Stratfor: "Iraq Endgame is Near"

The article below is from Stratfor.com. (The above photo of an Iraqi soldier is from www.michaelyon-online.com):

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Iraq Endgame

by George Friedman
August 18, 2009

Though the Iraq war is certainly not over, it has reached a crossroads. During the course of the war, about 40 countries sent troops to fight in what was called “Multi-National Force-Iraq.” As of this summer, only one foreign country’s fighting forces remain in Iraq — those of the United States. A name change in January 2010 will reflect the new reality, when the term “Multi-National Force-Iraq” will be changed to “United States Forces-Iraq.” If there is an endgame in Iraq, we are now in it.

The plan that U.S. President Barack Obama inherited from former President George W. Bush called for coalition forces to help create a viable Iraqi national military and security force that would maintain the Baghdad government’s authority and Iraq’s territorial cohesion and integrity. In the meantime, the major factions in Iraq would devise a regime in which all factions would participate and be satisfied that their factional interests were protected. While this was going on, the United States would systematically reduce its presence in Iraq until around the summer of 2010, when the last U.S. forces would leave.

Two provisos qualified this plan. The first was that the plan depended on the reality on the ground for its timeline. The second was the possibility that some residual force would remain in Iraq to guarantee the agreements made between factions, until they matured and solidified into a self-sustaining regime. Aside from minor tinkering with the timeline, the Obama administration — guided by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whom Bush appointed and Obama retained — has followed the Bush plan faithfully.

The moment of truth for the U.S. plan is now approaching. The United States still has substantial forces in Iraq. There is a coalition government in Baghdad dominated by Shia (a reasonable situation, since the Shia comprise the largest segment of the population of Iraq). Iraqi security forces are far from world-class, and will continue to struggle in asserting themselves in Iraq. As we move into the endgame, internal and external forces are re-examining power-sharing deals, with some trying to disrupt the entire process.

There are two foci for this disruption. The first concerns the Arab-Kurdish struggle over Kirkuk. The second concerns threats to Iran’s national security.

The Kurdish Question

Fighting continues in the Kirkuk region, where the Arabs and Kurds have a major issue to battle over: oil. The Kirkuk region is one of two major oil-producing regions in Iraq (the other is in the Shiite-dominated south). Whoever controls Kirkuk is in a position to extract a substantial amount of wealth from the surrounding region’s oil development. There are historical ethnic issues in play here, but the real issue is money. Iraqi central government laws on energy development remain unclear, precisely because there is no practical agreement on the degree to which the central government will control — and benefit — from oil development as opposed to the Kurdish Regional Government. Both Kurdish and Arab factions thus continue to jockey for control of the key city of Kirkuk.

Arab, particularly Sunni Arab, retention of control over Kirkuk opens the door for an expansion of Sunni Arab power into Iraqi Kurdistan. By contrast, Kurdish control of Kirkuk shuts down the Sunni threat to Iraqi Kurdish autonomy and cuts Sunni access to oil revenues from any route other than the Shiite-controlled central government. If the Sunnis get shut out of Kirkuk, they are on the road to marginalization by their bitter enemies — the Kurds and the Shia. Thus, from the Sunni point of view, the battle for Kirkuk is the battle for the Sunni place at the Iraqi table.

Turkey further complicates the situation in Iraq. Currently embedded in constitutional and political thinking in Iraq is the idea that the Kurds would not be independent, but could enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Couple autonomy with the financial benefits of heavy oil development, and the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq becomes a powerful entity. Add to that the peshmerga, the Kurdish independent military forces that have had U.S. patronage since the 1990s, and an autonomous Kurdistan becomes a substantial regional force. And this is not something Turkey wants to see.

The broader Kurdish region is divided among four countries, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Kurds have a substantial presence in southeastern Turkey, where Ankara is engaged in a low-intensity war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), members of which have taken refuge in northern Iraq. Turkey’s current government has adopted a much more nuanced approach in dealing with the Kurdish question. This has involved coupling the traditional military threats with guarantees of political and economic security to the Iraqi Kurds as long as the Iraqi Kurdish leadership abides by Turkish demands not to press the Kirkuk issue.

Still, whatever the constitutional and political arrangements between Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s central government, or between Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish government, the Iraqi Kurds have a nationalist imperative. The Turkish expectation is that over the long haul, a wealthy and powerful Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region could slip out of Baghdad’s control and become a center of Kurdish nationalism. Put another way, no matter what the Iraqi Kurds say now about cooperating with Turkey regarding the PKK, over the long run, they still have an interest in underwriting a broader Kurdish nationalism that will strike directly at Turkish national interests.

The degree to which Sunni activity in northern Iraq is coordinated with Turkish intelligence is unknown to us. The Sunnis are quite capable of waging this battle on their own. But the Turks are not disinterested bystanders, and already support local Turkmen in the Kirkuk region to counter the Iraqi Kurds. The Turks want to see Kurdish economic power and military power limited, and as such they are inherently in favor of the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government. The stronger Baghdad is, the weaker the Kurds will be.

Baghdad understands something critical: While the Kurds may be a significant fighting force in Iraq, they can’t possibly stand up to the Turkish army. More broadly, Iraq as a whole can’t stand up to the Turkish army. We are entering a period in which a significant strategic threat to Turkey from Iraq could potentially mean Turkish countermeasures. Iraqi memories of Turkish domination during the Ottoman Empire are not pleasant. Therefore, Iraq will be very careful not to cross any redline with the Turks.

This places the United States in a difficult position. Washington has supported the Kurds in Iraq ever since Operation Desert Storm. Through the last decade of the Saddam regime, U.S. special operations forces helped create a de facto autonomous region in Kurdistan. Washington and the Kurds have a long and bumpy history, now complicated by substantial private U.S. investment in Iraqi Kurdistan for the development of oil resources. Iraqi Kurdish and U.S. interests are strongly intertwined, and Washington would rather not see Iraqi Kurdistan swallowed up by arrangements in Baghdad that undermine current U.S. interests and past U.S. promises.

On the other hand, the U.S. relationship with Turkey is one of Washington’s most important. Whether the question at hand is Iran, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Central Asia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Afghanistan, Russia or Iraq, the Turks have a role. Given the status of U.S. power in the region, alienating Turkey is not an option. And the United States must remember that for Turkey, Kurdish power in Iraq and Turkey’s desired role in developing Iraqi oil are issues of fundamental national importance.

Now left alone to play out this endgame, the United States must figure out a way to finesse the Kurdish issue. In one sense, it doesn’t matter. Turkey has the power ultimately to redefine whatever institutional relationships the United States leaves behind in Iraq. But for Turkey, the sooner Washington hands over this responsibility, the better. The longer the Turks wait, the stronger the Kurds might become and the more destabilizing their actions could be to Turkey. Best of all, if Turkey can assert its influence now, which it has already begun to do, it doesn’t have to be branded as the villain.

All Turkey needs to do is make sure that the United States doesn’t intervene decisively against the Iraqi Sunnis in the battle over Kirkuk in honor of Washington’s commitment to the Kurds.

In any case, the United States doesn’t want to intervene against Iraq’s Sunnis again. In protecting Sunni Arab interests, the Americans have already been sidestepping any measures to organize a census and follow through with a constitutional mandate to hold a referendum in Kirkuk. For the United States, a strong Sunni community is the necessary counterweight to the Iraqi Shia since, over the long haul, it is not clear how a Shiite-dominated government will relate to Iran.

The Shiite Question

The Shiite-dominated government led by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is no puppet of Iran, but at the same time, it is not Iran’s enemy. As matters develop in Iraq, Iran remains the ultimate guarantor of Shiite interests. And Iranian support might not flow directly to the current Iraqi government, but to al-Maliki’s opponents within the Shiite community who have closer ties to Tehran. It is not clear whether Iranian militant networks in Iraq have been broken, or are simply lying low. But it is clear that Iran still has levers in place with which it could destabilize the Shiite community or rivals of the Iraqi Shia if it so desired.

Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in building up the Iraqi Sunni community before it leaves. And from an economic point of view, that means giving the Sunnis access to oil revenue as well as a guarantee of control over that revenue after the United States leaves.

With the tempo of attacks picking up as U.S. forces draw down, Iraq’s Sunni community is evidently not satisfied with the current security and political arrangements in Iraq. Attacks are on the upswing in the northern areas — where remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq continue to operate in Mosul — as well as in central Iraq in and around Baghdad. The foreign jihadists in Iraq hope such attacks will trigger a massive response from the Shiite community, thus plunging Iraq back into civil war. But the foreign jihadists would not be able to operate without some level of support from the local Sunni community. This broader community wants to make sure that the Shia and Americans don’t forget what the Sunnis are capable of should their political, economic and security interests fall by the wayside as the Americans withdraw.

Neither the Iraqi Sunnis nor the Kurds really want the Americans to leave. Neither trust that the intentions or guarantees of the Shiite-dominated government. Iraq lacks a tradition of respect for government institutions and agreements; a piece of paper is just that. Instead, the Sunnis and Kurds see the United States as the only force that can guarantee their interests. Ironically, the United States is now seen as the only real honest broker in Iraq.

But the United States is an honest broker with severe conflicts of interest. Satisfying both Sunni and Kurdish interests is possible only under three conditions. The first is that Washington exercise a substantial degree of control over the Shiite administration of the country — and particularly over energy laws — for a long period of time. The second is that the United States give significant guarantees to Turkey that the Kurds will not extend their nationalist campaign to Turkey, even if they are permitted to extend it to Iran in a bid to destabilize the Iranian regime. The third is that success in the first two conditions not force Iran into a position where it sees its own national security at risk, and so responds by destabilizing Baghdad — and with it, the entire foundation of the national settlement in Iraq negotiated by the United States.

The American strategy in this matter has been primarily tactical. Wanting to leave, it has promised everyone everything. That is not a bad strategy in the short run, but at a certain point, everyone adds up the promises and realizes that they can’t all be kept, either because they are contradictory or because there is no force to guarantee them. Boiled down, this leaves the United States with two strategic options.

First, the United States can leave a residual force of about 20,000 troops in Iraq to guarantee Sunni and Kurdish interests, to protect Turkish interests, etc. The price of pursuing this option is that it leaves Iran facing a nightmare scenario: e.g., the potential re-emergence of a powerful Iraq and the recurrence down the road of age-old conflict between Persia and Mesopotamia — with the added possibility of a division of American troops supporting their foes. This would pose an existential threat to Iran, forcing Tehran to use covert means to destabilize Iraq that would take advantage of a minimal, widely dispersed U.S. force vulnerable to local violence.

Second, the United States could withdraw and allow Iraq to become a cockpit for competition among neighboring countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria — and ultimately major regional powers like Russia. While chaos in Iraq is not inherently inconsistent with U.S. interests, it is highly unpredictable, meaning the United States could be pulled back into Iraq at the least opportune time and place.

The first option is attractive, but its major weakness is the uncertainty created by Iran. With Iran in the picture, a residual force is as much a hostage as a guarantor of Sunni and Kurdish interests. With Iran out of the picture, the residual U.S. force could be smaller and would be more secure. Eliminate the Iran problem completely, and the picture for all players becomes safer and more secure. But eliminating Iran from the equation is not an option — Iran most assuredly gets a vote in this endgame.

Re-post this article with credit to www.Stratfor.com.

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Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqi Leader: Internal Strife Could Destroy Iraq

If anything can destroy the new Iraq, it will be the internal strife that has always plagued that country. (A prior Shiite demonstration is pictured above.) No matter how hard America and its Coalition partners tried or how heavy the loss we sustained, we can’t force the Iraqis to get along with each other. Only the different Iraqi factions can find the common ground that must hold their nation together:

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Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)
January 26, 2009

Sectarianism A 'Rotten Thing,' Iraqi Leader Says

By Associated Press

BAGHDAD — Iraq's prime minister on Sunday blamed sectarianism for destroying the country, as he tried to tap into a backlash against religious parties before next weekend's nationwide provincial elections.

Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, has been delivering numerous speeches in the days leading up to Saturday's provincial elections in a thinly veiled effort to rally support for the candidates running under the umbrella group that includes his Dawa party.

"Sectarianism is behind the destruction of the country," al-Maliki told academics and sportsmen at a forum in Baghdad. "It is natural that we have different views, but we are all representing a unified Iraq that is not ready for division."

He appeared to be distancing himself from the major religious parties, particularly his governmental ally the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, after years of violence between Shiites and Sunnis.

He told the forum that sectarianism is a "rotten thing" and that Iraqis must focus on rebuilding efforts.

Al-Maliki isn't running, but his pictures have been plastered on campaign posters throughout Iraq, and he has campaigned extensively as he seeks to solidify his power base before national parliamentary elections later this year.

For years, al-Maliki himself had a reputation as a hard- line Shiite nationalist. But there are signs the public, especially in Baghdad and other major cities, has grown weary of the religious parties that have dominated national politics since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Al-Maliki's criticism of sectarian politics appeared to be an effort to tap into public discontent against parties run by clerics, such as the Supreme Council.

The prime minister also favors centralized rule and opposes a bid by the council, the country's biggest Shiite party, to establish a self-ruled region in the Shiite south modeled on the autonomous Kurdish administration in the north.

Voters on Saturday will be choosing ruling councils in 14 of the country's 18 provinces. It will be the first nationwide balloting in three years. A strong showing by al-Maliki's Coalition of the State of Law would bolster him against political rivals.

(Above article from Associated Press.)

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Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iran’s Surrogates Want Self Rule in Southern Iraq

The radical Shiites will remain the biggest threat to a unified and democratic Iraq. The ultimate goal is a Shiite theocracy like Iran and the Iranians will do everything they can do help make this happen. (Above photo is the most powerful Shiite cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani.)

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Arizona Republic (Phoenix)
January 17, 2009

Shiite Council Seeking Self-Rule In South Iraq

By Hamza Hendawi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Associated Press

NAJAF, Iraq - The country's biggest Shiite party is hoping for a big win in elections across the oil-rich south to jump-start its campaign for a self-ruled region - a move that would transform Iraq and, critics say, give Iran its biggest prize since the ouster of Saddam Hussein.

To reach that goal, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council needs to win control of Najaf - which it wants as a future capital of an autonomous southern Iraq - when voters across the country choose members of ruling provincial councils Jan. 31.

But the Supreme Council faces strong opposition from other Shiite groups, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa party and followers of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Those groups fear regional self-rule, modeled after the Kurdish autonomous area in the north, would weaken Iraq, open the door to expanded Iranian influence and threaten the existence of the Iraqi state.

On Friday, a Shiite candidate for provincial elections was assassinated while campaigning south of Baghdad, underscoring fears that political rivalries will lead to a spike in violence ahead of voting. The slain candidate, Hashim al-Husseini, was a member of the Dawa Party and was running on the party's State of Law list for a seat on the Babil provincial council.

In Najaf, Zoheir al-Hakim, a senior Supreme Council official, predicted a comfortable win in this urban center of Shiite learning about 100 miles south of Baghdad.

"Creating a region in the south is our right by law and under the constitution," Hakim said. "Our loyal masses will take on anyone who tries to take this right away from us."

The council's campaign posters outnumber the competition in Najaf, dominating every available space in the heart of the city. The party has a hometown advantage: Najaf is home to the Hakims, a prominent family that has produced generations of top clerics and scholars and founders of the Supreme Council.

Even so, the large number of candidates, about 1,100 running for 28 seats, makes it difficult for any single party to take power alone.

Hakim and other Supreme Council officials say they will take concrete steps toward creating a self-ruled region after the election but that the timing would depend on how well they do in the balloting.

To transform a province to self-rule, one-third of the members of a provincial council must call for a referendum that requires the support of a simple majority of the voters.

The law also provides a second, more cumbersome method involving collecting two sets of signatures of voters in support of self-rule. Once enough signatures are collected, the paperwork goes to the prime minister who has two weeks to forward the proposal to the election commission, which in turn must schedule a referendum within three months.

Under the constitution, self-ruled regions enjoy significant powers. They can write their own constitutions, amend federal laws that conflict with local ones, open representative offices abroad and assume responsibility for internal security. The Supreme Council hopes to establish a self-ruled region encompassing all nine provinces south of Baghdad, but officials say they would settle for less if they don't win everywhere.

Nevertheless, Najaf is a must-win, largely because of its prestige among the world's Shiite Muslims.

The city includes the most venerated Shiite shrine: the tomb of Imam Ali, a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the founding saint of the Shiite faith. The shrine and the Shiite seminaries draw pilgrims and students from throughout the Shiite world. It's also the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most powerful Shiite cleric and a close ally of the Supreme Council.

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America made its share of mistakes during our efforts in Iraq. One of them was not better understanding Islam's Sunni versus Shiite split.

Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqi Civilians Want the New Agreement

The following article was posted on military.com. While the Iraqis will certainly be glad to run their own country, it is still annoying that the Shiites have not thanked us in a large-scale official way for pulling them out from under Saddam’s Sunni thumb.

The new agreement, which will end our involvement in Iraq by the end of 2011, still has to be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, but it will likely go through since it has the blessing of Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the most powerful Shiite religious leader in Iraq.

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Iraqis Demonstrate in Favor of US Pact

November 19, 2008
Deutsche Presse-Agentur

BAGHDAD - More than 5,000 Iraqis demonstrated in the Iraqi city of Hillah on Nov. 18 to support the security agreement between the United States and Iraq that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from the country.

The deal sets the legal basis for the future presence of US troops in Iraq after a United Nations Security Council mandate expires at the end of the year.

Under the agreement, the deadline for the complete withdrawal of US troops is Dec. 31, 2011. More than 140,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in Iraq.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker signed the deal in Baghdad on Monday. However, it still needs parliamentary approval before it can be signed by the US and Iraqi presidents.

The demonstration in support of the security pact broke out in the centre of Hillah, 100 kilometres south of Baghdad. Clan chiefs and students were among the demonstrators, witnesses told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa.

The demonstrators carried flags and signs that said "Together for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq" and "With heart, with blood, we save you, Iraq." They also chanted slogans that urged the Iraqi government to sign the security agreement with the U.S.

Hundreds of Iraqi police and soldiers surrounded the demonstrators who walked to the city council.

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The war in Iraq may end for us by 2011, but watch the Shiite militias and the Iranians closely. The breeze of "fundamentalism" is blowing gently across the desert...

Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Withdrawal From Iraq Is Not Very Far Away

The following article discusses the problems in negotiations between Iraq and the United States on our continued presence there:

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'Deal, No Deal' on Iraq-US Troop Talks

November 07, 2008

Knight Ridder

BAGHDAD - The United States delivered Thursday what it said was the final text of the controversial accord on the stationing of U.S. forces in Iraq, but Iraq said more talks are needed before the government can accept it.

"We have gotten back to the Iraqi government with a final text. Through this step, we have concluded the process on the U.S. side," said Susan Ziadeh, the U.S. Embassy spokeswoman in Baghdad. "Iraq will now need to take it forward through their own process."

The accord, which calls for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011, has been the subject of tense negotiations for the past seven months.

According to State Department officials, the United States yielded to several important Iraqi demands, including Baghdad's proposal to inspect mail and cargo for U.S. forces in Iraq. One official said he did not know the details of how those inspections would be carried out, adding, "I don't think it's going to be overly intrusive."

He and other officials spoke on condition of anonymity, because the details of the American response were not being made public.

President Bush also accepted Iraq's request for firmer language in its call for U.S. troops to withdraw by the end of 2011, two defense officials said, although they did not know the details of the wording.

While the U.S. government signaled that it will not engage in further negotiations over the pact, which has been repeatedly delayed, the government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, indicated that Iraq expects further discussions with the United States before the process is completed.

"These amendments need meetings with the American side to reach the bilateral understanding, and the environment is positive," Dabbagh said in a statement on a government-funded television channel. "The Iraqi side needs time to give the main blocs to have their opinions, suggestions and notes on the amendments suggested by the American side."

Many Iraqi officials are now calling the status-of-forces accord, or SOFA, "the withdrawal agreement," possibly as a way of marketing it to a wary public.

The accord is controversial in Washington as well. The White House has pushed aggressively to reach the deal, but some Pentagon officials expressed concern that the concessions will set a precedent for current and future status-of-forces agreements with other countries. The United States is not believed to have agreed to another nation monitoring mail in status agreements with more than 80 other countries, for example.

Earlier this week, a senior Pentagon official who requested anonymity to speak candidly said he found it "hard to believe we could find aspects there that are acceptable" in the Iraqi proposal to search mail and cargo, adding: "What kind of precedents would we be setting?"

Administration officials said Bush sees the agreement as key to shaping his legacy on Iraq. They said Bush wanted to leave the presidency with a solidified relationship between the United States and an indisputably sovereign Iraq.

To the White House, "SOFA is a sign of success," a second U.S. defense official, who also requested anonymity to speak candidly, told McClatchy Newspapers.

That said, the Bush administration refused to accept one major Iraqi proposal, which would have given Iraq expanded legal jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers alleged to commit wrongdoing while in the country. U.S. officials have called that a "non-starter."

The agreement has to be completed by the end of this year in order to replace a U.N. mandate that provides the legal basis for the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Iraqi officials were tight-lipped Thursday about whether the changes were acceptable. The changes first must be presented to the Cabinet. If the Cabinet agrees, the draft will be presented to the Iraqi parliament. One of the main sticking points for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has been the issue of jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers in Iraq.

Shiite Muslim officials who raised new demands when the accord was completed two weeks ago have been accused of succumbing to Iranian influence not to sign the agreement. At the time, Iraqi officials openly predicted that the government would be forced to extend the United Nations mandate. In recent days, officials have sounded more positive about the outcome.

"The next step is for the Cabinet to meet to look at the responses," Iraq's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told McClatchy. "I hope it will be very soon."

The latest draft calls for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and withdraw from Iraq by 2011. It also lifts immunity for private U.S. contractors such as Blackwater, whose security guards were accused of uncontrolled shooting while on patrol duty, resulting in the deaths of Iraqi civilians.

It also allows for a joint U.S. and Iraqi committee to decide whether a U.S. Soldier who's committed a crime outside a U.S. base was off-duty and where he should be tried. Iraqi officials wanted to make that decision on their own, but the Bush administration has apparently rejected the demand.

President-elect Barack Obama has long advocated a U.S. withdrawal by the summer of 2010, a date that Maliki originally demanded in the agreement.

U.S. officials are pushing to get the deal done before the end of the month. If it's not done by the beginning of December, the government will have to begin the process to renew the U.N. mandate, one U.S. official in Iraq said. The parliament must approve the agreement when it's back in session next week and before it adjourns just before the end of the month for the Hajj season, when millions of Muslims make the holy pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

"Look, the government of Iraq has debated this agreement thoroughly. ... They forwarded to us their suggested amendments. We got back to them," State Department spokesman Robert Wood said Thursday. "Now the negotiating process has come to an end."

© Copyright 2008 Knight Ridder.

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As I have emphasized before, Iraq will never permit a long-term presence of foreign troops on their soil. They will also never permit the continued occupation of bases for America's stategic purposes. There will be no Germany or Japan-styled multi-decade presence.

Those of us who served in Iraq and who came to know the Iraqi people understood this reality from the beginning. The Crusades and the British colonial occupation of the early twentieth century are still bad memories for almost all Arabs.

The Bush administration has already accepted provisions in the status-of-forces agreement that will move our forces from the cities of Iraq to military bases in mid-2009. We have also agreed to have all troops out by the end of 2011. Mr. Obama will make it happen even sooner.

Watch Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army. This extremist Shiite militia is supported by Iran and its members are voicing opposition to anything that will keep Coalition forces in Iraq. Their ultimate objective is a fundamentalist theocracy like the one in Iran. Let's see what they do after the only things standing in their way are new Iraqi soldiers and police officers.

America's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can be proud of what they have accomplished in Iraq. In the end, the people of this troubled nation will decide for themselves how they will live in the future.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Opinions Vary on Iraq Troop Withdrawal Options

I know it's been awhile since my last posting (sorry about that). I have been traveling again, but it looks like that is slowly coming to an end. My pre-retirement medical exams, etc. may keep me in the Orlando area until I begin my terminal leave. We shall see.

Both Americans and Iraqis are debating when and under what circumstances American troops will begin to withdraw from Iraq. The following New York Times article offers some interesting perspectives, but some of the Iraqis who were interviewed have political agendas for their groups:

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New York Times
September 9, 2008
Pg. 6

Should U.S. Forces Withdraw From Iraq?

By Stephen Farrell

BAGHDAD — As Iraqi and American diplomats negotiate how long and under what circumstances American troops will remain in Iraq, Iraqis are also debating the issue.

For Iraqis, as for Americans, the answer is far more complex than a simple “stay” or “go.” For both it is about blood, treasure, pride, dignity and a nation’s sense of itself and its place in the world.

But a lot more Iraqi blood than American has already been spilled, and stands to be spilled again, if the politicians get it wrong.

On the streets of Iraq, the questions being asked about the continuing American presence are about sovereignty, stability and America’s intentions in Iraq’s past, present and future: How many American troops will stay? How quickly will they go? If they stay, where will they be based? To do what? With what powers? And under what restrictions?

For the most part, Iraqis’ views fall into three categories. One group, which includes many followers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and some intensely nationalist Sunni Arabs in parts of the country that have suffered the worst since the invasion, simply want the Americans to leave, period. They say no amount of American effort now can make up for the horrors of the occupation, including the destruction of society and the killing of innocent civilians.

A second group takes a similarly dim view of the occupation, but worries that the brief period this year of improving security in Iraq will be vulnerable if the Americans abruptly withdraws. They say that the United States has a moral obligation to remain, and that continued presence of the occupiers is preferable to a return to rule by gangs and militias.

A third group worries that without a referee, Iraq’s dominant powers — Kurds in the far north and Shiites in the center and south — will brutally dominate other groups.

The Americans are not the first to face such quandaries in Iraq. In August 1920, only two years after his declining colonial power had emerged from the devastation of World War I, the British secretary of war, Winston Churchill, wrote (but did not send) a letter to his prime minister that contained this assessment of Mesopotamia:

“It seems to me so gratuitous that after all the struggles of war, just when we want to get together our slender military resources and re-establish our finances and have a little in hand in case of danger here or there, we should be compelled to go on pouring armies and treasure into these thankless deserts.”

A millennium and a half earlier, in A.D. 694, the Umayyad provincial governor Al-Hajjaj also faced a fractious Baghdad. His response to one angry crowd was a speech learned by all Iraqi schoolchildren: “I see heads before me that are ripe and ready for the plucking, and I am the one to pluck them, and I see blood glistening between the turbans and the beards.” The turbans melted away.

Five years later, Al-Hajjaj faced a rebellion in a troublesome region to his east, which forced him to move troops from Iraq. That rebellion was in Kabulistan, now part of Afghanistan, a historical parallel that drew a wry smile from Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Iraq, when it was pointed out to him last month. General Petraeus will soon move up the chain of command to take over the Central Command region, making him responsible for an area that covers both Iraq and what was Kabulistan.

Names and governments change, but there is nothing new under the Mesopotamian sun.

The debate goes on. Following are some Iraqi perspectives on whether and how American troops should stay in their country.

Opinions of the Iraqis

The Choice Is Not Ours: America Wants to Stay

I don’t expect that the Americans will leave Iraq because they reached the maximum level of political influence in the region. America is controlling the future of energy, so I believe it’s not to America’s benefit for it to leave Iraq. -- ISMAIL KABABCHI, 38, a restaurant worker in central Baghdad

America will not leave Iraq. I think my grandsons’ grandsons will watch Uncle Sam and his blue jeans. The idea that America will depart is a kind of delusion because America came for its interests in Iraq. Iraq represents the most important treasure in the struggle among the superpowers for it includes plenty of wealth in addition to its important geographic location. In the long run, America will not leave Iraq because it reached the treasure of the world. -- SAID AL-MAJMAYI, 50, a painter in Baquba

Or Maybe It Doesn’t

I expect that the Americans will leave Iraq sooner or later because they can’t control the security situation. I expect their departure within the next few months because of the achievements of the Iraqi security forces and the Awakening in terms of security and stability. That will help the American forces leave Iraq and save the rest of their dignity before the situation turns bad again like between 2004 and 2005. -- ABU ABDUL QADER AL-JUMAYLI, 60, a retired army officer in Falluja

The withdrawal is coming, no doubt. America has lost its influence in Iraq to a very great and dangerous degree. The No. 1 country in the world didn’t imagine that it would become a toy in the hand of radical parties and armed groups, or some powers which will ally with America at daytime and conspire against it at night. -- MATEEN OMAR OJI, 32, a teacher in Kirkuk

America Must Leave Iraq Now

We want to push them out immediately. We don’t need them, and we don’t want them. We have two governments, the Iraqi and American governments. We are confused about who we need to obey, the Americans or Iraqis. And both the American and Iraqi governments are hurting the Iraqi people. -- ABDUL RAHMAN HAMED HUSSEIN, a social worker in Abu Dshir, south of Baghdad, who follows the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr

I want them to leave because they caused destruction for us, they have robbed us and they never gave us any of what they had promised to give us. If a civil war breaks out after their departure, it would be their doing. It’s going on now because of them. They are inflaming it. Iraqis have proved that they are not being seduced by the American actions. Their departure is the beginning of the road toward stability. What ever happens after their withdrawal, it will be finished within a year. -- MUHAMMAD SNAD, 36, an electrical technician in Mosul

We Don’t Love the Americans, But Withdrawal Is Worse

I am not with the coalition forces’ withdrawal from Iraq currently, because chaos and destruction will be all over Iraq. Even before the Americans came, we used to have genocide, destruction and wars. We know that the Americans came for their own benefit, yet they are our only solution. -- NISREEN HASSAN, 25, a teacher in Sulaimaniya

The presence of the American forces will make Iraq a regional and international power. If the Americans withdraw, Iraq will be subject to domination from neighboring countries which support terrorism in Iraq to protect their interests, so the departure of the American forces doesn’t serve Iraq’s interest. -- ABD MUHAMMAD AL-BEDEER, Samawa

If It’s Not the Americans, Someone Else Will Take Over

The coalition forces are the best solution to Iraq’s situation, they are just like a strong dam against the outside and the inside enemies and even the neighboring countries. They are all wolves — the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks. -- JALEEL MAHMOOD, 31, Sulaimaniya

Staying is the best thing for Iraq. If the Americans depart, half of Iraq will go to the Kurds and Iran will take the other half. We need a safety valve. America occupied Iraq and must solve the problems before its departure. America’s departure will increase the problems. -- AMJAD SALAH, 34, a driver in Basra

The Dream Deferred: Please Go, Just Not Yet

I don’t want them to leave right now, but I don’t want to see them here forever. Sooner or later the Americans have to leave Iraq or understand that our policy differs from their policy. They have to recognize the sovereignty of Iraq. I’d love to keep good relations with America rather than telling bad stories to my kids about it. -- HUDA HANI, 33, a Shiite employee of the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad

I’m against the Americans’ withdrawing before we have a fully independent government and security forces. I witnessed many terrible things with the Americans, and I don’t want the same thing to happen with the next generations. It would be better for both sides to have a scheduled withdrawal. -- MUHAMMAD MAHDI, 28, a Sunni graduate of the College of Arts who now works as a taxi driver in Baghdad

No one accepts the residence of the occupier, but the withdrawal should be studied well and not randomly. Things are getting better now, and we don’t want anything to affect that. The Americans are probably one of the reasons behind the previous chaos, but their quick withdrawal will generate bigger chaos. -- SALIM MUHAMMAD, 40, Najaf

Saying No and Meaning Yes

All of them declare in public that they are against the Americans remaining in Iraq. They demand Iraqi liberation. They always raise the same slogan: Independence for Iraq. But in private sessions or meetings they are always telling me and other reporters that the Americans must stay, and that if they leave right now it would be a big mistake. The reasons for this political hypocrisy are like a disease. Most of the Iraqi politicians suffer from it. Their aim is to maintain their reputation in the public eye. -- TAREQ MAHER, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad

In public we say we do not want American troops, but our hearts say they should stay in Iraq until we become a state of institutions based on democracy and dialogue, not violence. Most of our recent leaders are tiny in the political world and the Americans want to teach them how to be leaders. Really we need them to stay more. They are a fence against Iran’s ambitions toward Iraq. -- AHMED HASOON, 38, a teacher in Basra

Never Mind the Troops, I’m Leaving Iraq

At night in all seasons, especially in summer, it is so very, very hot because we are suffering from electricity shortages and water shortages. So many times I have to buy my baby’s milk from the black market. The American forces have been here for such a long time, and still it is not stable and nothing is sure. Sometimes I feel that I should leave Iraq and claim asylum or refugee status, so that later on I would be lucky enough to get another nationality, which would make me feel respectable and that I have some rights. As an Iraqi now I cannot help my country improve. But maybe later on with a new nationality I would be able to come back and do something. Only then will my voice be heard. -- ANWAR ALI, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad who is seeking asylum in the United States

Reporting was contributed by Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Kirkuk; Riyadh Mohammed, Ali Hameed, Mohamed Hussein and Anwar J. Ali from Baghdad; and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Mosul, Salahuddin Province, Falluja, Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and the Kurdish-administered northern region of Iraq.

* * * *

We will continue to negotiate the terms of our troop drawdown. Hopefully the Iraqis will work with us to make sure that the pace does not risk losing the security gains we have made together.

However, in the end it is their country. When they decide they don't want us there, we will have no choice but to leave.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Mahdi Army Influence Weakened By the Surge

I've been busy at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but I'm glad to see all the reports about the improvements in Iraq because of the surge.

The following story was in the New York Times and it talks about the declining influence of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. Unfortunately, these fundamentalist Shiite militiamen will alway be in the shadows because they are supported, trained and financed by their Iranian mentors.

We will eventually draw down our troop levels in Iraq (as the Iraqi government is able to assume more responsibility), but we must keep our eyes on these thugs from Sadr City and be ready to swat them like flies should they re-emerge:

* * * *

New York Times
July 27, 2008
Pg. 1

Shiite Militia In Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb

By Sabrina Tavernise

BAGHDAD — The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative, milestone for stability in Iraq.

It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.

Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki struck another blow this spring, when he led a military operation against it in Baghdad and in several southern cities.

The shift, if it holds, would solidify a transfer of power from Mr. Sadr, who had lorded his once broad political support over the government, to Mr. Maliki, who is increasingly seen as a true national leader.

It is part of a general decline in violence that is resonating in American as well as Iraqi politics: Senator John McCain argues that the advances in Iraq would have been impossible without the increase in American troops known as the surge, while Senator Barack Obama, who opposed the increase, says the security improvements should allow a faster withdrawal of combat troops.

The Mahdi Army’s decline also means that the Iraqi state, all but impotent in the early years of the war, has begun to act the part, taking over delivery of some services and control of some neighborhoods.

“The Iraqi government broke their branches and took down their tree,” said Abu Amjad, a civil servant who lives in the northern Baghdad district of Sadr City, once seen as an unbreachable stronghold for the group.

The change is showing up in the lives of ordinary people. The price of cooking gas is less than a fifth of what it was when the militia controlled local gas stations, and kerosene for heating has also become much less expensive. In interviews, 17 Iraqis, including municipal officials, gas station workers and residents, described a pattern in which the militia’s control over the local economy and public services had ebbed. Merchants say they no longer have to pay protection money to militiamen. In some cases, employees with allegiances to the militia have been fired or transferred. Despite the militia’s weakened state, none of the Iraqis interviewed agreed to have their full names published for fear of retribution.

In a further sign of weakness, Shiite tribes in several neighborhoods are asking for compensation from militia members’ families for past wrongs.

The changes are not irreversible. The security gains are in the hands of unseasoned Iraqi soldiers at checkpoints spread throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods. And local government officials have barely begun to take hold of service distribution networks, potentially leaving a window for the militia to reassert itself.

The militia’s roots are still in the ground, Abu Amjad said, and “given any chance, they will grow again.”

A Criminal Enterprise

At the peak of the militia’s control last summer, it was involved at all levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, private minibus services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice factories, and even collecting rent from squatters in houses whose owners had been displaced. The four main gas stations in Sadr City were handing over a total of about $13,000 a day, according to a member of the local council.

“It’s almost like the old Mafia criminal days in the United States,” said Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. Talley, an Army engineer rebuilding Sadr City’s main market.

Um Hussein, a mother of 10 in Sadr City, the largest Shiite district in the capital and one of the poorest, said her family’s fuel bill had dropped so far that she could afford to buy one of her daughters a pair of earrings with the savings. Others interviewed listed simpler purchases that had now become possible: tomatoes, laundry detergent, gasoline.

One young man said that even though his house was right across from a distribution center that sold cooking gas, he was not allowed to buy it there at state prices, but instead was forced to wait for a militia-affiliated distributor who sold it at higher prices.

“We had to get our share of the cooking gas from Mahdi Army people,” Um Hussein said. “Now, everything is available. We are free to buy what we want.”

Before, the Mahdi Army controlled the 12 trucks that made daily deliveries of cooking gas canisters for the district, because the leader of the Sadr City district council, who was affiliated with the militia, was the one who handled the trucks’ documents.

“We had no idea when they were coming or where they were going,” the council member said, referring to the trucks.

Those who questioned the militia’s authority were dealt with harshly. A gas station worker from Kadhimiya recalled a man in his 60s being beaten badly for refusing to pay the inflated gas price last year. The Sadr City council member described his relationship with the militia by touching his hand to his face.

“I was kissing them here, here and here,” he said pointing to his right cheek, his left cheek and then his forehead.

A spokesman for the movement in Sadr City, Sayeed Jaleel al-Sarkhy, defended the Mahdi Army, saying in an interview that it was not a formal militia and denying the charges that it had taken control of local services. He said the militia had been infiltrated by criminals who used the name of the Mahdi Army as a cover.

The Mahdi Army is an army of believers,” he said. “It was established to serve the people.”

An employee in the Sadr City local government who oversees trash collectors — daily laborers whose salaries he said were controlled by the militia — said that had long stopped being true.

“I am sick all over,” he said. “I am blind. I’ve got a headache. I’ve got a toothache. My back hurts. All of this is from the Mahdi Army.”

Signs of Weakness

A month after Mr. Maliki’s military operation, strange things started to happen in Shuala, a vast expanse of concrete and sand-colored houses in northern Baghdad that was one of the Mahdi Army’s main strongholds. Militia members suddenly stopped showing up to collect money from the main gas station, a worker there said.

A member of the Shuala district council said: “They used to come and order us to give them 100 gas canisters. Now it’s, ‘Can you please give me a gas canister?’”

Then, several weeks later, 11 workers, guards and even a director, all state employees with ties to the militia, were transferred to other areas. Employees’ pictures were posted so American and Iraqi soldiers could identify impostors.

The Iraqi Army now occupies the militia’s old headquarters in Shuala. Soldiers set up 18 checkpoints around the neighborhood, including at the gas station. When the militia opened a new office, soldiers put a checkpoint there, too, said an Iraqi major from the unit based there. Iraqi soldiers recently distributed warning notices to families squatting in houses whose rent had been collected by the Mahdi Army until May.

In Sadr City, the authorities closed the militia’s radio station. The leader of the district council was arrested by the American military. Cooking gas delivery documents must now be approved by three officials, not just one, the council member said.

Another sign of weakness is the growing number of financial settlements between powerful Shiites and Mahdi Army members’ families over loved ones who were killed by the militia. In Topchi, a Shiite neighborhood in western Baghdad, a handwritten list of militia members’ names was taped up in the market this month, with the warning for their families to leave town. Several of their houses were attacked.

Some militia members’ families went to the local council to ask for help. They found none. Mahdi militiamen killed four local council members over several weeks last fall.

“I told them this isn’t good, they must not be blamed,” the council member said. Even so, “if your brother has been killed, this is the time for revenge.”

Now neighborhoods are breathing more freely. A hairdresser in Ameen, a militia-controlled neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, said her clients no longer had to cover their faces when they left her house wearing makeup. Minibuses ferrying commuters in Sadr City are no longer required to play religious songs, said Abu Amjad, the civil servant, and now play songs about love, some even sung by women.

“They lost everything,” said the Sadr City government employee. “The Sadr movement has no power now. There is no militia control.”

Lingering Fears

The Mahdi Army might be weak, but it is not gone.

Majid, a Sadr City resident who works in a government ministry, said several Iraqi Army officers in his area had to move their families to other neighborhoods after Mr. Maliki’s military operation because the militia threatened them. Bombs are still wounding and killing American soldiers in the district. And early this month, one Iraqi officer’s teenage son was kidnapped and killed, his body hung in a public place as a warning, said Majid, who gave only his first name because he feared reprisals.

“People are still afraid of the Mahdi Army,” he said. “You still get punished if you talk bad about them.”

While most of the Iraqi soldiers at the new checkpoints seem loyal to the government, others have sympathies closer to the militia. A friend of Majid’s was obliged to pay a steep tribal settlement, after telling an army patrol about his neighbor, a militia member. The patrol had been infiltrated and leaked the tip to the neighbor.

“They are still trying to influence things,” General Talley said, though his overall assessment was that their control was receding.

The shift comes at a crucial moment: Iraqis will vote in provincial elections in December. The weakening of the Sadrists in national politics clears the stage for the group’s most bitter rival — a Shiite party led by another cleric, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. One of the party’s members, Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, a sheik and a member of Parliament, is arranging state aid for Sunni families willing to move back to Topchi.

The timing was not missed by the Sadr movement’s spokesman, who said the government had recently warned the group to vacate its office. He blames Mr. Hakim’s party for the attempts to marginalize his movement, whose members have also been targets of a political crackdown in southern Iraq.

“Some parties are occupying large buildings in Jadriya,” he said, referring indirectly to the headquarters of Mr. Hakim’s party. “That’s what makes us suspicious. Why only us?”

He added, “The main motive is to exclude the Sadr movement from politics.”
One indicator of whether the new gains will hold is whether local governments can truly fill the gap that the militia left and deliver services effectively and consistently.

General Talley said his unit had recently spent $34 million to help reconstruct a major market in Sadr City. But the district council has gotten bogged down in arguments over who has the right to disburse $100 million that Mr. Maliki promised Sadr City after the military operation. The district council was given 90 days to come up with projects. More than 30 days have passed and not one proposal has been submitted, council members said.

“To be honest with you, I find it very slow,” said Haidar al-Abadi, an adviser to Mr. Maliki who said that funds had been held back because militia-affiliated companies had gotten involved. “There’s a danger this slowness could backfire.”

The militia is painting its response on Sadr City walls: “We will be back, after this break.”

The Iraqi Army is painting over it.

Reporting was contributed by Mohammed Hussein, Tareq Maher, Campbell Robertson, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Alissa J. Rubin.

* * * *

Great article; surprised it was in the New York Times....

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

One Day the Iraqis Will Send Us Home

While I was in Baghdad in 2004, I asked an Iraqi civilian if he was glad that Saddam Hussein was gone from the scene and he said, “Oh, yes, thank you..”

When I asked him if he was glad the American and Coalition forces were in his country, he said, “Oh, no…”

Then he added, “But please don’t leave yet…”

One of the biggest screw-ups in the beginning of the Iraq war was the failure of the Bush administration to look deeply into the history of the Arab world, the Shiite-Sunni conflicts and the long-held feelings of the Arab peoples that they didn’t want to be “occupied” by any western military forces.

We must remember that the Crusades were not noble endeavors. The Crusaders waged brutal warfare, leaving a trail of blood and Arab bodies – including men, women and children – as they rampaged throughout the Middle East and they were “terrorists” in their own time. Arabs have a long memory and this one remains quite vivid.

Then the British occupied Arabia during their colonial period, suppressing the Arab culture before finally carving up the Arab lands in what may have seemed a logical fashion, but which ignored many of the cultural needs of the people – such as the Kurdish citizens who were not given their own nation.

We must understand that the day will come when the Iraqi people want to be left alone. When they are comfortable that they possess the ability to take care of themselves, they will surely ask us to leave. They will not want any – repeat any – western military forces permanently occupying any part of their land. To believe otherwise ignores an Arab history that is one of complete distrust of western motives. Can we blame them?

American troops and their Coalition partners have done an amazing job and we have made many friends among the Iraqi people, but even these friends do not want our troops there forever. It is not about the willingness of an American administration to continue operations in Iraq; it is simply about whether or not the Iraqi people want us there. This is the Muslim Arab world which believes it has little in common with western powers.

In the end, the Shiite majority will determine the direction of Iraq. With luck the nation will remain a secular one, with a strong relationship – and hopefully friendship - with the United States. However, it remains likely that radical Shiites – with the help of Iran – will try to seize control of the government at some point after we have been shown the door. Should this happen, there will be nothing we can do about it except offer our help if it is requested - as we would for any of our other allies.

The following article is from McClatchy-Tribune Information Services and was posted on Military.com:

* * * *

US-Iraq Security Deal in Trouble

June 11, 2008
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services

BAGHDAD - A proposed U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that would set the conditions for a defense alliance and long-term U.S. troop presence appears increasingly in trouble, facing growing resistance from the Iraqi government, bipartisan opposition in Congress and strong questioning from Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama.

President Bush is trying to finish the agreement before he leaves office, and senior U.S. officials insist publicly that the negotiations can be completed by a July 31 target date.

But that seems increasing doubtful, and in Baghdad and Washington there is growing speculation that a United Nations mandate for U.S.-led military operations in Iraq may have to be renewed after it expires at the end of 2008.

On Capitol Hill, top Democrats and Republicans complain that Bush is rushing the negotiations to try to tie his successor's hands.

Iraqi lawmakers say the United States has dropped at least one demand and is no longer insisting on complete immunity for private contractors.

Six senators, including the chairmen of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees and their ranking minority members have written Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the past week asking for transparency in the negotiations and more briefings. White House, State Department and Pentagon officials briefed staff members on the talks June 10.

"There's a tremendous amount of concern up here about the state of these negotiations. ... It's been expressed repeatedly," said a senior congressional staffer, who requested anonymity. He noted that their appeared to be growing talk in Iraq of simply extending the U.N. mandate.

A spokesman for Obama, D-Ill., said any long-term U.S. security commitment to Iraq must be subject to Congressional approval; alternatively the administration should seek an extension of the current UN mandate. Obama wants a new administration to make it "absolutely clear that the United States will not maintain permanent bases in Iraq," said spokesman Bill Burton.

Some Iraqi parliamentarians are now saying that Iraq has a third option besides extending the U.N. mandate or agreeing to the proposed Status of Forces Agreement: telling the Americans to go home.

"By December Iraq has to decide what to do," said Sami al-Askari, a Shiite lawmaker who is close to Prime Minister Maliki. "If we are put in a corner...we have three options, not just two." Al-Askari said the U.S. side is "keen to sign it early" but said the U.S. "have to be realistic and deal with the issues that are very sensitive for the Iraqis."

On June 10, Ambassador David Satterfield, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's top advisor on Iraq, told reporters in Baghdad that both the Iraqis and Americans were on track to agree and that the U.S. was respecting Iraq's sovereignty during negotiations.

"We're confident it can be achieved, and by the end of July deadline," Satterfield said. "It's doable, that's where our focus is, not on alternatives...We're focused on plan A because we believe plan A can succeed."

He spoke less than 24 hours after an unnamed senior U.S. official told the Associated Press that the deal may not be completed before Bush leaves office next January. Satterfield bristled when questioned about the "unnamed official" and insisted that the talks were on track for completion July 31.

Iraqi lawmakers say the Bush administration is demanding concessions that are unacceptable, among them: dozens of semi-permanent bases from which U.S. forces can launch missions with no prior consent from Iraq's government; control of Iraq's air space; and no guarantees the United States will defend Iraq against a foreign attack.

The United States has portrayed opposition to the agreement as limited to Iranian officials and followers of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who opposes the U.S. occupation. But the chorus of rejection is growing.

"There is only one agenda for us-we need foreign troops because our forces are not capable yet to defend Iraq inside and outside of Iraq," al-Askari said. But when Iraq reaches the point it can defend itself, "That's it, no more foreign troops on our soil," he added.

"It seems from the draft (agreement) and from the discussions that the Americans have something else in their mind, for instance fighting al-Qaida or terrorism. That's why they want a free hand in arresting any Iraqi. But the Iraqis say, `no you don't have the free hand'."

In interviews this week, majority Shiite legislators told McClatchy Newspapers that the U.S.-proposed draft agreement is unacceptable and, given the way negotiations are going, they did not see them being complete by July 31.

The majority of Iraqi politicians support some kind of security agreement with the United States and the presence of some U.S. forces, although on their terms.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said Iraq's government has reached the point of decision.

"Time is of the essence," he said. "There is a need for a clear political decision... Either the Iraqis want this or they don't want it." Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed a declaration of principles for the accord last November, Zebari noted. "It hasn't come out of a vacuum or out of the blue."

Iraq wants an agreement in which U.S. Soldiers stay on bases outside of the cities; the United States does not control its air space; and acts only if Iraq asks for help.

* * * *

The fact that the Iraqis will one day no longer want us in their country is not a sign that we failed. If their self-sufficiency is accompanied by a strong free-market economy, if they have achieved the ability to defend themselves from aggression and if they have retained the power to determine their own destiny, then we have achieved success.

Regardless of what future they choose in the long run - it is THEIR future.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Mahdi Army Itches to Fight Again

Success in Iraq will depend on how the Iraqi government deals – or fails to deal – with the Shiite militias like the Mahdi Army.

To watch a comparable situation, keep your eyes on the democratic government of Lebanon that continues a shaky relationship with the radical Hezbollah terrorist militia.

By the way, both Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army are supplied, funded and trained by Iran. Iran’s ultimate goals in both Lebanon and Iraq are the establishment of fundamentalist governments like the one in Tehran.

Check out the following article:

* * * *

Philadelphia Inquirer
May 29, 2008

Dissent Arises Over Iraq Cease-Fire
A Mahdi Army leader said, "We were duped." A disagreement could restart Shiite fighting.

By Hamza Hendawi, Associated Press

BAGHDAD - An angry Shiite militia commander complained yesterday "we were duped" into accepting a cease-fire in Sadr City - remarks that pointed to a potentially damaging rift within the movement of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The May 11 truce ended seven weeks of fierce fighting in Baghdad between U.S. and Iraqi government forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which held nearly complete control of the capital's sprawling Sadr City district.

Iraqi soldiers now have moved into most parts of Sadr City with little resistance. But the objections raised by the commander highlight apparent dissent by some Mahdi Army leaders.

A split among Sadr's followers - between those favoring a more militant path and others seeking compromise with Iraq's government - could threaten the relative calm in Baghdad and reignite Shiite-on-Shiite violence across Iraq's oil-rich south.

The commander, speaking to tribal sheikhs and lawmakers loyal to Sadr, said "we were duped and deceived" by the truce. "They are arresting many of us now."

The group had gathered in Sadr's main Baghdad office to discuss how to respond to what they consider cease-fire "violations" by Iraqi troops, such as arrests and house searches.

Some in the audience, however, took issue with the views of the commander, whose name was not made public for security reasons.

"You can be the winner without a military victory," said Falah Hassan Shanshal, a prominent Sadrist and one of two parliamentarians who attended the meeting in Sadr City, home to 2.5 million Shiites.

"We had to bow before the storm because it was uprooting everything and everyone standing in its path," he said.

Shanshal was referring to the punishing attacks by U.S. and Iraqi government forces, which used tanks, helicopter gunships, and Hellfire missiles fired from unmanned aircraft. The strikes killed and wounded hundreds and left parts of Sadr City in ruins.

The southern section of the district has been sealed off from the rest of Sadr City in an attempt to foil militia movements and rocket and mortar attacks on the U.S.-protected Green Zone.

The battles in Sadr City were part of a wider Mahdi Army backlash to a government crackdown on armed groups launched in late March in the southern city of Basra.

Sadr, who has been in Iran for at least a year, supported the Sadr City cease-fire, perhaps to save his Mahdi Army from further losses so it can continue the fight later.

But signs of opposition have been growing within the militia ranks. Last week, two Mahdi Army commanders said militiamen were divided over whether the cease-fire was in their interest.

The head of Sadr's office in Sadr City, Sheikh Salman al-Freiji, suggested the truce might collapse if "violations" by the Iraqi army continued.

"There will not be any trust built between the two sides like that," Freiji warned. "The Mahdi Army was created to defend the Iraqi people. How can you do that without fighting the occupier?"

Shanshal, the Sadrist lawmaker, was conciliatory. He blamed the Iraqi army for heavy-handed tactics but stressed that he did not want more fighting in Sadr City.

* * * *

As long as the armed radical militias remain in the shadows, ready to continue their fight, long-term peace will be difficult to achieve in Iraq.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

It Wasn't My Fault Say the Generals

One day in 2004, my team and I stood by at the front doors of the Water Palace (Al Faw Palace) at Camp Victory. As a protective service detail, we were waiting for our general to emerge from the palace after meeting with then-commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez (pictured above).

Before our boss exited the palace, Sanchez came walking out of the doors, followed by his “Incredible Hulk”-style Army bodyguard. I saluted Sanchez and he crisply returned my salute.

At the time, all of us average soldiers believed that men like Sanchez had their fingers on the pulse of the war. Still, we were concerned with several issues whose solutions seemed fairly obvious, even to the average privates and sergeants.

The failure of CPA boss Bremer to pay for obviously critical improvements to Iraqi society bothered us all. We had invaded a nation of more than 25 million people, removed their government, their army, their police and their infrastructure, but somehow we were supposed to fix everything with only 140,000 troops. The people needed electricity, water, jobs and a host of other things. Our failure to provide these necessities resulted in a lot of hungry ex-soldiers and ex-cops joining the insurgency.

When fiery cleric Muqtada al Sadr launched his up-risings in 2004, the troops wanted to take him out along with his Mahdi Army. The CPA succumbed to political pressure from al Sadr’s fellow Shiites. Now, in 2008, the Mahdi Army is Iraq’s version of Hezbollah or Hamas and this Iranian-trained militia is still killing Americans and Iraqis.

Also in 2004, we watched our troops fight valiantly in Fallujah, only to be pulled out when a former Iraqi general under Saddam Hussein was given permission to form the “Fallujah Protective Army”. This was a force of Fallujah residents who did exactly as all of us average soldiers predicted - nothing. They gave insurgents free reign in Fallujah and refused to turn over the foreign fighters.

The soldiers always knew what should have been done in the beginning. We had faith that our military leaders would do what was necessary to succeed in Iraq, but our faith was misplaced to a large degree in those early days of the war.

We must still emerge victorious in Iraq – as long as the Iraqis continue to work with us. But now we are watching some of our former commanders, like Sanchez and other generals, try to put all of the blame on the politicians for those early strategic mistakes. Most of the blame belongs with the political leaders in Washington, but some of it does not.

Generals whose men are making the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield must do more than “follow orders”. When it comes to the ultimate test of honor, a general has an obligation to speak up on behalf of those who are doing the fighting and dying, even if it costs that general his job. A good example of such a general of honor is Eric Shinseki, who told Congress exactly what it would take to succeed in Iraq and who was summarily shuffled off into retirement.

Like many veterans of the Iraq war, I have become tired of listening to retired generals who have become “talking heads” on the evening news. It wasn’t their fault, they say. They were only following orders, they say. Many of these generals were commanders who failed as leaders because their honor became secondary to their next promotion.

Things have changed for the better in Iraq because the military leaders, and the soldiers under them, have taken the lead in getting things done. As it should have been in the beginning, authority to make things happen has finally been delegated to all levels of command. This is much improved over those early days in the war when very little authority was granted – even to the generals.

The following article about retired Lt. General Sanchez’s new book appeared in today’s Miami Herald.

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Miami Herald
May 17, 2008

Ex-Iraq Commander Distances Self From Culpability
The former head of command in Iraq said he may have been the chief, but he was just following orders.

By Nancy A. Youssef

WASHINGTON--To hear retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez explain it, the mistakes of the Iraq war that happened while he was in command there weren't his fault. Not Abu Ghraib, not the birth of the insurgency, not the decision to let rebel cleric Muqtada al Sadr survive.

Sanchez was a soldier, and according to him, a general's job is to give advice. What the civilian leaders decide after that is out of a general's hands.

''It's our responsibility to provide the best judgment we can,'' Sanchez said in an interview with McClatchy. ``But when those decisions are made, if they are not illegal or immoral, civilian control of the military dictates that we comply.''

Sanchez argues that crafting a strategy wasn't his responsibility, even as the top commander in Iraq. That fell to the civilian leaders, such as the secretary of defense and the president.

But as part of the military's emerging counterinsurgency strategy, commanders now are calling their soldiers ''strategic corporals.'' That is, every soldier's decision is part of the broader strategy.

Captains serving in outposts throughout Iraq now are leading fiefdoms alongside local Iraqi leaders, deciding everything from who should protect the community to how local funds should be spent. Commanders now stress to corporals and captains stationed in those outposts that their decisions are part of the broader strategy.

''It's all well and good for a general to say I am not responsible for grand strategy,'' said retired Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan. ``But corporals can be strategic. They can make things happen.''

Latest book

Sanchez's comments were part of a series of interviews he's given recently to promote his new autobiography, ''Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story,'' the latest of several books by key Iraq decision-makers that seem intended to exonerate them of responsibility.

In his book, Sanchez repeatedly spells out instances in which civilian leaders made decisions that countered his recommendations.

Advice ignored

Sanchez said the key window for the United States to turn the situation around in Iraq opened with the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003.

It closed the following April, he said, when the U.S. made two key mistakes: It launched its first major offensive into Fallujah and decided not to capture Sadr, whose Shiite militia has since grown into one of Iraq's most powerful forces.

Sanchez said he advised President Bush not to go into Fallujah in April 2004 after four private security contractors were taken hostage and killed. Their burned bodies were hung from a bridge as several Iraqis celebrated beneath them, in widely-circulated photos.

Sanchez said he feared that proponents of attacking Fallujah were being driven by a knee-jerk reaction to the photos and not by any consideration of the difficulty of moving into the city, which had been a troublesome redoubt of anti-American insurgents since the day U.S. troops toppled Hussein.

He said he advised against the offensive. The president ''appreciated our caution but then ordered us to attack,'' Sanchez wrote.

That battle ended in failure less than a month later and signaled to the insurgency that the U.S. would walk away from a major fight.

That same month, the U.S. had a chance to arrest Sadr, but Sanchez said that L. Paul Bremer, then the head of the Coalition Provincial Authority, called off the operation. Sadr has been haunting U.S. efforts in Iraq ever since.

Abu Ghraib

Sanchez said that he should have known more about what was going on at the Abu Ghraib prison, where Iraqi prisoners were subjected to abuses that resulted in the courts-martial of seven low-ranking soldiers.

But even there, he said he bore no direct responsibility for what was taking place. Instead, the abuses of Abu Ghraib were a result of the Bush administration's endorsement of aggressive interrogations, which began in Afghanistan. He points out that an Army inspector general report ultimately absolved him.

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The early mistakes in Iraq do not negate the necessity to succeed in our military efforts in that country. We must never forget that the ultimate problem is, and shall be for some time, the Iranian issue. If we pull out of Iraq before the Iraqis can defend themselves, Iran will use Muqtada al Sadr to carry out a proxy takeover of Iraq.

This is the ultimate goal of the radical Shiites and such a victory would only ensure a continued river of blood throughout the Middle East.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqi Militias Must Go

Back in 2004, the Mahdi Army consisted of only a few thousand members, mostly young street hoodlums attracted to Muqtada al Sadr because his father was a well-respected ayatollah who was executed by Saddam Hussein.

Those of us working the perilous streets of Baghdad that year were disheartened when our bosses decided to leave the Mahdi Army untouched because al Sadr indicated he would turn to politics. We didn’t believe he or his militia would ever disarm and he launched two uprisings that year. Many Americans were killed or wounded by his militia thugs.

Now Muqtada’s private army is conservatively estimated to consist of around 60,000 members. That doesn’t include the sympathizers among Iraqi civilians or the family members who help sustain and equip these black-uniformed killers. It also doesn’t include the Iranian advisors who provide arms, ammunition and training to their Iraqi revolutionary brothers – just as they did in 2004.

Al Sadr owes his life and the lives of his fellow Shiites to the American and Coalition forces, but he has refused to deal with the United States. This ungrateful fundamentalist only wants to lead the ultimate Shiite theocracy he sees simmering beneath the surface of the Iraqi political landscape. Any cooperation at all is only because it is in his interests for the moment while he pursues his own agenda.

While al Sadr hides in Iran, the new Iraqi Army has done reasonably well against his militia, even though some of the fundamentalists are surely within the military’s ranks. With Sunnis working with the Coalition for the most part to steadily wipe out the foreign fighters, one of the biggest remaining issues remains the in-fighting among the Shiites. Clearly, many of these Shiites – like al Maliki – have begun to realize that a functioning democracy is the only way to prevent a bloody civil war.

We have been correct to stay the course and we must continue to do so as long as freedom-loving Iraqis work with us. American and Coalition military forces can never impose a democracy on the people of Iraq because democracy is a free-will choice of the people of any nation.

If the average Iraqi citizen wants liberty, then he must be willing to fight for it as well. The Mahdi Army and the other militias must be squashed once and for all, but the Iranian influence in Iraqi society will always remain concealed in the shadows.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqi Citizens Are Taking Responsibility

"For those who have fought for it, freedom has a flavor the protected will never know."

Quote from the Vietnam War

No citizen can ever really appreciate the value of freedom if they are not willing to defend their own liberty. Most Iraqis have come to understand this and they have learned it through the example and sacrifice of America’s warriors and civilians as well as their own valiant countrymen.

As I sit back at my unit waiting for DFAS (Defense Finance and Accounting Service) to get off their collective asses and pay my multiple travel vouchers, I saw this article in today’s Washington Times:

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Washington Times
January 2, 2008
Pg. 8

Citizen Forces Seen Key To Driving Out Violence
Deadly attack on mourners points to risk

By Richard Tomkins, Washington Times

BAGHDAD — Ordinary Iraqis helping take responsibility for neighborhood security and earning money while doing so are contributing to hopes for a continued downturn in violence in Baghdad in the new year.

Nevertheless, the year got off to a bloody start yesterday, when a suicide attacker killed at least 32 men gathered in eastern Baghdad to mourn the death of a retired Iraqi army officer, a Shi'ite who was slain last week in a car bombing blamed on al Qaeda in Iraq.

The attack was a reminder of the dangers that persist despite the recent decline of violence in Baghdad and of the peril for any mass gathering in a country where the bereaved often find themselves targets.

Still, the rapid growth of Sunni Muslim forces opposed to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden marked a dramatic turnaround from the abysmal first four years after the U.S. invasion.

In the volatile Adhamiya District of eastern Baghdad, for example, Iraqi Security Volunteers, or ISVs, last month found a large cache of explosives as well as several car bombs and reported them to U.S. and Iraqi army forces. It was the fifth such find for them in just a few weeks.

West of Baghdad, another group of volunteers discovered a large cache of artillery shells through a tip from a local resident.

In the East Rashid area of southeast Baghdad, Sunni volunteers establishing a neighborhood headquarters in a rented house last week found two artillery shells that could have been used to blow up U.S. and Iraqi security forces.

"The ISVs are doing a good and important job," said U.S. Army Capt. Alfred Boone, who is in charge of the ISV project in East Rashid.

"This is a temporary security solution that could lead to these groups going into the Iraqi army or the national police," Capt. Boone said.

The ISVs fall under the general, overall nomenclature of Concerned Local Citizens, a force distrusted in its present state by the Shi'ite-dominated government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which fears the predominately Sunni volunteers could become a military force outside the control of the government.

The Sunni opposition to al Qaeda began with the so-called "Awakening" movement by Sunni tribal leaders cooperating with U.S. forces in Anbar province west of Baghdad.

President Bush and Gen. David H. Petraeus, architect of the counterinsurgency strategy now being followed in Iraq, credit the movement with being a major factor in the drop in violence nationwide and in pushing al Qaeda out of its strongholds.

A cornerstone of the strategy, which includes the surge of U.S. forces into Baghdad, is securing neighborhoods from a return of terrorists once the terrorists are driven out.

That means boots on the ground in the communities, or in this case, shoes and sandals.

"The fact is concerned local citizens are helping provide security," Air Force Col. Donald Bacon, chief of strategy and plans and strategic communications for U.S.-led forces, told reporters recently.

"Without it, [al Qaeda in Iraq] would move back into these areas if we didn't have our forces there," Col. Bacon said.

In East Rashid, part of the larger Dora District of Baghdad, more than 200 men turned up recently at St. Peter's Chaldean Catholic Seminary on the first day of recruiting for just 135 ISV slots.

One by one, they were called forward, presented with identity documents and questioned by Iraqi interpreters who registered their information. They were then fingerprinted by a team of Americans, who also photographed them and took biometric information, such as retina scans, for entry into a new database and for cross-referencing.

"I don't have a job," said Hazem Abdullah Ali, a middle-aged recruit. "I need the job. And I want to help bring peace."

Volunteers for the U.S.-Iraqi funded program are paid $10 a day and use their own weapons. Under Iraqi law, each household is allowed to possess one AK-47 rifle.

* * * *

We must stand beside the Iraqis who have the courage to step forward and face the brutality of the terrorists. These brave individuals want lasting peace and permanent security for their families and their communities.

It is our responsibility to finish what we started and to make sure that the sacrifices of our warriors have not been in vain.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Al Sadr's Quest for Power in Iraq

My “series” of posts on Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army continues.

Al Sadr may be trying to position himself in order to eventually declare that he is the “Mahdi” or “the guided one”. According to many fundamentalists, this individual will appear when Muslims are being oppressed throughout the world. The Mahdi will make war against those who are deemed to be oppressors. All Muslims will be joined together in peace and justice and the Mahdi will rule over all Arabs. According to believers, the Mahdi will even pray at Mecca with Jesus (“Isa” in the Quran).

Although Muqtada’s father was a high-ranking ayatollah, Muqtada has not even completed his formal religious training. This article talks about his quest for Islamic credentials:

* * * *

Iraq cleric Sadr eyes higher religious credentials

Reuters: December 14, 2007

KUFA, Iraq: Powerful Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is taking advanced Islamic studies in a bid to earn credentials that would allow him to issue religious decrees, a top aide to the young firebrand said on Friday.

Some senior figures in the Shi'ite clerical establishment view Sadr, who commands the feared Mehdi Army militia and has a bloc of legislators in parliament, as an upstart given his lack of scholarly achievement.

The anti-American cleric has a strong following among poor, urban Shi'ites across Iraq. Attaining higher religious credentials would likely enhance the influence of Sadr among majority Shi'ites, engaged in a power struggle for influence in the oil-rich south as foreign troops scale down their presence.

Senior aide Salah al-Ubaidi, speaking in the southern town of Kufa near the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, said Sadr was looking to gain the title of "Marji", a term used for a cleric who is qualified to make religious decisions for his followers.

"Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr is studying the Hawza like any other Shi'ite student who aims to reach the level of Ijtihad," Ubaidi told Reuters, referring to a term that describes a level that allows someone to issue religious decrees or "fatwas".

He said Sadr, who is believed to be in his 30s, was studying at Najaf, adding it was unclear how long it would take the cleric the achieve the credentials, but the process normally takes years.

Sadr's followers currently have to seek guidance on religious issues from clerics who have the necessary qualifications.

If Sadr succeeds, he could earn more respect from top Shi'ite clerics who have been unsettled by his rising following, which they believe stems from his respected father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed by suspected agents of Saddam Hussein along with two of his sons in 1999.

Ubaidi denied Sadr was developing his religious stature to push for more influence in mainly Shi'ite southern Iraq, a region rich in oil reserves.

"He has no interest in public funds," Ubaidi said.

Sadr's main mass movement Shi'ite rival is the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.

Hakim also built his reputation partly through his father Muhsin al-Hakim, one of the most prominent Shi'ite scholars of recent times. But Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has a closer relationship to traditional clerics at the top of the hierarchy than Sadr.

Sadr, who led two uprisings against U.S. forces in 2004, froze the activities of the Mehdi Army for six months in late August after some of his followers were blamed for sparking intra-Shi'ite violence at a major religious ceremony.

The U.S. military has welcomed the ceasefire and said it has helped bring down violence in Iraq.

Sadr has vowed to reorganise his militia and root out rebellious elements who are ignoring his commands and taking the law into their own hands.

(Reporting by Khaled Farhan in Najaf; writing by Mussab Al- Khairalla in Baghdad, Editing by Dean Yates and Ibon Villelabeitia)

* * * *

We must remember that the future of Iraq will ultimately be determined by Iraqis, not America and its Coalition partners.

Since Arabs have a history of following charismatic religious leaders, we should always look at the fundamentalist Islamic leaders who may be trying to position themselves as the “voice” of Islam. There are quite a few of these potential “wannabe Mahdis” including al Sadr, Osama bin Laden and the religious leaders in Iran.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com