of Iraq will go to the Kurds and Iran will take the other half. We need a safety valve. America occupied Iraq and must solve the problems before its departure. America’s departure will increase the problems. -- AMJAD SALAH, 34, a driver in Basra

The Dream Deferred: Please Go, Just Not Yet

I don’t want them to leave right now, but I don’t want to see them here forever. Sooner or later the Americans have to leave Iraq or understand that our policy differs from their policy. They have to recognize the sovereignty of Iraq. I’d love to keep good relations with America rather than telling bad stories to my kids about it. -- HUDA HANI, 33, a Shiite employee of the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad

I’m against the Americans’ withdrawing before we have a fully independent government and security forces. I witnessed many terrible things with the Americans, and I don’t want the same thing to happen with the next generations. It would be better for both sides to have a scheduled withdrawal. -- MUHAMMAD MAHDI, 28, a Sunni graduate of the College of Arts who now works as a taxi driver in Baghdad

No one accepts the residence of the occupier, but the withdrawal should be studied well and not randomly. Things are getting better now, and we don’t want anything to affect that. The Americans are probably one of the reasons behind the previous chaos, but their quick withdrawal will generate bigger chaos. -- SALIM MUHAMMAD, 40, Najaf

Saying No and Meaning Yes

All of them declare in public that they are against the Americans remaining in Iraq. They demand Iraqi liberation. They always raise the same slogan: Independence for Iraq. But in private sessions or meetings they are always telling me and other reporters that the Americans must stay, and that if they leave right now it would be a big mistake. The reasons for this political hypocrisy are like a disease. Most of the Iraqi politicians suffer from it. Their aim is to maintain their reputation in the public eye. -- TAREQ MAHER, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad

In public we say we do not want American troops, but our hearts say they should stay in Iraq until we become a state of institutions based on democracy and dialogue, not violence. Most of our recent leaders are tiny in the political world and the Americans want to teach them how to be leaders. Really we need them to stay more. They are a fence against Iran’s ambitions toward Iraq. -- AHMED HASOON, 38, a teacher in Basra

Never Mind the Troops, I’m Leaving Iraq

At night in all seasons, especially in summer, it is so very, very hot because we are suffering from electricity shortages and water shortages. So many times I have to buy my baby’s milk from the black market. The American forces have been here for such a long time, and still it is not stable and nothing is sure. Sometimes I feel that I should leave Iraq and claim asylum or refugee status, so that later on I would be lucky enough to get another nationality, which would make me feel respectable and that I have some rights. As an Iraqi now I cannot help my country improve. But maybe later on with a new nationality I would be able to come back and do something. Only then will my voice be heard. -- ANWAR ALI, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad who is seeking asylum in the United States

Reporting was contributed by Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Kirkuk; Riyadh Mohammed, Ali Hameed, Mohamed Hussein and Anwar J. Ali from Baghdad; and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Mosul, Salahuddin Province, Falluja, Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and the Kurdish-administered northern region of Iraq.


* * * *

We will continue to negotiate the terms of our troop drawdown. Hopefully the Iraqis will work with us to make sure that the pace does not risk losing the security gains we have made together.

However, in the end it is their country. When they decide they don't want us there, we will have no choice but to leave.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Wednesday, June 11, 2008

One Day the Iraqis Will Send Us Home


While I was in Baghdad in 2004, I asked an Iraqi civilian if he was glad that Saddam Hussein was gone from the scene and he said, “Oh, yes, thank you..”

When I asked him if he was glad the American and Coalition forces were in his country, he said, “Oh, no…”

Then he added, “But please don’t leave yet…”

One of the biggest screw-ups in the beginning of the Iraq war was the failure of the Bush administration to look deeply into the history of the Arab world, the Shiite-Sunni conflicts and the long-held feelings of the Arab peoples that they didn’t want to be “occupied” by any western military forces.

We must remember that the Crusades were not noble endeavors. The Crusaders waged brutal warfare, leaving a trail of blood and Arab bodies – including men, women and children – as they rampaged throughout the Middle East and they were “terrorists” in their own time. Arabs have a long memory and this one remains quite vivid.

Then the British occupied Arabia during their colonial period, suppressing the Arab culture before finally carving up the Arab lands in what may have seemed a logical fashion, but which ignored many of the cultural needs of the people – such as the Kurdish citizens who were not given their own nation.

We must understand that the day will come when the Iraqi people want to be left alone. When they are comfortable that they possess the ability to take care of themselves, they will surely ask us to leave. They will not want any – repeat any – western military forces permanently occupying any part of their land. To believe otherwise ignores an Arab history that is one of complete distrust of western motives. Can we blame them?

American troops and their Coalition partners have done an amazing job and we have made many friends among the Iraqi people, but even these friends do not want our troops there forever. It is not about the willingness of an American administration to continue operations in Iraq; it is simply about whether or not the Iraqi people want us there. This is the Muslim Arab world which believes it has little in common with western powers.

In the end, the Shiite majority will determine the direction of Iraq. With luck the nation will remain a secular one, with a strong relationship – and hopefully friendship - with the United States. However, it remains likely that radical Shiites – with the help of Iran – will try to seize control of the government at some point after we have been shown the door. Should this happen, there will be nothing we can do about it except offer our help if it is requested - as we would for any of our other allies.

The following article is from McClatchy-Tribune Information Services and was posted on Military.com:

* * * *

US-Iraq Security Deal in Trouble

June 11, 2008
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services

BAGHDAD - A proposed U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that would set the conditions for a defense alliance and long-term U.S. troop presence appears increasingly in trouble, facing growing resistance from the Iraqi government, bipartisan opposition in Congress and strong questioning from Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama.

President Bush is trying to finish the agreement before he leaves office, and senior U.S. officials insist publicly that the negotiations can be completed by a July 31 target date.

But that seems increasing doubtful, and in Baghdad and Washington there is growing speculation that a United Nations mandate for U.S.-led military operations in Iraq may have to be renewed after it expires at the end of 2008.

On Capitol Hill, top Democrats and Republicans complain that Bush is rushing the negotiations to try to tie his successor's hands.

Iraqi lawmakers say the United States has dropped at least one demand and is no longer insisting on complete immunity for private contractors.

Six senators, including the chairmen of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees and their ranking minority members have written Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the past week asking for transparency in the negotiations and more briefings. White House, State Department and Pentagon officials briefed staff members on the talks June 10.

"There's a tremendous amount of concern up here about the state of these negotiations. ... It's been expressed repeatedly," said a senior congressional staffer, who requested anonymity. He noted that their appeared to be growing talk in Iraq of simply extending the U.N. mandate.

A spokesman for Obama, D-Ill., said any long-term U.S. security commitment to Iraq must be subject to Congressional approval; alternatively the administration should seek an extension of the current UN mandate. Obama wants a new administration to make it "absolutely clear that the United States will not maintain permanent bases in Iraq," said spokesman Bill Burton.

Some Iraqi parliamentarians are now saying that Iraq has a third option besides extending the U.N. mandate or agreeing to the proposed Status of Forces Agreement: telling the Americans to go home.

"By December Iraq has to decide what to do," said Sami al-Askari, a Shiite lawmaker who is close to Prime Minister Maliki. "If we are put in a corner...we have three options, not just two." Al-Askari said the U.S. side is "keen to sign it early" but said the U.S. "have to be realistic and deal with the issues that are very sensitive for the Iraqis."

On June 10, Ambassador David Satterfield, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's top advisor on Iraq, told reporters in Baghdad that both the Iraqis and Americans were on track to agree and that the U.S. was respecting Iraq's sovereignty during negotiations.

"We're confident it can be achieved, and by the end of July deadline," Satterfield said. "It's doable, that's where our focus is, not on alternatives...We're focused on plan A because we believe plan A can succeed."

He spoke less than 24 hours after an unnamed senior U.S. official told the Associated Press that the deal may not be completed before Bush leaves office next January. Satterfield bristled when questioned about the "unnamed official" and insisted that the talks were on track for completion July 31.

Iraqi lawmakers say the Bush administration is demanding concessions that are unacceptable, among them: dozens of semi-permanent bases from which U.S. forces can launch missions with no prior consent from Iraq's government; control of Iraq's air space; and no guarantees the United States will defend Iraq against a foreign attack.

The United States has portrayed opposition to the agreement as limited to Iranian officials and followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who opposes the U.S. occupation. But the chorus of rejection is growing.

"There is only one agenda for us-we need foreign troops because our forces are not capable yet to defend Iraq inside and outside of Iraq," al-Askari said. But when Iraq reaches the point it can defend itself, "That's it, no more foreign troops on our soil," he added.

"It seems from the draft (agreement) and from the discussions that the Americans have something else in their mind, for instance fighting al-Qaida or terrorism. That's why they want a free hand in arresting any Iraqi. But the Iraqis say, `no you don't have the free hand'."

In interviews this week, majority Shiite legislators told McClatchy Newspapers that the U.S.-proposed draft agreement is unacceptable and, given the way negotiations are going, they did not see them being complete by July 31.

The majority of Iraqi politicians support some kind of security agreement with the United States and the presence of some U.S. forces, although on their terms.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Iraq's government has reached the point of decision.

"Time is of the essence," he said. "There is a need for a clear political decision... Either the Iraqis want this or they don't want it." Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed a declaration of principles for the accord last November, Zebari noted. "It hasn't come out of a vacuum or out of the blue."

Iraq wants an agreement in which U.S. Soldiers stay on bases outside of the cities; the United States does not control its air space; and acts only if Iraq asks for help.

* * * *

The fact that the Iraqis will one day no longer want us in their country is not a sign that we failed. If their self-sufficiency is accompanied by a strong free-market economy, if they have achieved the ability to defend themselves from aggression and if they have retained the power to determine their own destiny, then we have achieved success.

Regardless of what future they choose in the long run - it is THEIR future.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Mahdi Army Spreads Fear Through Intimidation


A couple of days ago, I posted a piece on Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and the threat it poses to the future of Iraq. The American and Iraqi governments have already paid a heavy price in blood because they failed to deal with the Mahdi Army when it was a much smaller force. The ultimate price has yet to be determined.

Taliban-like threats and intimidation of the Iraqi people will not end any time soon. Muqtada al Sadr has big plans for himself and his militia. Those plans have nothing to do with democracy or the basic rights of man.

* * * *

Washington Post
December 13, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear;
Schoolgirls Told to Wear Scarves, Under Threat of Death


By Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD -- On the first day of class, two male teenagers entered a girls' high school in the Tobji neighborhood, clutching AK-47 assault rifles. The young Shiite fighters handed the principal a handwritten note and ordered her to assemble the students in the courtyard, witnesses said.

"All girls must wear hijab," she read aloud, her voice trembling. "If the girls don't wear hijab, we will close the school or kill the girls."

That October day Sara Mustafa, 14, a secular Sunni Arab, also trembled. The next morning, she covered up with an Islamic head scarf for the first time. The young fighters now controlled her life. "We could not do anything," Sara recalled.

The Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is using a new generation of youths, some as young as 15, to expand and tighten its grip across Baghdad, but the ruthlessness of some of these young fighters is alienating Sunnis and Shiites alike.

The fighters are filling the vacuum of leadership created by a 10-month-old U.S.-led security offensive. Hundreds of senior and mid-level militia members have been arrested, killed or forced into hiding, weakening what was once the second most powerful force in Iraq after the U.S. military. But the militia still rules through fear and intimidation, often under the radar of U.S. troops.

"JAM is alive and well in Tobji, although they have gotten younger, like in many other areas," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, using a military acronym derived from the militia's name in Arabic. For much of this year, his soldiers operated in Tobji.

The rise of this new generation is a reflection of the Mahdi Army's deep infiltration of society and could presage a turbulent resurgence of the militia as the U.S. military reduces troop levels. The emergence also highlights the struggle Sadr faces in his quest to control the capital and lead Iraq.

In late August, the 34-year-old cleric declared a freeze in operations, in part to exert more authority over his unruly, decentralized militia. Many followers stood down, so much that U.S. commanders give Sadr some credit for a downturn in violence this year. But some militia leaders have ignored Sadr's freeze, and their young, power-hungry foot soldiers may ultimately undermine the cleric's popular appeal.

"We have to show people we are not weak," said Ali, a 19-year-old Mahdi Army fighter in Tobji.

'I Was in Control. I Ruled'

Two years ago, Ali was unemployed. He recalled that he idolized his older cousins who were veteran Mahdi Army fighters. Like them, he was born and raised in Tobji, a wisp of a neighborhood in north-central Baghdad where every neighbor knows the other. Its official name is Salaam, or peace.

Ali and his cousins once befriended Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. But after the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra, sectarian violence shattered Tobji's tribal and social bonds. Suddenly sect was all that mattered to Ali, and the militia became his new family. He was 17.

Abu Sajjad, a 44-year-old former Mahdi Army fighter, remembered seeing a rise in disaffected, jobless recruits at the time. "They were nothing before they joined the Mahdi Army," said Abu Sajjad, who asked to be called by his nickname to protect his security. "The Mahdi Army will protect them better than their tribes or their families."

Older fighters quickly indoctrinated Ali. "They are Sunnis. We are Shia. They are not going to kick us out of Tobji," Ali recalled them saying.

Ali, tall and slim with wavy black hair, spoke on condition that his full name not be used, fearing arrest by U.S. forces and retaliation by the militia. He is trying to leave the militia and has joined the Iraqi army, which he keeps secret from his comrades. In separate interviews, Sunni and Shiite residents said that Ali was a well-known Mahdi Army member involved in several attacks.

Initially, Ali was assigned to a militia checkpoint. He searched cars and demanded that drivers give their tribal names, so he could determine their sect. "I was a teenager. I was in control. I ruled," said Ali, who during a four-hour interview wore a brown sweater and, like many Shiites, a silver ring on his left pinky. "If I told any car to stop, it would stop."

At the local Sadr office, recruits were given lessons in Shiite religion and Mahdi Army ideology, which centered on Shiite supremacy. The recruits were ordered to inform on anyone suspicious or breaking Islamic codes.

"They can convince anybody," Ali said. "If they tell you that your father is a bad man, you will be more than happy to kill your father."

Ali also worked in a barbershop. When customers discussed their lives, he took mental notes and later reported what he had heard to the Sadr office.

Four months after he joined, Ali fought his first street battle. He fired a rocket-propelled grenade into the house of a member of a Sunni tribe called the Egheidat, killing him. Ali said he felt remorse, which vanished as smiling, older fighters hugged him.

"You are a hero," one of them told Ali. "The rocket saved our lives."

Two Egheidat leaders, including Mustafa Salih, Sara's father, said that Ali was known to have fired RPGs during the battle, but they were unsure if he had killed anyone.

Mahdi Army commanders punished young fighters for disobeying orders. Offenders were taken to a room inside the Sadr office, filled with steel cables, whips and slabs of iron, where they were tortured. Ali said it was called "The Happiness Room."

Murder and Protection

On the streets of Tobji one recent day, clusters of girls headed to school in their uniforms, all wearing the hijab. The portrait of a serene Haider Hamrani, a 17-year-old militia fighter shot dead by U.S. forces, stared out from a billboard.

Young men with cellphones circled the neighborhood, which was plastered with images of Sadr. They drove mopeds on side streets or gathered on corners. Some wore jeans, others baseball caps, blending into the landscape. They were the early warning system, keeping watch for strangers and U.S. patrols.

"No one will suspect they are Mahdi Army," Ali said.

Today, more than half the militia here is under age 20, said Ali and another young fighter named Mahmoud. The new generation is heavily involved in the militia's income-generating schemes. They sell the cars of kidnap victims and rent out the houses of displaced Sunnis. The militia also demands payments from generator men supplying electricity. Each month, youths collect 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or about $4, in protection money from every household.

"The more flagrant, younger crowd tends to focus on organized crime and lining their pockets with cash," said Miska, the U.S. officer.

Many young militiamen appear to have become ruthless murderers, replacing older fighters who have been captured or gone underground. Ali said he took part in four killings, all of neighbors. After Ali informed the Sadr office that his childhood friend Wissam had joined the Iraqi army, several young militia members abducted him and his mother. First they shot Wissam. When his mother kneeled over his body, screaming and in tears, they shot her in the head, Ali and Mahmoud said.

Another neighbor, a divorced woman, was killed after Ali mentioned that he had heard on the street that she was a prostitute -- a crime in the view of the militia -- although he had no proof. One of her assassins, Ali said, was a 17-year-old named Saad, who had joined at age 15.

When young fighters are told to kill someone, Ali said, "they will kill that person the next day without hesitation."

Nearby, in the living room of his narrow two-story home, Abu Ali Hassan, a 42-year-old Sunni, has hung a portrait of Imam Ali, one of Shiite Islam's most revered figures, in case militia fighters visit. Each month, he hands them the 5,000 dinars, which he calls "extortion money."

He's noticed that older fighters have all but vanished. "They are running the neighborhood through these kids," said Hassan, a Transportation Ministry employee.

Like many areas in Baghdad, Tobji has experienced a decline in violent attacks. But most Sunnis who fled have yet to return, community leaders said. Those who remain live under constant fear that they are being monitored. This year, the militia started to deploy women as spies, Ali and other residents said.

Desperate, Hassan has befriended a few young militiamen on his street. "God forbid, if anything happens to me tomorrow, they will be useful to me," he said. "Now, they are the supreme power in our neighborhood."

Shiites as Victims

Increasingly, the militia's victims are Shiites.

Tobji's Shiite head of the local council, Abu Hussein Kamil, and another official were assassinated in August. Kamil, Ali said, had not given jobs to relatives of the militiamen and was suspected of collaborating with U.S. forces. "He was hurting his own people," Ali said.

In June, several young fighters tortured and killed a Shiite generator man because he would not give additional electricity to the house of a militia member, his family and neighbors said. "They call themselves the Mahdi Army, but they act like a gang," said Majid al-Zubaidi, 28, the man's brother. "They just want to show they are in control of everything. They want people to fear them."

"Now, both Sunni and Shia are upset with the Mahdi Army," Zubaidi said.

Abu Sajjad, the veteran fighter, said many older militiamen are also angry. The youths are tarnishing the militia's image as guardians of Shiites, he said. One day, he witnessed two young fighters on a moped drive up to a car and fatally shoot the driver, a Shiite who had publicly criticized Sadr. Abu Sajjad urged the Sadr office to punish the assailants, but nothing happened, he said.

The leaders of the office protect the shebab, as the young men are called in Arabic, Abu Sajjad said. "The shebab are their eyes in the neighborhood and are following their orders."

On another day, a 17-year-old fighter went to the Sadr office and complained that his parents had ordered him to leave the militia. The office threatened the family, said Abu Sajjad, who knows the teenager and his family.

The U.S. military has exploited this generational rift and the anger of residents, Miska said. His troops paid informers for tips that often led to raids and arrests. But some community leaders complained that the American military had also targeted moderate leaders who brought some discipline to the militia.

"It's hard to believe they can't distinguish between the good people and bad people," said Ali Khadim, 44, a prominent Shiite tribal leader. U.S. troops, he said, recently raided his own house, where his elderly parents live.

Schoolchildren 'Seduced'

Down the street from the Sadr office, the tan wall of a secondary school was covered with posters of Sadr and Imam Ali. A long black banner commemorated a Shiite holiday, as women covered in head-to-ankle abayas seemed to float by.

Inside some of Tobji's schools, young militiamen have pressured teachers to disclose exam answers and give high grades to relatives of Mahdi Army fighters. They have ordered them to give Shiite religious lessons to students, including Sunnis, according to teachers and parents.

"They have turned the schools into their safe houses," said Fadhil Hassan, who teaches at a school in Tobji that he asked not be named, fearing retaliation. A young fighter wanted by U.S. forces shows up every day, Hassan said, and sometimes hits students on the head or shoulder with a stick, separating Sunnis from Shiites.

Now, students with problems are also turning to the Mahdi Army, he added, and looking up to militiamen as role models.

"They are seduced by these young fighters," Abu Sajjad said. "When children get power and pistols, this is their biggest dream come true." By infiltrating the schools, he added, the fighters have found the most effective means of controlling Tobji. "Families will be terrified through their kids."

Following the arrests of Mahdi Army commanders, Tobji's tribes are trying to reassert themselves. But ancient rules built on honor and respect hold little sway over the new generation.

Khadim, the Shiite tribal leader, has tried to persuade several young fighters to leave. Only one did, he said.

Ali is trying to quit. He's in love with a Sunni woman from the neighborhood. If the militiamen learn of this, he fears he will be killed, he said.

Worried about his future, Mustafa Salih has added his name to a list of Sunnis keen to launch a sahwa -- or "awakening" -- protection force, like those the U.S. military has funded in other areas. The tipping point came when he saw his daughter, Sara, rush home from school in October, upset that she had to wear a hijab.

"Why plant extremist ideas in children?" Salih asked bitterly.

Today, Sara's head scarf has become a metaphor for the militia's grip on her neighborhood. "It feels like someone is choking me," she said.

* * * *

Remember that Muqtada al Sadr already controls a large percentage of the seats in the new Iraqi Parliament, giving his Iranian sponsors the eyes and ears they need to plan their own vision for the future of Iraq.

In reality, al Sadr and his militia are the "resident evil" of Baghdad and just as dangerous as the foreign terrorists or the Sunni insurgency.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

The Mahdi Army - Iran's Surrogate in Iraq


There will come a day when the United States largely pulls out of Iraq at the request of that nation’s leaders. If our goals are met, then a multi-party Iraqi government will be able to defend itself from outside aggressors and provide a stable, democratic environment that will protect the interests of all the various political factions.

One of the largest wild cards in the future of Iraq will remain Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a Hezbollah-like militia that has opposed the American and Coalition presence since day one. When I was in Iraq in 2004, the Mahdi Army was already building its relationship with Iran and this militia became a force to be reckoned with. Many Americans died during al Sadr’s uprisings that year.

Al Sadr’s opposition seems surprising since we liberated Iraq’s Shiites from decades of oppression under Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, such opposition isn’t surprising when we realize that Iraq’s most radical Shiites are simply an extension of the Iranian fundamentalist leaders who are the sworn enemies of America.

With Shiites comprising some 60% of the Iraqi population, this majority will surely lead the way toward the future of Iraq – whatever kind of future that may be.

This article from today’s Christian Science Monitor talks about the Mahdi Army of 2007. The above photo is Muqtada al Sadr:

* * * *

Christian Science Monitor
December 11, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Sadr Uses Lull To Rebuild Army

By Sam Dagher, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

KARBALA, IRAQ -- For more than three months, the Mahdi Army has been largely silent. The potent, black-clad Iraqi Shiite force put down its guns in late August at the behest of Moqtada al-Sadr.

The move has bolstered improved security in Baghdad, even though the US says some Mahdi Army splinter groups that it calls "criminals" or "extremists" have not heeded Mr. Sadr's freeze.

Away from public view, however, Sadr's top aides say the anti-American cleric is anything but idle. Instead, he is orchestrating a revival among his army of loyalists entrenched in Baghdad and Shiite enclaves to the south - from the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf to the economic hub of Basra. What is in the making, they say, is a better-trained and leaner force free of rogue elements accused of atrocities and crimes during the height of the sectarian war last year.

Many analysts say what may reemerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon's Hizbullah - a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region.

"He is now in the process of reconstituting the [Mahdi] Army and removing all the bad people that committed mistakes and those that sullied its reputation. There will be a whole new structure and dozens of conditions for membership," says Sheikh Abdul-Hadi al-Mahamadawi, a turbaned cleric who commands Sadr's operation in Karbala.

Sheikh Mahamadawi says each fighter would have to be vouched for by fellow fighters in good standing and would have to undergo a series of physical and character tests. "He must have high morals, strong faith, and above all, be obedient."

Sadr is also said to have created a special force called the "golden one" to cleanse the ranks of the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al-Mahdi in Arabic, from unwanted members, according to militia and police sources.

One Mahdi Army fighter, who did not wish to be named, says safe houses have been rented in Najaf for senior militiamen from neighboring Diwaniyah, where a joint Iraqi-US crackdown on the militia has been under way for months.

He says militiamen are spending their time carrying out good deeds like giving blood and sweeping streets to endear themselves again to the masses. The name of the Mahdi Army has, in many areas, become associated with killings, kidnappings, and extortion.

During the freeze, he says, he continues to be in contact with members of his unit but has returned to his day job as a hotel receptionist in Najaf, where he awaits instructions from his commanders. "There is just bound to be another war as long as the occupation remains. Our main enemy is America."

The Mahdi Army's next phase

In recent weeks, Sadrists - many dressed in black and donning white cloaks to symbolize martyrdom - have marched in Baghdad and the south. The largest rally took place in Najaf on Nov. 15, when tens of thousands of militiamen were bused in from all over Iraq to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the killing of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, their spiritual leader and Sadr's father.

They paraded through Najaf's Valley of Peace cemetery, which was the scene of some of the worst fighting between the militia and the US in 2004. Celebrants flashed victory signs and shouted anti-American slogans. Those attending received a CD showing footage of purported roadside bombings planted by the militia against US forces and militiamen in training.

Mothers of Mahdi Army fighters killed since 2004 wept in a special section of the cemetery reserved for them. Like the Hizbullah cemeteries in Lebanon, hundreds of tombstones were festooned with artificial flowers and billboards praising the heroics of the so-called martyrs.

As for Sadr's intent, his spokesman in Najaf, Salah al-Obeidi, says: "We have new visions for what the Mahdi Army will do in the next phase."

Mr. Obeidi explains that most Shiite parties have embraced the political process wholeheartedly and accept the presence of US forces, while the Sadrists, who continue to oppose it, need to keep their Army as a "national resistance force."

In his latest statement last week, Sadr said: "I tell the evil Bush, leave our land, we do not need you or your armies.... I tell the occupiers ... you have your democracy and we have our Islam; get out of our land."

And using language that could have been torn right out of the fiery speeches of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, he urged the Mahdi Army to continue to abide by his freeze order for now.

The cleric warned the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against extending the mandate of US-led multinational forces. He blasted Mr. Maliki's Dawa Party and its allies, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) and the Badr Organization, for targeting Sadrists. And he chided Iraqi security forces, many of them beholden to ISCI and Badr, for taking part in those anti-Sadrist operations.

The early history of Hizbullah, too, involved bloody internal fighting with a rival Shiite group and training by Iran before it became a skilled guerrilla group.

"Iran is definitely interested in having its own proxy political and military force in Iraq, just like Lebanon. Iran may try to wait a bit now to see who will emerge as the more dominant force," says Riad al-Kahwaji, a Dubai-based military expert on Iran. "All the indications so far are that [Iran] has invested a great deal in the Mahdi Army."

But, he adds, "it has been a bumpy start. The Mahdi Army is far from being the organized fighting machine like Hizbullah."

Shiite rivals do battle

The Mahdi Army freeze grew out of fierce battles in late August between ISCI and its affiliate, Badr, both headed by Sadr's archnemesis Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, in Karbala. In two days of fighting, more than 50 people were killed at the city's shrines during an important pilgrimage. The outside wall of the revered Imam Hussein mausoleum still bears the scars of the fighting.

Video footage of the clashes provided by Sadr's aides in Karbala shows black-clad men loyal to the cleric taunting guards, who are largely made up of Badr partisans, and then hurling shoes at them for refusing them entry into the shrine. Later, these guards are seen firing directly at throngs of pilgrims.

Mr. Maliki himself came down to Karbala at the time and gave police chief Brig. Gen. Raed Shaker, carte blanche to go after the Mahdi Army.

About 500 people were arrested at the time, including several provincial council members loyal to Sadr. General Shaker also declared publicly that the Mahdi Army was responsible for the assassination of at least 400 people in Karbala since 2004.

"These are only the bodies that we found," he said in an interview. "This is all documented. I am not doing this for any political agenda."

Umm Bassem says the Mahdi Army killed her son Bassem Hassoun, an Iraqi Army officer. She says they crippled her second son, Haidar.

"It's the fault of Sayyed [honorific] Moqtada; he encouraged them and armed them," says a tearful Umm Bassem, a nickname that means "mother of Bassem," as she clutches a portrait of her late son.

Mahamadawi, Sadr's aide in Karbala, says there may have been bad apples in the ranks of the Mahdi Army.

"We are not saying they are all angels, they are humans that can make mistakes; we have punished some and kicked out others," he says, adding that there is an intent by the government to sully the image of the Mahdi Army and finish it off. He also accuses the Karbala police of committing unspeakable crimes against the Sadrists including the killing of two children of a wanted militiaman in October and the torture of prisoners.

The assault on Sadr supporters

Anger against the police force, mixed with vows of revenge, reigns among the Daoum tribe in their village fiefdom on the outskirts of Karbala. Sixty-five of their members were among those arrested in the aftermath of the August events.

Muhammad Miri, who has been released since, lifts up his shirt to show scars on his back from what he says are from torture with wire cables. He says at least 22 prisoners were also sexually abused by police interrogators.

A police officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, says his claims are true. Widely circulated video footage also shows Hamid Ganoush, a Sadrist provincial council member, blindfolded and on his knees as he is being hit on the head with a shoe by interrogators who press him on the whereabouts of Ali Shria, a Karbala Mahdi Army leader, believed to be in Iran now.

The risk now is that these ever-deepening intra-Shiite feuds may also take on a tribal aspect.

A Baghdad-based US Department of Defense intelligence analyst, who tracks the Mahdi Army and who spoke on condition of anonymity, says intra-Shiite feuds in Iraq have always managed to sort themselves out, adding that he believes Sadr will maintain his freeze despite the rhetoric, as his paramount concern is political survival.

"It's working well. It's serving Sadr's interest well because it's solidifying his position as the clear leader ... and satisfying our desires to eliminate rogue criminal elements," he says. "I am not seeing any evidence that there is [a danger] that this is going to unravel."

Echoing recent remarks by top US military officials, he says that while there has been a decrease in roadside bombs - using Iranian armor-piercing explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) - against US troops, the militia's rogue elements still operate.

He blames recent bombings in Baghdad and mortar attacks on the Green Zone on Thanksgiving Day on these rogue elements. He also says a "massive" cache of Iranian-made arms was found in Diwaniyah recently, and on Dec. 1 a dealer of Iranian weapons was arrested in the city of Nasiriyah in southern Iraq.

"The guy was a major mover of lethal aid in his area," he says.

Some of these so-called rogue groups have also been blamed for the kidnapping of five Britons in May from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad. A group calling itself the "The Islamic Shiite Resistance in Iraq" released video footage of one of the hostages on Dec. 4 accompanied with a written statement demanding British troops leave Basra within 10 days.

Britain has pulled out from inside the city in September and now has only 4,500 soldiers left at an air base outside the city. The pullout of the bulk of this force is expected soon, leaving the Mahdi Army as the strongest armed group among its rivals in Basra.

Top US officials in Iraq have made no secret of their concern over Iranian plans to turn the Mahdi Army into another Hizbullah-like organization, pointing to their capture of a Hizbullah operative in March in Basra.

"His sole purpose in life was to come to Iraq to try to make JAM [Jaish al-Mahdi] a mirror image of Hizbullah," the Defense analyst says.

A senior official in Sadr's rival party, the ISCI, which is very close to the Iranian government, says Mr. Hakim received assurances from Iran at the highest level that they would rein in the hard-line factions within the Islamic Republic who might be supporting Sadr's militia.

"The events in Karbala embarrassed the Iranians," says the official, who requested anonymity, referring to the sanctity of the shrines to Shiite Iran. "There is a nationalist current in Iran, though, that does not want to see stability in Iraq ... this keeps us worried."

The Sadrists have long distanced themselves from Iran publicly and sought to portray themselves more as Arab nationalists.

Sadr's spokesman Obeidi says while the movement admires Iranian-backed Hizbullah, the Mahdi Army is different.

He says the US military and the Mahdi Army's Shiite rivals are trying hard to force the dismantling of Sadr's militia forming tribal councils across the Shiite south, much like the Americans did in Sunni parts of the country to combat Al Qaeda.

But, the spokesman says, this strategy isn't going to work in the south, where many of the tribesmen's sons are Mahdi fighters.

* * * *

Keep watching the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al Sadr and their partnership with Iran. When it comes to such Islamic fundamentalist relationships, all we can do is watch, wait and keep our weapons at hand.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

With Al Qaeda Safe Havens, What Do They Expect?


"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) on guerrilla warfare


The following article in today’s New York Times emphasizes once again that the Al Qaeda problem will never go away as long as the terrorists have safe havens in which to recruit, train and equip new “holy warriors”.

Our troops did a magnificent job in routing the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, our self-imposed and “politically correct” rules of engagement have now put us on the defense, trapped within the borders of that country.

We won’t enter the tribal regions of Pakistan to squash the Al Qaeda bases, but the enemy continues to make its own rules. Their leaders are free to casually sip tea, read the Quran and plan their next terror attacks in safety.

The initiative belongs to them…

* * * *

New York Times
December 4, 2007

U.S. Senses A Rise In Activity By Al Qaeda In Afghanistan

By Thom Shanker

KABUL, Afghanistan, Dec. 3 — American military and intelligence officials are detecting early signs that Al Qaeda may be increasing its activities in Afghanistan, perhaps even seeking to return to its former base of operations, a senior Defense Department official said Monday.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates arrived in Kabul late Monday for meetings with government leaders and military commanders to discuss how to speed economic and political development at a time of increasing violence.

The senior Defense Department official, aboard Mr. Gates’s plane, said, “We are seeing early indicators that there may be some stepped-up activity by Al Qaeda.” No details were offered.

The official cautioned, “It’s pretty hard to pull trends out of a few indications,” but added that even tentative evidence of increased Qaeda activity in Afghanistan “is something we are concerned with.”

The official spoke on standard rules of anonymity to discuss intelligence on Al Qaeda and Mr. Gates’s agenda before the secretary’s third trip to Afghanistan during his first year in office.

Mr. Gates, in brief comments before landing in Kabul, said he was interested in how combat operations could be better woven into a “comprehensive development strategy” to include accelerated economic and political development.

“One of the clear concerns we all have is that in the last two or three years there has been an increase in the overall level of violence,” Mr. Gates said, adding that the rise in attacks and bombings was notable in southern Afghanistan, which had served as the Taliban’s spiritual base.

“I am not worried about a backslide as much as I am about how we continue the momentum going forward,” he added.

Officials said Mr. Gates also planned to assess whether the recent political turmoil in neighboring Pakistan had given greater freedom of movement to Taliban and Qaeda forces in tribal areas along the Afghan border.

Pentagon and military officials said the higher number of attacks and roadside bombings could be attributed to increased money for the insurgency from foreign sources and profits from domestic poppy production. The officials also attribute the increase in violence to the sanctuary provided in tribal areas of Pakistan that has allowed the Taliban and Al Qaeda to regroup.

Mr. Gates spent most of Monday in Djibouti, in eastern Africa, to inspect one of the most unusual missions in the American military. The operation, called Task Force Horn of Africa, has not captured or killed a single terrorist or foreign fighter, yet it is viewed by Pentagon officials as a model military deployment.

The task force’s mission is to apply the “soft power” Mr. Gates advocated in a Nov. 26 speech at Kansas State University, when he said American counterterrorism efforts required not only combat operations, but also a broader range of economic development and diplomacy.

American combat personnel in Djibouti train regional armed forces to strengthen their own counterterrorism abilities. Combat engineers build schools and hospitals and dig wells in an effort to promote stability and prevent terrorists from taking root.

In his first trip to Djibouti, Mr. Gates visited Camp Lemonier, a former French Foreign Legion compound that is home to the 2,000 troops in the task force and support missions. The operation is already shaping the way the Pentagon will organize its efforts in coming years.

The American military is organizing a new Africa Command, the first American combatant command dedicated solely to Africa. The lessons learned from the operation in Djibouti will shape the command’s emphasis on defense as well as on diplomacy and development, according to senior Pentagon officials.

The mission was first devised to trap terrorists expected to flee Afghanistan along traditional smugglers’ routes down the Persian Gulf, into the Arabian Sea and past the Horn of Africa.

But the overlapping ground, maritime and air patrols across the region appear to have deterred the use of that route.

American intelligence and military officers say Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to move through the region, with small numbers believed to be operating in ungoverned parts of Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen.

* * * *

The only path to victory in war is to turn the enemy’s offense into the enemy’s defense. As long as we remain on the defense in any war, we are simply reacting to the enemy’s tactics and he is the one who chooses when and where the next battles will be fought.

Such is the nature of guerrilla war…

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Thursday, November 15, 2007

Can the Sunnis and Shiites Ever Reconcile?


America’s soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have done a magnificent job of removing Saddam Hussein and creating an atmosphere in which the new Iraqi government can take advantage of its freedom. With cooperation, decisive action and a spirit of reconciliation, Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds can build a prosperous nation of the kind never seen before in the Middle East.

The problem is that the Shiite-dominated government still won’t reach out to the Sunnis because they represent the party of Saddam Hussein. The Sunni minority ruled over Iraq – and the Shiites – with an iron hand. Now that the Shiite majority has the power, they fear sharing any of that power with the Sunnis. (Above picture shows me with some Shiite security guards in Baghdad's Green Zone in 2004.)

Unless the people of Iraq try to put their past behind them for the sake of all their people, there will be little the Americans or the Coalition can do to prevent a catastrophe. Our presence alone will not fix Iraq. Only Iraqis can ultimately build their own nation.

As the article below says, there is now a window of opportunity for the Iraqis to move ahead, to improve the daily lives of all their people, to create a rich future for an ancient land and to learn to live together in peace and brotherhood.

If thousand-year-old feuds and hatreds cannot be quelled, then America will soon face some hard decisions. We can’t do everything for the Iraqis. We’ve opened the door to freedom and prosperity, but they must accept the ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of the new Iraq.

* * * *

Washington Post
November 15, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say
Amid Relative Calm, Government Is Urged to Reach Out to Opponents

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

CAMP LIBERTY, Iraq -- Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al-Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.

In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government's failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but "it's unclear how long that window is going to be open."

The lack of political progress calls into question the core rationale behind the troop buildup President Bush announced in January, which was premised on the notion that improved security would create space for Iraqis to arrive at new power-sharing arrangements. And what if there is no such breakthrough by next summer? "If that doesn't happen," Odierno said, "we're going to have to review our strategy."

Brig. Gen. John F. Campbell, deputy commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, complained last week that Iraqi politicians appear out of touch with everyday citizens. "The ministers, they don't get out," he said. "They don't know what the hell is going on on the ground." Campbell noted approvingly that Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, the top Iraqi commander in the Baghdad security offensive, lately has begun escorting cabinet officials involved in health, housing, oil and other issues out of the Green Zone to show them, as Campbell put it, "Hey, I got the security, bring in the [expletive] essential services."

Indeed, some U.S. Army officers now talk more sympathetically about former insurgents than they do about their ostensible allies in the Shiite-led central government. "It is painful, very painful," dealing with the obstructionism of Iraqi officials, said Army Lt. Col. Mark Fetter. As for the Sunni fighters who for years bombed and shot U.S. soldiers and now want to join the police, Fetter shrugged. "They have got to eat," he said over lunch in the 1st Cavalry Division's mess hall here. "There are so many we've detained and interrogated, they did what they did for money."

The best promise for breaking the deadlock would be holding provincial elections, officers said -- though they recognize that elections could turn bloody and turbulent, undercutting the fragile stability they now see developing in Iraq.

"The tipping point that I've been looking for as an intel officer, we are there," said one Army officer here who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of his position. "The GOI [government of Iraq] and ISF [Iraqi security forces] are at the point where they can make it or break it."

The latest news of declining violence comes as the U.S. troop contingent in Iraq has reached an all-time high. This week, the U.S. troop number will hit 175,000 -- the largest presence so far in the 4 1/2 -year war -- as units that are rotating in and out overlap briefly. But those numbers are scheduled to come down rapidly over the next several months, which will place an increasing burden on Iraqi security forces and an Iraqi government that has yet to demonstrate it is up to the challenge, senior military officials said.

Indeed, after years of seizing on every positive development and complaining that the good news wasn't being adequately conveyed, American military officials now warn against excessive optimism. "It's never as bad as it was, and it's not as good as it's being reported now," said Army Maj. Gen. Michael Barbero, chief of strategic operations for U.S. forces in Iraq.

On the diplomatic side of the Iraq equation, U.S. officials said they realize time is short. "We've got six months because the military is leaving," said one official. But this official and others expressed irritation with the military's negativity toward the Iraqi government -- which they interpret as blaming the State Department for not speeding reconciliation.

"That's their out," the official said of the military. "It's convenient, and I know plenty of them have been helping that story around."

Diplomatic officials, none of whom were authorized to speak on the record, insisted that progress is being made, even if it lags behind military successes. They highlighted two key elements needed for political reconciliation in Iraq, one domestic and one external. Internally, sectarian politicians remain deadlocked on a range of issues. Shiite political groups are holding back as they vie for national power and control over resources, while the majority Shiite population fears that the Sunnis hope to recapture the dominance they held under Saddam Hussein.

In recent weeks, U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker has focused on external forces, hoping to persuade neighboring Sunni Arab governments to increase their official presence in Iraq -- no Arab government currently has an embassy in Baghdad -- to boost the confidence of Iraqi Sunnis.

Late last month, Crocker traveled to virtually every nearby Arab country except Syria and Saudi Arabia. His message, one official said, was "Look, you have got to get behind this because you've got to do everything you can to give all sides confidence."

The U.S. military approach in Iraq this year has focused on striking deals with Sunni insurgents, under which they stop fighting the Americans and instead protect their own neighborhoods. So far about 70,000 such volunteers have been enrolled -- a trend that makes the Shiite-led central government nervous, especially as the movement gets closer to Baghdad.

Indeed, all the U.S. military officials interviewed said their most pressing concern is that the Sunnis will sour if the Iraqi government doesn't begin to reciprocate their peace overtures. "The Sunnis have shown great patience," said Campbell. "You don't want the Sunnis that are working with you . . . to go back to the dark side."

The Army officer who requested anonymity said that if the Iraqi government doesn't reach out, then for former Sunni insurgents "it's game on -- they're back to attacking again."

The year-long progress in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq could carry a downside: Maj. Mark Brady, who works on reconciliation issues, noted that a Sunni leader told him: "As soon as we finish with al-Qaeda, we start with the Shiite extremists." Talk like that is sharply discouraged, Brady noted as he walked across the dusty ground of Camp Liberty, on the western fringes of Baghdad.

But not all agreed that the Sunnis would take up arms. "I don't think going back to violence is in the cards," said Barbero. Rather, he predicted that if they give up on reaching an accommodation, they will resort to new political actions. One possibility mentioned by other officials is a symbolic Sunni move to secede from Iraq.

Also, some outside experts contend that U.S. officials still don't grasp how their empowerment of militias under the bottom-up model of reconciliation is helping tear apart Iraq. Marc Lynch, a George Washington University expert on the Middle East, argued recently on his blog, Abu Aardvark, that partly because of U.S. political tactics in Iraq, the country is drifting "towards a warlord state, along a Basra model, with power devolved to local militias, gangs, tribes, and power-brokers, with a purely nominal central state."

Officials identified other potential problems flowing from reductions in violence. Military planners already worry that if security continues to improve, many of the 2 million Iraqis who fled the country will return. Those who left are overwhelmingly Sunni, and many of their old houses are occupied by Shiites. How would the Shiite-dominated Iraqi army and police handle the likely friction? "Displaced people is a major flashpoint" to worry about in 2008, said Fetter.

The answer to many of Iraq's problems, several military officials said, would be to hold provincial elections, which they said would inject new blood into Iraq's political life and also better link the Baghdad government to the people. The question under debate is whether to hold them sooner, while the U.S. military still has available its five "surge" brigades, or hold them later and let Iraqis enjoy their growing sense of safety -- even though a smaller U.S. military would have less flexibility. "Some areas, you need them right now, to get people into the government," said Campbell. "But the other side of me says, let it settle in, let security develop, let people see some services." Later rather than sooner is especially appealing because the election campaigns are expected to turn violent.

But the longer the provincial balloting is put off, the more likely the current political stalemate will continue. Also, if the elections are postponed until, say, the fall of next year, they will be held on the eve of a U.S. presidential vote in which the Iraq war promises to be a major issue, military planners here note.

So, how to force political change in Iraq without destabilizing the country further? "I pity the guy who has to reconcile that tension," said Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, the chief of planning for U.S. military operations in Baghdad, whose tour of duty ends next month.

Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Washington contributed to this report.

* * * *

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Saturday, July 7, 2007

“Never, never, never, never, never give up.” Sir Winston Churchill


“We regard Iraq’s success to be our success.
And, God forbid, Iraq’s failure will also be ours.”

Zalmay Khalilzad, then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq on February 20, 2005


I still remember the faces and the voices of the Iraqi men, women and children I met in 2004. When my team and I left to come home, some of those Iraqis who became our friends cried real tears. I was going home to my family and to safety. They were remaining in a life filled with uncertainty and fear. (Above photo of me and some Iraqi school kids courtesy of Captain Matt Pedersen.)

Needless to say, some of that survivor’s guilt remains and it probably always will. Now that I’m close to entering my last year in the Army, it’s unlikely I’ll go back to Iraq. Because just knowing an American can be deadly, I can’t even try to contact these friends who may or may not be alive.

In the modern world of instant gratification and self-absorption, we sometimes can’t see the forest for the trees. There is an inherent goodness in the vast majority of the Iraqi people and it’s sad that our political leaders and even our military leaders seem to be moving toward an end-game in this war. The need of many of our people to “get past” the war or “move on” to more “pleasant” subjects means that we may very well leave Iraq before the job is done.

During the American Revolution, only a few million people lived in the colonies. I once read a history book that said the largest the Continental Army ever became was only about 30,000 soldiers. The vast majority of the patriot warriors’ fellow citizens either supported them quietly or remained publicly neutral because of fear. Some continued to support the enemy.

The people in Iraq have a history much longer than ours, so we can imagine how hard it must be for them. It’s not surprising that they are constantly terrified of the brutal insurgent enemy even as they try to squeeze a living out of that war-torn country.

Yes, the various political factions should try harder to work together – the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds. Yet the citizens themselves don’t always find that there’s such a great difference. There are Sunnis married to Shiites and a great many Iraqis would be very happy to live in a secular country where everyone could just get along, raise their families and enjoy life.

The Iraqis will hopefully get that chance – if we don’t leave that nation to fall into a protracted civil war from which another dictator will surely arise. The leading candidates for such a dictatorship are probably among the Shiite religious leaders. That’s right – Iran, Jr.

Our service men and women have done a remarkable job in Iraq. They have sown the American spirit among the Iraqi people and they have spread good will everywhere they went. Sadly, many have given their lives in the process.

It could only be “intellectual arrogance” that led some of our leaders to believe we could conquer a nation of 25 million people, remove their government, their soldiers and their cops, and then solve all the problems with only 140,000 troops. Our own soldiers always knew there was a better way. Although the politicians have admitted their errors, it may or may not be too late.

As I help send more soldiers to the war zones, I am filled with confidence in their capabilities, their determination and their sense of duty. They believe in their missions and they are patriots as great as those who won our freedom over two hundred years ago.

Unfortunately, their ultimate success will depend in large part on a bunch of political animals in the halls of Congress. This is where the Vietnam analogy might play out and our warriors could be withdrawn before the job is done. I hope this is not the case.

General Douglas MacArthur may have said it best: “It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it.”

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com