Showing posts with label Muqtada al Sadr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muqtada al Sadr. Show all posts

Sunday, December 11, 2011

Victory In Iraq - Now It's Up To The Iraqis

Me at Baghdad's Camp Victory in early 2004 
I'm a Vietnam veteran as well as a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, so I know a little about guerrilla wars. Sometimes they end well, and sometimes they don't.

You see, I remember what it felt like to sit in my living room in April, 1975, staring at the television while enemy tanks rolled into Saigon. Only then did I have the painful realization that my fellow soldiers and I had fought and bled for a lost cause.

I'm not ashamed to say I cried that day. I remembered the hardships of my own months in Vietnam's jungles, and I saw the faces of my lost friends in the dark corners of my mind. To be honest, I still see them almost every day. You know - those couple of hours in the middle of the night when sleep won't come and the mind refuses to rest. Such is the legacy of Vietnam.

Although the losses are just as painful, the story in Iraq is a different one. When our last soldiers arrive home before Christmas and Iraq's security rests in its own hands, we can honestly say we have been victorious.

There are now over thirty million people living in Iraq. Because of the sacrifice of America and its coalition partners, there is a democratic government elected by the people. Is everything perfect? Of course not. But the problems that remain can only be solved by Iraqis. Whether it is sectarian differences or problems caused by foreign terrorists, it is time for Iraq to take care of itself.

What do I fear most now that we have pulled our soldiers out of Iraq? I fear the influence of Iran, a Shiite country that provides training and equipment to radical Shiites in Iraq like Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army.

But Americans cannot stay in Iraq forever. The truth is that wherever we go, we become a lightning rod for those with ancient reasons for hating foreign intervention. It was this way in Vietnam, in Iraq, and it is also the same in Afghanistan.

We must welcome our troops home from Iraq as the victorious warriors they are. We shall help them recover both physically and mentally, and they should be proud of all they accomplished.

We shall also continue to extend the hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. While many fundamentalist Iraqis will always hate us, there are a lot of Iraqis who will never forget the generosity of America or our sacrifices on their behalf. We have done all we can to give them a chance for a free and prosperous future.

The rest is up to them...

Charles M. Grist
Author of the award-winning book My Last War: A Vietnam Veteran's Tour in Iraq

Sunday, May 1, 2011

We Won In Iraq - It's Time To Come Home

The agreement negotiated by President George W. Bush with the Iraqi government mandates that our troops leave Iraq by the end of 2011. There has been some talk that we would stay longer if the Iraqis asked, but there is no indication they will invite us to do so. That is as it should be. It's time to come home.

Like many military veterans who served in Iraq, I always felt that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a war that didn't need to be fought while we were still chasing Osama bin Laden all over Afghanistan and Pakistan. Still, my fellow warriors and I did our duty, followed our orders, and defeated the regime of Saddam Hussein. We also killed or captured a lot of Islamic fundamentalist bad guys.

In place of the Sunni dictator, we installed a democratic government that has now been in place for many years. We drew down on our combat forces as the Iraqis built up their army and police. Our training mission continues, but we have forces in place that could respond like a SWAT team to a major problem. We also have advisors who accompany Iraqi units in the field, and those Americans remain in great danger. If any training continues after this year, it can be conducted next door in Kuwait or elsewhere.

The problems that remain in Iraq will be there whether we leave today or twenty years from now. The Sunni versus Shiite religious disagreements existed long before America was created. They will continue to be the greatest issue to face the Iraqi people. Watch radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army - they are the Hamas, Hezbollah, or Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq.

I am proud to have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom with some of the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who ever fought for America. We liberated over twenty-five million people, made many friends among the Iraqis, and gave them a great opportunity to live in a land filled with freedom and opportunity.

The future of Iraq is now in their hands.

Charles M. Grist
www.MyLastWar.com

Saturday, April 9, 2011

Part II - Radical Iraqi Cleric Muqtada Al Sadr Threatens Violence

Muqtada Al Sadr with his inner circle
With regard to my recent post of April 6 on radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia, here is an update today from the Associated Press:

*  *  *  *

Iraqi cleric threatens action if U.S. forces remain
BAGHDAD – A powerful anti-American Shiite cleric threatened Saturday to reactivate his feared militia if American soldiers remain in Iraq beyond this year, after a U.S. offer to keep troops on if they are needed.

Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement to his followers on the eight anniversary of Saddam Hussein's ouster that stopped just short of calling for violent action against U.S. forces. He accused "the occupation" of inciting panic, corruption and unrest among Iraqis.
His statement was read aloud at a huge protest of tens of thousands in Baghdad's Mawal Square, near al-Sadr's stronghold in an eastern Baghdad slum. The cleric is in Iran, where he has been studying religion for the last several years.
"What if the invasion forces will not leave our lands?" al-Sadr asked in the statement, which was read at the protest by his aide Salah al-Obeidi. "What if the U.S. forces and others stay in our beloved lands? What if their companies and embassy headquarters will continue to exist with the American flags hoisted on them? Will you be silent? Will you overlook this?"
"No, no America. No, no America," the crowd shouted in reply.In January, al-Sadr visited his ancestral home in the holy Shiite city of Najaf, 100 miles (160 kilometers) south of Baghdad, and told followers to embrace a peaceful approach to diplomacy as his political wing gains power in Iraq's government. But he also said that should the U.S. troops remain in Iraq past 2011, followers might retaliate "by all means of resistance."
On Saturday, al-Sadr elaborated on that point explaining he would quickly train newly armed followers and bring his feared Mahdi Army militia out of retirement. "We will have to adopt (this) approach if they will not leave our country," he said.
The Mahdi Army ran rampant in Baghdad, Basra and other Iraqi cities at the peak of Iraq's violence a few years ago, raiding homes and killing Sunnis in the widespread sectarian fighting that brought the country to the brink of civil war. Al-Sadr froze the militia after it was roundly defeated by Iraqi forces in Basra in 2008, dramatically reducing violence in the country.
Under a security agreement between Washington and Baghdad, U.S. troops are scheduled to leave Iraq at the end of 2011. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who needed al-Sadr's support to keep his job after his party failed to win a majority in national elections last year, has said repeatedly he believes the American forces will no longer be needed in Iraq by next year.
But many Sunni and Kurdish lawmakers want U.S. troops to stay, fearing Iraq is still too unstable to be able to protect itself should Iran begin to play a more active role in the country after American forces leave.
Visiting Iraq this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the Obama administration is willing to keep troops in Iraq past 2011. After meeting with al-Maliki and other leaders during his two-day visit, Gates signaled that scenario was becoming increasingly likely.But demonstrator Haidar Nuaman, 25, said al-Sadr's statement shows that many Iraqis won't stand for a continued U.S. military presence in Iraq.
"It seems that the government does not know what to do. Muqtada's is an important voice to stand against any intention by the government to extend the presence of forces," he said.
On April 9, 2003, a U.S.-led coalition ended Saddam's nearly quarter-century regime in Iraq, deposing his government after he fled Baghdad.
Saddam's fall was celebrated by millions of Shiites, Kurds and even Sunnis across the country, whose joy was immortalized in images broadcast worldwide of Iraqis beating a huge statue of the dictator with their fists, feet and shoes after American Marines pulled it down.
Many of those pictures were rebroadcast on Iraq state TV on Saturday. Images of men pulling the head of the Saddam statue down the street were followed by a map of Iraq and the slogan: "The day of change, the place of change."
At a Baghdad speech to his Shiite Dawa party that Saddam terrorized for years, al-Maliki did not mention the anniversary but lamented the day that also marked the assassination of one of al-Sadr's relatives. Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr was killed by Saddam's forces in 1980, and al-Maliki's message Saturday likely will be welcomed by the Sadrists.
"It is good to remember this anniversary in order not to have criminal in power again," al-Maliki said.
Many Iraqis are frustrated with al-Maliki's government, however, including some who have compared him to Saddam because of his often heavy-handed leadership.
"Toppling Saddam Hussein's regime was a dream," said Ari Harseen, a senior leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. "Since then we've gotten some of our rights, but we still have fears about the future as there are still Saddamist thoughts in some governmental institutions."
Associated Press Writers Mazin Yahya in Baghdad and Yahya Barzanji in Sulaimaniyah, Iraq, contributed to this report.
*  *  *  *
Once America has left Iraq, old grudges and ancient rivalries will continue to fester. It will not be an easy time.
Charles M. Grist

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

America Winds Down In Iraq - The Mahdi Army Waits In The Shadows

Muqtada al Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army
When I was in Iraq in 2004, there were two major uprisings by the Mahdi Army, a violent Shiite militia led by anti-American cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Many Americans and Iraqis were killed by his black-uniformed militia members. Eventually, Al Sadr moved his militia back into the shadows. He participated in the new Iraqi government, and his Shiite wing was instrumental in selecting many of the leaders of that government.

Then good old Muqtada went to Iran where he has continued his religious education. His ultimate goal is to become an ayatollah like his late father. In his quest to increase his status in Iraq, his mentors are the Iranians, and their influence has been substantial from the beginning of the war. Many of the rockets and mortars my fellow soldiers and I dodged during our tour were supplied by the Iranians.

Only about 47,000 American troops remain in Iraq, and those will be gone by the end of this year. When two U.S. soldiers were killed in southern Iraq in early April, it was likely the Mahdi Army was behind the attack. Militia members - with Al Sadr's blessing - say they will continue to target Americans until all have left Iraq.

Once all Americans have pulled out, watch for Muqtada al Sadr to make his move. A democracy will not work for a terrorist like Al Sadr. He and his fellow hardliners will endeavor to turn Iraq into the Arab equivalent of the Persian religious dictatorship in Iran.

It was a foregone conclusion that America would never have a long-term presence in Iraq - any more than we will have post World War II-styled military bases for decades in Afghanistan. We are the "infidels" to the leaders of both the Sunni and the Shiite factions. Yes, we removed the Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein, the mortal enemy of Iran. In many ways, I guess we did Iran a favor. Now they can deal with Muqtada and the sixty percent of Iraqis who are Shiites. Once again, time is on the side of the Muslims. It is their part of the world, and we are only temporary interlopers.

As the Middle East continues to erupt, Islamic fundamentalists will take advantage of turmoil in each country in turn. It is already happening in the post "democratic" revolution in Egypt that Barack Obama encouraged. Fundamentalists are encouraging rioters in Bahrain to keep up the struggle against that government as well as the Saudi Arabian troops who have entered the fray. When they think the time is right, the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al Sadr will make their move in Iraq.

Then we will see if the democracy we fought to establish there is strong enough to survive.

Charles M. Grist
www.MyLastWar.com

Saturday, November 8, 2008

Withdrawal From Iraq Is Not Very Far Away


The following article discusses the problems in negotiations between Iraq and the United States on our continued presence there:

* * * *

'Deal, No Deal' on Iraq-US Troop Talks

November 07, 2008

Knight Ridder

BAGHDAD - The United States delivered Thursday what it said was the final text of the controversial accord on the stationing of U.S. forces in Iraq, but Iraq said more talks are needed before the government can accept it.

"We have gotten back to the Iraqi government with a final text. Through this step, we have concluded the process on the U.S. side," said Susan Ziadeh, the U.S. Embassy spokeswoman in Baghdad. "Iraq will now need to take it forward through their own process."

The accord, which calls for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011, has been the subject of tense negotiations for the past seven months.

According to State Department officials, the United States yielded to several important Iraqi demands, including Baghdad's proposal to inspect mail and cargo for U.S. forces in Iraq. One official said he did not know the details of how those inspections would be carried out, adding, "I don't think it's going to be overly intrusive."

He and other officials spoke on condition of anonymity, because the details of the American response were not being made public.

President Bush also accepted Iraq's request for firmer language in its call for U.S. troops to withdraw by the end of 2011, two defense officials said, although they did not know the details of the wording.

While the U.S. government signaled that it will not engage in further negotiations over the pact, which has been repeatedly delayed, the government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, indicated that Iraq expects further discussions with the United States before the process is completed.

"These amendments need meetings with the American side to reach the bilateral understanding, and the environment is positive," Dabbagh said in a statement on a government-funded television channel. "The Iraqi side needs time to give the main blocs to have their opinions, suggestions and notes on the amendments suggested by the American side."

Many Iraqi officials are now calling the status-of-forces accord, or SOFA, "the withdrawal agreement," possibly as a way of marketing it to a wary public.

The accord is controversial in Washington as well. The White House has pushed aggressively to reach the deal, but some Pentagon officials expressed concern that the concessions will set a precedent for current and future status-of-forces agreements with other countries. The United States is not believed to have agreed to another nation monitoring mail in status agreements with more than 80 other countries, for example.

Earlier this week, a senior Pentagon official who requested anonymity to speak candidly said he found it "hard to believe we could find aspects there that are acceptable" in the Iraqi proposal to search mail and cargo, adding: "What kind of precedents would we be setting?"

Administration officials said Bush sees the agreement as key to shaping his legacy on Iraq. They said Bush wanted to leave the presidency with a solidified relationship between the United States and an indisputably sovereign Iraq.

To the White House, "SOFA is a sign of success," a second U.S. defense official, who also requested anonymity to speak candidly, told McClatchy Newspapers.

That said, the Bush administration refused to accept one major Iraqi proposal, which would have given Iraq expanded legal jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers alleged to commit wrongdoing while in the country. U.S. officials have called that a "non-starter."

The agreement has to be completed by the end of this year in order to replace a U.N. mandate that provides the legal basis for the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Iraqi officials were tight-lipped Thursday about whether the changes were acceptable. The changes first must be presented to the Cabinet. If the Cabinet agrees, the draft will be presented to the Iraqi parliament. One of the main sticking points for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has been the issue of jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers in Iraq.

Shiite Muslim officials who raised new demands when the accord was completed two weeks ago have been accused of succumbing to Iranian influence not to sign the agreement. At the time, Iraqi officials openly predicted that the government would be forced to extend the United Nations mandate. In recent days, officials have sounded more positive about the outcome.

"The next step is for the Cabinet to meet to look at the responses," Iraq's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told McClatchy. "I hope it will be very soon."

The latest draft calls for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and withdraw from Iraq by 2011. It also lifts immunity for private U.S. contractors such as Blackwater, whose security guards were accused of uncontrolled shooting while on patrol duty, resulting in the deaths of Iraqi civilians.

It also allows for a joint U.S. and Iraqi committee to decide whether a U.S. Soldier who's committed a crime outside a U.S. base was off-duty and where he should be tried. Iraqi officials wanted to make that decision on their own, but the Bush administration has apparently rejected the demand.

President-elect Barack Obama has long advocated a U.S. withdrawal by the summer of 2010, a date that Maliki originally demanded in the agreement.

U.S. officials are pushing to get the deal done before the end of the month. If it's not done by the beginning of December, the government will have to begin the process to renew the U.N. mandate, one U.S. official in Iraq said. The parliament must approve the agreement when it's back in session next week and before it adjourns just before the end of the month for the Hajj season, when millions of Muslims make the holy pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

"Look, the government of Iraq has debated this agreement thoroughly. ... They forwarded to us their suggested amendments. We got back to them," State Department spokesman Robert Wood said Thursday. "Now the negotiating process has come to an end."

© Copyright 2008 Knight Ridder.


* * * *

As I have emphasized before, Iraq will never permit a long-term presence of foreign troops on their soil. They will also never permit the continued occupation of bases for America's stategic purposes. There will be no Germany or Japan-styled multi-decade presence.

Those of us who served in Iraq and who came to know the Iraqi people understood this reality from the beginning. The Crusades and the British colonial occupation of the early twentieth century are still bad memories for almost all Arabs.

The Bush administration has already accepted provisions in the status-of-forces agreement that will move our forces from the cities of Iraq to military bases in mid-2009. We have also agreed to have all troops out by the end of 2011. Mr. Obama will make it happen even sooner.

Watch Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army. This extremist Shiite militia is supported by Iran and its members are voicing opposition to anything that will keep Coalition forces in Iraq. Their ultimate objective is a fundamentalist theocracy like the one in Iran. Let's see what they do after the only things standing in their way are new Iraqi soldiers and police officers.

America's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can be proud of what they have accomplished in Iraq. In the end, the people of this troubled nation will decide for themselves how they will live in the future.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, September 9, 2008

Opinions Vary on Iraq Troop Withdrawal Options


I know it's been awhile since my last posting (sorry about that). I have been traveling again, but it looks like that is slowly coming to an end. My pre-retirement medical exams, etc. may keep me in the Orlando area until I begin my terminal leave. We shall see.

Both Americans and Iraqis are debating when and under what circumstances American troops will begin to withdraw from Iraq. The following New York Times article offers some interesting perspectives, but some of the Iraqis who were interviewed have political agendas for their groups:

* * * *

New York Times
September 9, 2008
Pg. 6

Should U.S. Forces Withdraw From Iraq?

By Stephen Farrell

BAGHDAD — As Iraqi and American diplomats negotiate how long and under what circumstances American troops will remain in Iraq, Iraqis are also debating the issue.

For Iraqis, as for Americans, the answer is far more complex than a simple “stay” or “go.” For both it is about blood, treasure, pride, dignity and a nation’s sense of itself and its place in the world.

But a lot more Iraqi blood than American has already been spilled, and stands to be spilled again, if the politicians get it wrong.

On the streets of Iraq, the questions being asked about the continuing American presence are about sovereignty, stability and America’s intentions in Iraq’s past, present and future: How many American troops will stay? How quickly will they go? If they stay, where will they be based? To do what? With what powers? And under what restrictions?

For the most part, Iraqis’ views fall into three categories. One group, which includes many followers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and some intensely nationalist Sunni Arabs in parts of the country that have suffered the worst since the invasion, simply want the Americans to leave, period. They say no amount of American effort now can make up for the horrors of the occupation, including the destruction of society and the killing of innocent civilians.

A second group takes a similarly dim view of the occupation, but worries that the brief period this year of improving security in Iraq will be vulnerable if the Americans abruptly withdraws. They say that the United States has a moral obligation to remain, and that continued presence of the occupiers is preferable to a return to rule by gangs and militias.

A third group worries that without a referee, Iraq’s dominant powers — Kurds in the far north and Shiites in the center and south — will brutally dominate other groups.

The Americans are not the first to face such quandaries in Iraq. In August 1920, only two years after his declining colonial power had emerged from the devastation of World War I, the British secretary of war, Winston Churchill, wrote (but did not send) a letter to his prime minister that contained this assessment of Mesopotamia:

“It seems to me so gratuitous that after all the struggles of war, just when we want to get together our slender military resources and re-establish our finances and have a little in hand in case of danger here or there, we should be compelled to go on pouring armies and treasure into these thankless deserts.”

A millennium and a half earlier, in A.D. 694, the Umayyad provincial governor Al-Hajjaj also faced a fractious Baghdad. His response to one angry crowd was a speech learned by all Iraqi schoolchildren: “I see heads before me that are ripe and ready for the plucking, and I am the one to pluck them, and I see blood glistening between the turbans and the beards.” The turbans melted away.

Five years later, Al-Hajjaj faced a rebellion in a troublesome region to his east, which forced him to move troops from Iraq. That rebellion was in Kabulistan, now part of Afghanistan, a historical parallel that drew a wry smile from Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Iraq, when it was pointed out to him last month. General Petraeus will soon move up the chain of command to take over the Central Command region, making him responsible for an area that covers both Iraq and what was Kabulistan.

Names and governments change, but there is nothing new under the Mesopotamian sun.

The debate goes on. Following are some Iraqi perspectives on whether and how American troops should stay in their country.

Opinions of the Iraqis

The Choice Is Not Ours: America Wants to Stay

I don’t expect that the Americans will leave Iraq because they reached the maximum level of political influence in the region. America is controlling the future of energy, so I believe it’s not to America’s benefit for it to leave Iraq. -- ISMAIL KABABCHI, 38, a restaurant worker in central Baghdad

America will not leave Iraq. I think my grandsons’ grandsons will watch Uncle Sam and his blue jeans. The idea that America will depart is a kind of delusion because America came for its interests in Iraq. Iraq represents the most important treasure in the struggle among the superpowers for it includes plenty of wealth in addition to its important geographic location. In the long run, America will not leave Iraq because it reached the treasure of the world. -- SAID AL-MAJMAYI, 50, a painter in Baquba

Or Maybe It Doesn’t

I expect that the Americans will leave Iraq sooner or later because they can’t control the security situation. I expect their departure within the next few months because of the achievements of the Iraqi security forces and the Awakening in terms of security and stability. That will help the American forces leave Iraq and save the rest of their dignity before the situation turns bad again like between 2004 and 2005. -- ABU ABDUL QADER AL-JUMAYLI, 60, a retired army officer in Falluja

The withdrawal is coming, no doubt. America has lost its influence in Iraq to a very great and dangerous degree. The No. 1 country in the world didn’t imagine that it would become a toy in the hand of radical parties and armed groups, or some powers which will ally with America at daytime and conspire against it at night. -- MATEEN OMAR OJI, 32, a teacher in Kirkuk

America Must Leave Iraq Now

We want to push them out immediately. We don’t need them, and we don’t want them. We have two governments, the Iraqi and American governments. We are confused about who we need to obey, the Americans or Iraqis. And both the American and Iraqi governments are hurting the Iraqi people. -- ABDUL RAHMAN HAMED HUSSEIN, a social worker in Abu Dshir, south of Baghdad, who follows the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr

I want them to leave because they caused destruction for us, they have robbed us and they never gave us any of what they had promised to give us. If a civil war breaks out after their departure, it would be their doing. It’s going on now because of them. They are inflaming it. Iraqis have proved that they are not being seduced by the American actions. Their departure is the beginning of the road toward stability. What ever happens after their withdrawal, it will be finished within a year. -- MUHAMMAD SNAD, 36, an electrical technician in Mosul

We Don’t Love the Americans, But Withdrawal Is Worse

I am not with the coalition forces’ withdrawal from Iraq currently, because chaos and destruction will be all over Iraq. Even before the Americans came, we used to have genocide, destruction and wars. We know that the Americans came for their own benefit, yet they are our only solution. -- NISREEN HASSAN, 25, a teacher in Sulaimaniya

The presence of the American forces will make Iraq a regional and international power. If the Americans withdraw, Iraq will be subject to domination from neighboring countries which support terrorism in Iraq to protect their interests, so the departure of the American forces doesn’t serve Iraq’s interest. -- ABD MUHAMMAD AL-BEDEER, Samawa

If It’s Not the Americans, Someone Else Will Take Over

The coalition forces are the best solution to Iraq’s situation, they are just like a strong dam against the outside and the inside enemies and even the neighboring countries. They are all wolves — the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks. -- JALEEL MAHMOOD, 31, Sulaimaniya

Staying is the best thing for Iraq. If the Americans depart, half of Iraq will go to the Kurds and Iran will take the other half. We need a safety valve. America occupied Iraq and must solve the problems before its departure. America’s departure will increase the problems. -- AMJAD SALAH, 34, a driver in Basra

The Dream Deferred: Please Go, Just Not Yet

I don’t want them to leave right now, but I don’t want to see them here forever. Sooner or later the Americans have to leave Iraq or understand that our policy differs from their policy. They have to recognize the sovereignty of Iraq. I’d love to keep good relations with America rather than telling bad stories to my kids about it. -- HUDA HANI, 33, a Shiite employee of the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad

I’m against the Americans’ withdrawing before we have a fully independent government and security forces. I witnessed many terrible things with the Americans, and I don’t want the same thing to happen with the next generations. It would be better for both sides to have a scheduled withdrawal. -- MUHAMMAD MAHDI, 28, a Sunni graduate of the College of Arts who now works as a taxi driver in Baghdad

No one accepts the residence of the occupier, but the withdrawal should be studied well and not randomly. Things are getting better now, and we don’t want anything to affect that. The Americans are probably one of the reasons behind the previous chaos, but their quick withdrawal will generate bigger chaos. -- SALIM MUHAMMAD, 40, Najaf

Saying No and Meaning Yes

All of them declare in public that they are against the Americans remaining in Iraq. They demand Iraqi liberation. They always raise the same slogan: Independence for Iraq. But in private sessions or meetings they are always telling me and other reporters that the Americans must stay, and that if they leave right now it would be a big mistake. The reasons for this political hypocrisy are like a disease. Most of the Iraqi politicians suffer from it. Their aim is to maintain their reputation in the public eye. -- TAREQ MAHER, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad

In public we say we do not want American troops, but our hearts say they should stay in Iraq until we become a state of institutions based on democracy and dialogue, not violence. Most of our recent leaders are tiny in the political world and the Americans want to teach them how to be leaders. Really we need them to stay more. They are a fence against Iran’s ambitions toward Iraq. -- AHMED HASOON, 38, a teacher in Basra

Never Mind the Troops, I’m Leaving Iraq

At night in all seasons, especially in summer, it is so very, very hot because we are suffering from electricity shortages and water shortages. So many times I have to buy my baby’s milk from the black market. The American forces have been here for such a long time, and still it is not stable and nothing is sure. Sometimes I feel that I should leave Iraq and claim asylum or refugee status, so that later on I would be lucky enough to get another nationality, which would make me feel respectable and that I have some rights. As an Iraqi now I cannot help my country improve. But maybe later on with a new nationality I would be able to come back and do something. Only then will my voice be heard. -- ANWAR ALI, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad who is seeking asylum in the United States

Reporting was contributed by Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Kirkuk; Riyadh Mohammed, Ali Hameed, Mohamed Hussein and Anwar J. Ali from Baghdad; and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Mosul, Salahuddin Province, Falluja, Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and the Kurdish-administered northern region of Iraq.


* * * *

We will continue to negotiate the terms of our troop drawdown. Hopefully the Iraqis will work with us to make sure that the pace does not risk losing the security gains we have made together.

However, in the end it is their country. When they decide they don't want us there, we will have no choice but to leave.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Sunday, July 27, 2008

Mahdi Army Influence Weakened By the Surge


I've been busy at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but I'm glad to see all the reports about the improvements in Iraq because of the surge.

The following story was in the New York Times and it talks about the declining influence of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. Unfortunately, these fundamentalist Shiite militiamen will alway be in the shadows because they are supported, trained and financed by their Iranian mentors.

We will eventually draw down our troop levels in Iraq (as the Iraqi government is able to assume more responsibility), but we must keep our eyes on these thugs from Sadr City and be ready to swat them like flies should they re-emerge:

* * * *

New York Times
July 27, 2008
Pg. 1

Shiite Militia In Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb

By Sabrina Tavernise

BAGHDAD — The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative, milestone for stability in Iraq.

It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.

Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki struck another blow this spring, when he led a military operation against it in Baghdad and in several southern cities.

The shift, if it holds, would solidify a transfer of power from Mr. Sadr, who had lorded his once broad political support over the government, to Mr. Maliki, who is increasingly seen as a true national leader.

It is part of a general decline in violence that is resonating in American as well as Iraqi politics: Senator John McCain argues that the advances in Iraq would have been impossible without the increase in American troops known as the surge, while Senator Barack Obama, who opposed the increase, says the security improvements should allow a faster withdrawal of combat troops.

The Mahdi Army’s decline also means that the Iraqi state, all but impotent in the early years of the war, has begun to act the part, taking over delivery of some services and control of some neighborhoods.

“The Iraqi government broke their branches and took down their tree,” said Abu Amjad, a civil servant who lives in the northern Baghdad district of Sadr City, once seen as an unbreachable stronghold for the group.

The change is showing up in the lives of ordinary people. The price of cooking gas is less than a fifth of what it was when the militia controlled local gas stations, and kerosene for heating has also become much less expensive. In interviews, 17 Iraqis, including municipal officials, gas station workers and residents, described a pattern in which the militia’s control over the local economy and public services had ebbed. Merchants say they no longer have to pay protection money to militiamen. In some cases, employees with allegiances to the militia have been fired or transferred. Despite the militia’s weakened state, none of the Iraqis interviewed agreed to have their full names published for fear of retribution.

In a further sign of weakness, Shiite tribes in several neighborhoods are asking for compensation from militia members’ families for past wrongs.

The changes are not irreversible. The security gains are in the hands of unseasoned Iraqi soldiers at checkpoints spread throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods. And local government officials have barely begun to take hold of service distribution networks, potentially leaving a window for the militia to reassert itself.

The militia’s roots are still in the ground, Abu Amjad said, and “given any chance, they will grow again.”

A Criminal Enterprise

At the peak of the militia’s control last summer, it was involved at all levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, private minibus services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice factories, and even collecting rent from squatters in houses whose owners had been displaced. The four main gas stations in Sadr City were handing over a total of about $13,000 a day, according to a member of the local council.

“It’s almost like the old Mafia criminal days in the United States,” said Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. Talley, an Army engineer rebuilding Sadr City’s main market.

Um Hussein, a mother of 10 in Sadr City, the largest Shiite district in the capital and one of the poorest, said her family’s fuel bill had dropped so far that she could afford to buy one of her daughters a pair of earrings with the savings. Others interviewed listed simpler purchases that had now become possible: tomatoes, laundry detergent, gasoline.

One young man said that even though his house was right across from a distribution center that sold cooking gas, he was not allowed to buy it there at state prices, but instead was forced to wait for a militia-affiliated distributor who sold it at higher prices.

“We had to get our share of the cooking gas from Mahdi Army people,” Um Hussein said. “Now, everything is available. We are free to buy what we want.”

Before, the Mahdi Army controlled the 12 trucks that made daily deliveries of cooking gas canisters for the district, because the leader of the Sadr City district council, who was affiliated with the militia, was the one who handled the trucks’ documents.

“We had no idea when they were coming or where they were going,” the council member said, referring to the trucks.

Those who questioned the militia’s authority were dealt with harshly. A gas station worker from Kadhimiya recalled a man in his 60s being beaten badly for refusing to pay the inflated gas price last year. The Sadr City council member described his relationship with the militia by touching his hand to his face.

“I was kissing them here, here and here,” he said pointing to his right cheek, his left cheek and then his forehead.

A spokesman for the movement in Sadr City, Sayeed Jaleel al-Sarkhy, defended the Mahdi Army, saying in an interview that it was not a formal militia and denying the charges that it had taken control of local services. He said the militia had been infiltrated by criminals who used the name of the Mahdi Army as a cover.

The Mahdi Army is an army of believers,” he said. “It was established to serve the people.”

An employee in the Sadr City local government who oversees trash collectors — daily laborers whose salaries he said were controlled by the militia — said that had long stopped being true.

“I am sick all over,” he said. “I am blind. I’ve got a headache. I’ve got a toothache. My back hurts. All of this is from the Mahdi Army.”

Signs of Weakness

A month after Mr. Maliki’s military operation, strange things started to happen in Shuala, a vast expanse of concrete and sand-colored houses in northern Baghdad that was one of the Mahdi Army’s main strongholds. Militia members suddenly stopped showing up to collect money from the main gas station, a worker there said.

A member of the Shuala district council said: “They used to come and order us to give them 100 gas canisters. Now it’s, ‘Can you please give me a gas canister?’”

Then, several weeks later, 11 workers, guards and even a director, all state employees with ties to the militia, were transferred to other areas. Employees’ pictures were posted so American and Iraqi soldiers could identify impostors.

The Iraqi Army now occupies the militia’s old headquarters in Shuala. Soldiers set up 18 checkpoints around the neighborhood, including at the gas station. When the militia opened a new office, soldiers put a checkpoint there, too, said an Iraqi major from the unit based there. Iraqi soldiers recently distributed warning notices to families squatting in houses whose rent had been collected by the Mahdi Army until May.

In Sadr City, the authorities closed the militia’s radio station. The leader of the district council was arrested by the American military. Cooking gas delivery documents must now be approved by three officials, not just one, the council member said.

Another sign of weakness is the growing number of financial settlements between powerful Shiites and Mahdi Army members’ families over loved ones who were killed by the militia. In Topchi, a Shiite neighborhood in western Baghdad, a handwritten list of militia members’ names was taped up in the market this month, with the warning for their families to leave town. Several of their houses were attacked.

Some militia members’ families went to the local council to ask for help. They found none. Mahdi militiamen killed four local council members over several weeks last fall.

“I told them this isn’t good, they must not be blamed,” the council member said. Even so, “if your brother has been killed, this is the time for revenge.”

Now neighborhoods are breathing more freely. A hairdresser in Ameen, a militia-controlled neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, said her clients no longer had to cover their faces when they left her house wearing makeup. Minibuses ferrying commuters in Sadr City are no longer required to play religious songs, said Abu Amjad, the civil servant, and now play songs about love, some even sung by women.

“They lost everything,” said the Sadr City government employee. “The Sadr movement has no power now. There is no militia control.”

Lingering Fears

The Mahdi Army might be weak, but it is not gone.

Majid, a Sadr City resident who works in a government ministry, said several Iraqi Army officers in his area had to move their families to other neighborhoods after Mr. Maliki’s military operation because the militia threatened them. Bombs are still wounding and killing American soldiers in the district. And early this month, one Iraqi officer’s teenage son was kidnapped and killed, his body hung in a public place as a warning, said Majid, who gave only his first name because he feared reprisals.

“People are still afraid of the Mahdi Army,” he said. “You still get punished if you talk bad about them.”

While most of the Iraqi soldiers at the new checkpoints seem loyal to the government, others have sympathies closer to the militia. A friend of Majid’s was obliged to pay a steep tribal settlement, after telling an army patrol about his neighbor, a militia member. The patrol had been infiltrated and leaked the tip to the neighbor.

“They are still trying to influence things,” General Talley said, though his overall assessment was that their control was receding.

The shift comes at a crucial moment: Iraqis will vote in provincial elections in December. The weakening of the Sadrists in national politics clears the stage for the group’s most bitter rival — a Shiite party led by another cleric, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. One of the party’s members, Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, a sheik and a member of Parliament, is arranging state aid for Sunni families willing to move back to Topchi.

The timing was not missed by the Sadr movement’s spokesman, who said the government had recently warned the group to vacate its office. He blames Mr. Hakim’s party for the attempts to marginalize his movement, whose members have also been targets of a political crackdown in southern Iraq.

“Some parties are occupying large buildings in Jadriya,” he said, referring indirectly to the headquarters of Mr. Hakim’s party. “That’s what makes us suspicious. Why only us?”

He added, “The main motive is to exclude the Sadr movement from politics.”
One indicator of whether the new gains will hold is whether local governments can truly fill the gap that the militia left and deliver services effectively and consistently.

General Talley said his unit had recently spent $34 million to help reconstruct a major market in Sadr City. But the district council has gotten bogged down in arguments over who has the right to disburse $100 million that Mr. Maliki promised Sadr City after the military operation. The district council was given 90 days to come up with projects. More than 30 days have passed and not one proposal has been submitted, council members said.

“To be honest with you, I find it very slow,” said Haidar al-Abadi, an adviser to Mr. Maliki who said that funds had been held back because militia-affiliated companies had gotten involved. “There’s a danger this slowness could backfire.”

The militia is painting its response on Sadr City walls: “We will be back, after this break.”

The Iraqi Army is painting over it.

Reporting was contributed by Mohammed Hussein, Tareq Maher, Campbell Robertson, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Alissa J. Rubin.


* * * *

Great article; surprised it was in the New York Times....

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Thursday, May 29, 2008

Mahdi Army Itches to Fight Again


Success in Iraq will depend on how the Iraqi government deals – or fails to deal – with the Shiite militias like the Mahdi Army.

To watch a comparable situation, keep your eyes on the democratic government of Lebanon that continues a shaky relationship with the radical Hezbollah terrorist militia.

By the way, both Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army are supplied, funded and trained by Iran. Iran’s ultimate goals in both Lebanon and Iraq are the establishment of fundamentalist governments like the one in Tehran.

Check out the following article:

* * * *

Philadelphia Inquirer
May 29, 2008

Dissent Arises Over Iraq Cease-Fire
A Mahdi Army leader said, "We were duped." A disagreement could restart Shiite fighting.

By Hamza Hendawi, Associated Press

BAGHDAD - An angry Shiite militia commander complained yesterday "we were duped" into accepting a cease-fire in Sadr City - remarks that pointed to a potentially damaging rift within the movement of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The May 11 truce ended seven weeks of fierce fighting in Baghdad between U.S. and Iraqi government forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which held nearly complete control of the capital's sprawling Sadr City district.

Iraqi soldiers now have moved into most parts of Sadr City with little resistance. But the objections raised by the commander highlight apparent dissent by some Mahdi Army leaders.

A split among Sadr's followers - between those favoring a more militant path and others seeking compromise with Iraq's government - could threaten the relative calm in Baghdad and reignite Shiite-on-Shiite violence across Iraq's oil-rich south.

The commander, speaking to tribal sheikhs and lawmakers loyal to Sadr, said "we were duped and deceived" by the truce. "They are arresting many of us now."

The group had gathered in Sadr's main Baghdad office to discuss how to respond to what they consider cease-fire "violations" by Iraqi troops, such as arrests and house searches.

Some in the audience, however, took issue with the views of the commander, whose name was not made public for security reasons.

"You can be the winner without a military victory," said Falah Hassan Shanshal, a prominent Sadrist and one of two parliamentarians who attended the meeting in Sadr City, home to 2.5 million Shiites.

"We had to bow before the storm because it was uprooting everything and everyone standing in its path," he said.

Shanshal was referring to the punishing attacks by U.S. and Iraqi government forces, which used tanks, helicopter gunships, and Hellfire missiles fired from unmanned aircraft. The strikes killed and wounded hundreds and left parts of Sadr City in ruins.

The southern section of the district has been sealed off from the rest of Sadr City in an attempt to foil militia movements and rocket and mortar attacks on the U.S.-protected Green Zone.

The battles in Sadr City were part of a wider Mahdi Army backlash to a government crackdown on armed groups launched in late March in the southern city of Basra.

Sadr, who has been in Iran for at least a year, supported the Sadr City cease-fire, perhaps to save his Mahdi Army from further losses so it can continue the fight later.

But signs of opposition have been growing within the militia ranks. Last week, two Mahdi Army commanders said militiamen were divided over whether the cease-fire was in their interest.

The head of Sadr's office in Sadr City, Sheikh Salman al-Freiji, suggested the truce might collapse if "violations" by the Iraqi army continued.

"There will not be any trust built between the two sides like that," Freiji warned. "The Mahdi Army was created to defend the Iraqi people. How can you do that without fighting the occupier?"

Shanshal, the Sadrist lawmaker, was conciliatory. He blamed the Iraqi army for heavy-handed tactics but stressed that he did not want more fighting in Sadr City.

* * * *

As long as the armed radical militias remain in the shadows, ready to continue their fight, long-term peace will be difficult to achieve in Iraq.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Saturday, May 17, 2008

It Wasn't My Fault Say the Generals


One day in 2004, my team and I stood by at the front doors of the Water Palace (Al Faw Palace) at Camp Victory. As a protective service detail, we were waiting for our general to emerge from the palace after meeting with then-commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez (pictured above).

Before our boss exited the palace, Sanchez came walking out of the doors, followed by his “Incredible Hulk”-style Army bodyguard. I saluted Sanchez and he crisply returned my salute.

At the time, all of us average soldiers believed that men like Sanchez had their fingers on the pulse of the war. Still, we were concerned with several issues whose solutions seemed fairly obvious, even to the average privates and sergeants.

The failure of CPA boss Bremer to pay for obviously critical improvements to Iraqi society bothered us all. We had invaded a nation of more than 25 million people, removed their government, their army, their police and their infrastructure, but somehow we were supposed to fix everything with only 140,000 troops. The people needed electricity, water, jobs and a host of other things. Our failure to provide these necessities resulted in a lot of hungry ex-soldiers and ex-cops joining the insurgency.

When fiery cleric Muqtada al Sadr launched his up-risings in 2004, the troops wanted to take him out along with his Mahdi Army. The CPA succumbed to political pressure from al Sadr’s fellow Shiites. Now, in 2008, the Mahdi Army is Iraq’s version of Hezbollah or Hamas and this Iranian-trained militia is still killing Americans and Iraqis.

Also in 2004, we watched our troops fight valiantly in Fallujah, only to be pulled out when a former Iraqi general under Saddam Hussein was given permission to form the “Fallujah Protective Army”. This was a force of Fallujah residents who did exactly as all of us average soldiers predicted - nothing. They gave insurgents free reign in Fallujah and refused to turn over the foreign fighters.

The soldiers always knew what should have been done in the beginning. We had faith that our military leaders would do what was necessary to succeed in Iraq, but our faith was misplaced to a large degree in those early days of the war.

We must still emerge victorious in Iraq – as long as the Iraqis continue to work with us. But now we are watching some of our former commanders, like Sanchez and other generals, try to put all of the blame on the politicians for those early strategic mistakes. Most of the blame belongs with the political leaders in Washington, but some of it does not.

Generals whose men are making the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield must do more than “follow orders”. When it comes to the ultimate test of honor, a general has an obligation to speak up on behalf of those who are doing the fighting and dying, even if it costs that general his job. A good example of such a general of honor is Eric Shinseki, who told Congress exactly what it would take to succeed in Iraq and who was summarily shuffled off into retirement.

Like many veterans of the Iraq war, I have become tired of listening to retired generals who have become “talking heads” on the evening news. It wasn’t their fault, they say. They were only following orders, they say. Many of these generals were commanders who failed as leaders because their honor became secondary to their next promotion.

Things have changed for the better in Iraq because the military leaders, and the soldiers under them, have taken the lead in getting things done. As it should have been in the beginning, authority to make things happen has finally been delegated to all levels of command. This is much improved over those early days in the war when very little authority was granted – even to the generals.

The following article about retired Lt. General Sanchez’s new book appeared in today’s Miami Herald.

* * * *

Miami Herald
May 17, 2008

Ex-Iraq Commander Distances Self From Culpability
The former head of command in Iraq said he may have been the chief, but he was just following orders.

By Nancy A. Youssef

WASHINGTON--To hear retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez explain it, the mistakes of the Iraq war that happened while he was in command there weren't his fault. Not Abu Ghraib, not the birth of the insurgency, not the decision to let rebel cleric Muqtada al Sadr survive.

Sanchez was a soldier, and according to him, a general's job is to give advice. What the civilian leaders decide after that is out of a general's hands.

''It's our responsibility to provide the best judgment we can,'' Sanchez said in an interview with McClatchy. ``But when those decisions are made, if they are not illegal or immoral, civilian control of the military dictates that we comply.''

Sanchez argues that crafting a strategy wasn't his responsibility, even as the top commander in Iraq. That fell to the civilian leaders, such as the secretary of defense and the president.

But as part of the military's emerging counterinsurgency strategy, commanders now are calling their soldiers ''strategic corporals.'' That is, every soldier's decision is part of the broader strategy.

Captains serving in outposts throughout Iraq now are leading fiefdoms alongside local Iraqi leaders, deciding everything from who should protect the community to how local funds should be spent. Commanders now stress to corporals and captains stationed in those outposts that their decisions are part of the broader strategy.

''It's all well and good for a general to say I am not responsible for grand strategy,'' said retired Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan. ``But corporals can be strategic. They can make things happen.''

Latest book

Sanchez's comments were part of a series of interviews he's given recently to promote his new autobiography, ''Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story,'' the latest of several books by key Iraq decision-makers that seem intended to exonerate them of responsibility.

In his book, Sanchez repeatedly spells out instances in which civilian leaders made decisions that countered his recommendations.

Advice ignored

Sanchez said the key window for the United States to turn the situation around in Iraq opened with the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003.

It closed the following April, he said, when the U.S. made two key mistakes: It launched its first major offensive into Fallujah and decided not to capture Sadr, whose Shiite militia has since grown into one of Iraq's most powerful forces.

Sanchez said he advised President Bush not to go into Fallujah in April 2004 after four private security contractors were taken hostage and killed. Their burned bodies were hung from a bridge as several Iraqis celebrated beneath them, in widely-circulated photos.

Sanchez said he feared that proponents of attacking Fallujah were being driven by a knee-jerk reaction to the photos and not by any consideration of the difficulty of moving into the city, which had been a troublesome redoubt of anti-American insurgents since the day U.S. troops toppled Hussein.

He said he advised against the offensive. The president ''appreciated our caution but then ordered us to attack,'' Sanchez wrote.

That battle ended in failure less than a month later and signaled to the insurgency that the U.S. would walk away from a major fight.

That same month, the U.S. had a chance to arrest Sadr, but Sanchez said that L. Paul Bremer, then the head of the Coalition Provincial Authority, called off the operation. Sadr has been haunting U.S. efforts in Iraq ever since.

Abu Ghraib

Sanchez said that he should have known more about what was going on at the Abu Ghraib prison, where Iraqi prisoners were subjected to abuses that resulted in the courts-martial of seven low-ranking soldiers.

But even there, he said he bore no direct responsibility for what was taking place. Instead, the abuses of Abu Ghraib were a result of the Bush administration's endorsement of aggressive interrogations, which began in Afghanistan. He points out that an Army inspector general report ultimately absolved him.

* * * *

The early mistakes in Iraq do not negate the necessity to succeed in our military efforts in that country. We must never forget that the ultimate problem is, and shall be for some time, the Iranian issue. If we pull out of Iraq before the Iraqis can defend themselves, Iran will use Muqtada al Sadr to carry out a proxy takeover of Iraq.

This is the ultimate goal of the radical Shiites and such a victory would only ensure a continued river of blood throughout the Middle East.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, April 22, 2008

Iraqi Militias Must Go


Back in 2004, the Mahdi Army consisted of only a few thousand members, mostly young street hoodlums attracted to Muqtada al Sadr because his father was a well-respected ayatollah who was executed by Saddam Hussein.

Those of us working the perilous streets of Baghdad that year were disheartened when our bosses decided to leave the Mahdi Army untouched because al Sadr indicated he would turn to politics. We didn’t believe he or his militia would ever disarm and he launched two uprisings that year. Many Americans were killed or wounded by his militia thugs.

Now Muqtada’s private army is conservatively estimated to consist of around 60,000 members. That doesn’t include the sympathizers among Iraqi civilians or the family members who help sustain and equip these black-uniformed killers. It also doesn’t include the Iranian advisors who provide arms, ammunition and training to their Iraqi revolutionary brothers – just as they did in 2004.

Al Sadr owes his life and the lives of his fellow Shiites to the American and Coalition forces, but he has refused to deal with the United States. This ungrateful fundamentalist only wants to lead the ultimate Shiite theocracy he sees simmering beneath the surface of the Iraqi political landscape. Any cooperation at all is only because it is in his interests for the moment while he pursues his own agenda.

While al Sadr hides in Iran, the new Iraqi Army has done reasonably well against his militia, even though some of the fundamentalists are surely within the military’s ranks. With Sunnis working with the Coalition for the most part to steadily wipe out the foreign fighters, one of the biggest remaining issues remains the in-fighting among the Shiites. Clearly, many of these Shiites – like al Maliki – have begun to realize that a functioning democracy is the only way to prevent a bloody civil war.

We have been correct to stay the course and we must continue to do so as long as freedom-loving Iraqis work with us. American and Coalition military forces can never impose a democracy on the people of Iraq because democracy is a free-will choice of the people of any nation.

If the average Iraqi citizen wants liberty, then he must be willing to fight for it as well. The Mahdi Army and the other militias must be squashed once and for all, but the Iranian influence in Iraqi society will always remain concealed in the shadows.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Saturday, December 15, 2007

Al Sadr's Quest for Power in Iraq


My “series” of posts on Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army continues.

Al Sadr may be trying to position himself in order to eventually declare that he is the “Mahdi” or “the guided one”. According to many fundamentalists, this individual will appear when Muslims are being oppressed throughout the world. The Mahdi will make war against those who are deemed to be oppressors. All Muslims will be joined together in peace and justice and the Mahdi will rule over all Arabs. According to believers, the Mahdi will even pray at Mecca with Jesus (“Isa” in the Quran).

Although Muqtada’s father was a high-ranking ayatollah, Muqtada has not even completed his formal religious training. This article talks about his quest for Islamic credentials:

* * * *

Iraq cleric Sadr eyes higher religious credentials

Reuters: December 14, 2007

KUFA, Iraq: Powerful Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is taking advanced Islamic studies in a bid to earn credentials that would allow him to issue religious decrees, a top aide to the young firebrand said on Friday.

Some senior figures in the Shi'ite clerical establishment view Sadr, who commands the feared Mehdi Army militia and has a bloc of legislators in parliament, as an upstart given his lack of scholarly achievement.

The anti-American cleric has a strong following among poor, urban Shi'ites across Iraq. Attaining higher religious credentials would likely enhance the influence of Sadr among majority Shi'ites, engaged in a power struggle for influence in the oil-rich south as foreign troops scale down their presence.

Senior aide Salah al-Ubaidi, speaking in the southern town of Kufa near the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, said Sadr was looking to gain the title of "Marji", a term used for a cleric who is qualified to make religious decisions for his followers.

"Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr is studying the Hawza like any other Shi'ite student who aims to reach the level of Ijtihad," Ubaidi told Reuters, referring to a term that describes a level that allows someone to issue religious decrees or "fatwas".

He said Sadr, who is believed to be in his 30s, was studying at Najaf, adding it was unclear how long it would take the cleric the achieve the credentials, but the process normally takes years.

Sadr's followers currently have to seek guidance on religious issues from clerics who have the necessary qualifications.

If Sadr succeeds, he could earn more respect from top Shi'ite clerics who have been unsettled by his rising following, which they believe stems from his respected father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed by suspected agents of Saddam Hussein along with two of his sons in 1999.

Ubaidi denied Sadr was developing his religious stature to push for more influence in mainly Shi'ite southern Iraq, a region rich in oil reserves.

"He has no interest in public funds," Ubaidi said.

Sadr's main mass movement Shi'ite rival is the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.

Hakim also built his reputation partly through his father Muhsin al-Hakim, one of the most prominent Shi'ite scholars of recent times. But Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has a closer relationship to traditional clerics at the top of the hierarchy than Sadr.

Sadr, who led two uprisings against U.S. forces in 2004, froze the activities of the Mehdi Army for six months in late August after some of his followers were blamed for sparking intra-Shi'ite violence at a major religious ceremony.

The U.S. military has welcomed the ceasefire and said it has helped bring down violence in Iraq.

Sadr has vowed to reorganise his militia and root out rebellious elements who are ignoring his commands and taking the law into their own hands.

(Reporting by Khaled Farhan in Najaf; writing by Mussab Al- Khairalla in Baghdad, Editing by Dean Yates and Ibon Villelabeitia)

* * * *

We must remember that the future of Iraq will ultimately be determined by Iraqis, not America and its Coalition partners.

Since Arabs have a history of following charismatic religious leaders, we should always look at the fundamentalist Islamic leaders who may be trying to position themselves as the “voice” of Islam. There are quite a few of these potential “wannabe Mahdis” including al Sadr, Osama bin Laden and the religious leaders in Iran.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Thursday, December 13, 2007

Mahdi Army Spreads Fear Through Intimidation


A couple of days ago, I posted a piece on Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and the threat it poses to the future of Iraq. The American and Iraqi governments have already paid a heavy price in blood because they failed to deal with the Mahdi Army when it was a much smaller force. The ultimate price has yet to be determined.

Taliban-like threats and intimidation of the Iraqi people will not end any time soon. Muqtada al Sadr has big plans for himself and his militia. Those plans have nothing to do with democracy or the basic rights of man.

* * * *

Washington Post
December 13, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear;
Schoolgirls Told to Wear Scarves, Under Threat of Death


By Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD -- On the first day of class, two male teenagers entered a girls' high school in the Tobji neighborhood, clutching AK-47 assault rifles. The young Shiite fighters handed the principal a handwritten note and ordered her to assemble the students in the courtyard, witnesses said.

"All girls must wear hijab," she read aloud, her voice trembling. "If the girls don't wear hijab, we will close the school or kill the girls."

That October day Sara Mustafa, 14, a secular Sunni Arab, also trembled. The next morning, she covered up with an Islamic head scarf for the first time. The young fighters now controlled her life. "We could not do anything," Sara recalled.

The Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is using a new generation of youths, some as young as 15, to expand and tighten its grip across Baghdad, but the ruthlessness of some of these young fighters is alienating Sunnis and Shiites alike.

The fighters are filling the vacuum of leadership created by a 10-month-old U.S.-led security offensive. Hundreds of senior and mid-level militia members have been arrested, killed or forced into hiding, weakening what was once the second most powerful force in Iraq after the U.S. military. But the militia still rules through fear and intimidation, often under the radar of U.S. troops.

"JAM is alive and well in Tobji, although they have gotten younger, like in many other areas," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, using a military acronym derived from the militia's name in Arabic. For much of this year, his soldiers operated in Tobji.

The rise of this new generation is a reflection of the Mahdi Army's deep infiltration of society and could presage a turbulent resurgence of the militia as the U.S. military reduces troop levels. The emergence also highlights the struggle Sadr faces in his quest to control the capital and lead Iraq.

In late August, the 34-year-old cleric declared a freeze in operations, in part to exert more authority over his unruly, decentralized militia. Many followers stood down, so much that U.S. commanders give Sadr some credit for a downturn in violence this year. But some militia leaders have ignored Sadr's freeze, and their young, power-hungry foot soldiers may ultimately undermine the cleric's popular appeal.

"We have to show people we are not weak," said Ali, a 19-year-old Mahdi Army fighter in Tobji.

'I Was in Control. I Ruled'

Two years ago, Ali was unemployed. He recalled that he idolized his older cousins who were veteran Mahdi Army fighters. Like them, he was born and raised in Tobji, a wisp of a neighborhood in north-central Baghdad where every neighbor knows the other. Its official name is Salaam, or peace.

Ali and his cousins once befriended Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. But after the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra, sectarian violence shattered Tobji's tribal and social bonds. Suddenly sect was all that mattered to Ali, and the militia became his new family. He was 17.

Abu Sajjad, a 44-year-old former Mahdi Army fighter, remembered seeing a rise in disaffected, jobless recruits at the time. "They were nothing before they joined the Mahdi Army," said Abu Sajjad, who asked to be called by his nickname to protect his security. "The Mahdi Army will protect them better than their tribes or their families."

Older fighters quickly indoctrinated Ali. "They are Sunnis. We are Shia. They are not going to kick us out of Tobji," Ali recalled them saying.

Ali, tall and slim with wavy black hair, spoke on condition that his full name not be used, fearing arrest by U.S. forces and retaliation by the militia. He is trying to leave the militia and has joined the Iraqi army, which he keeps secret from his comrades. In separate interviews, Sunni and Shiite residents said that Ali was a well-known Mahdi Army member involved in several attacks.

Initially, Ali was assigned to a militia checkpoint. He searched cars and demanded that drivers give their tribal names, so he could determine their sect. "I was a teenager. I was in control. I ruled," said Ali, who during a four-hour interview wore a brown sweater and, like many Shiites, a silver ring on his left pinky. "If I told any car to stop, it would stop."

At the local Sadr office, recruits were given lessons in Shiite religion and Mahdi Army ideology, which centered on Shiite supremacy. The recruits were ordered to inform on anyone suspicious or breaking Islamic codes.

"They can convince anybody," Ali said. "If they tell you that your father is a bad man, you will be more than happy to kill your father."

Ali also worked in a barbershop. When customers discussed their lives, he took mental notes and later reported what he had heard to the Sadr office.

Four months after he joined, Ali fought his first street battle. He fired a rocket-propelled grenade into the house of a member of a Sunni tribe called the Egheidat, killing him. Ali said he felt remorse, which vanished as smiling, older fighters hugged him.

"You are a hero," one of them told Ali. "The rocket saved our lives."

Two Egheidat leaders, including Mustafa Salih, Sara's father, said that Ali was known to have fired RPGs during the battle, but they were unsure if he had killed anyone.

Mahdi Army commanders punished young fighters for disobeying orders. Offenders were taken to a room inside the Sadr office, filled with steel cables, whips and slabs of iron, where they were tortured. Ali said it was called "The Happiness Room."

Murder and Protection

On the streets of Tobji one recent day, clusters of girls headed to school in their uniforms, all wearing the hijab. The portrait of a serene Haider Hamrani, a 17-year-old militia fighter shot dead by U.S. forces, stared out from a billboard.

Young men with cellphones circled the neighborhood, which was plastered with images of Sadr. They drove mopeds on side streets or gathered on corners. Some wore jeans, others baseball caps, blending into the landscape. They were the early warning system, keeping watch for strangers and U.S. patrols.

"No one will suspect they are Mahdi Army," Ali said.

Today, more than half the militia here is under age 20, said Ali and another young fighter named Mahmoud. The new generation is heavily involved in the militia's income-generating schemes. They sell the cars of kidnap victims and rent out the houses of displaced Sunnis. The militia also demands payments from generator men supplying electricity. Each month, youths collect 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or about $4, in protection money from every household.

"The more flagrant, younger crowd tends to focus on organized crime and lining their pockets with cash," said Miska, the U.S. officer.

Many young militiamen appear to have become ruthless murderers, replacing older fighters who have been captured or gone underground. Ali said he took part in four killings, all of neighbors. After Ali informed the Sadr office that his childhood friend Wissam had joined the Iraqi army, several young militia members abducted him and his mother. First they shot Wissam. When his mother kneeled over his body, screaming and in tears, they shot her in the head, Ali and Mahmoud said.

Another neighbor, a divorced woman, was killed after Ali mentioned that he had heard on the street that she was a prostitute -- a crime in the view of the militia -- although he had no proof. One of her assassins, Ali said, was a 17-year-old named Saad, who had joined at age 15.

When young fighters are told to kill someone, Ali said, "they will kill that person the next day without hesitation."

Nearby, in the living room of his narrow two-story home, Abu Ali Hassan, a 42-year-old Sunni, has hung a portrait of Imam Ali, one of Shiite Islam's most revered figures, in case militia fighters visit. Each month, he hands them the 5,000 dinars, which he calls "extortion money."

He's noticed that older fighters have all but vanished. "They are running the neighborhood through these kids," said Hassan, a Transportation Ministry employee.

Like many areas in Baghdad, Tobji has experienced a decline in violent attacks. But most Sunnis who fled have yet to return, community leaders said. Those who remain live under constant fear that they are being monitored. This year, the militia started to deploy women as spies, Ali and other residents said.

Desperate, Hassan has befriended a few young militiamen on his street. "God forbid, if anything happens to me tomorrow, they will be useful to me," he said. "Now, they are the supreme power in our neighborhood."

Shiites as Victims

Increasingly, the militia's victims are Shiites.

Tobji's Shiite head of the local council, Abu Hussein Kamil, and another official were assassinated in August. Kamil, Ali said, had not given jobs to relatives of the militiamen and was suspected of collaborating with U.S. forces. "He was hurting his own people," Ali said.

In June, several young fighters tortured and killed a Shiite generator man because he would not give additional electricity to the house of a militia member, his family and neighbors said. "They call themselves the Mahdi Army, but they act like a gang," said Majid al-Zubaidi, 28, the man's brother. "They just want to show they are in control of everything. They want people to fear them."

"Now, both Sunni and Shia are upset with the Mahdi Army," Zubaidi said.

Abu Sajjad, the veteran fighter, said many older militiamen are also angry. The youths are tarnishing the militia's image as guardians of Shiites, he said. One day, he witnessed two young fighters on a moped drive up to a car and fatally shoot the driver, a Shiite who had publicly criticized Sadr. Abu Sajjad urged the Sadr office to punish the assailants, but nothing happened, he said.

The leaders of the office protect the shebab, as the young men are called in Arabic, Abu Sajjad said. "The shebab are their eyes in the neighborhood and are following their orders."

On another day, a 17-year-old fighter went to the Sadr office and complained that his parents had ordered him to leave the militia. The office threatened the family, said Abu Sajjad, who knows the teenager and his family.

The U.S. military has exploited this generational rift and the anger of residents, Miska said. His troops paid informers for tips that often led to raids and arrests. But some community leaders complained that the American military had also targeted moderate leaders who brought some discipline to the militia.

"It's hard to believe they can't distinguish between the good people and bad people," said Ali Khadim, 44, a prominent Shiite tribal leader. U.S. troops, he said, recently raided his own house, where his elderly parents live.

Schoolchildren 'Seduced'

Down the street from the Sadr office, the tan wall of a secondary school was covered with posters of Sadr and Imam Ali. A long black banner commemorated a Shiite holiday, as women covered in head-to-ankle abayas seemed to float by.

Inside some of Tobji's schools, young militiamen have pressured teachers to disclose exam answers and give high grades to relatives of Mahdi Army fighters. They have ordered them to give Shiite religious lessons to students, including Sunnis, according to teachers and parents.

"They have turned the schools into their safe houses," said Fadhil Hassan, who teaches at a school in Tobji that he asked not be named, fearing retaliation. A young fighter wanted by U.S. forces shows up every day, Hassan said, and sometimes hits students on the head or shoulder with a stick, separating Sunnis from Shiites.

Now, students with problems are also turning to the Mahdi Army, he added, and looking up to militiamen as role models.

"They are seduced by these young fighters," Abu Sajjad said. "When children get power and pistols, this is their biggest dream come true." By infiltrating the schools, he added, the fighters have found the most effective means of controlling Tobji. "Families will be terrified through their kids."

Following the arrests of Mahdi Army commanders, Tobji's tribes are trying to reassert themselves. But ancient rules built on honor and respect hold little sway over the new generation.

Khadim, the Shiite tribal leader, has tried to persuade several young fighters to leave. Only one did, he said.

Ali is trying to quit. He's in love with a Sunni woman from the neighborhood. If the militiamen learn of this, he fears he will be killed, he said.

Worried about his future, Mustafa Salih has added his name to a list of Sunnis keen to launch a sahwa -- or "awakening" -- protection force, like those the U.S. military has funded in other areas. The tipping point came when he saw his daughter, Sara, rush home from school in October, upset that she had to wear a hijab.

"Why plant extremist ideas in children?" Salih asked bitterly.

Today, Sara's head scarf has become a metaphor for the militia's grip on her neighborhood. "It feels like someone is choking me," she said.

* * * *

Remember that Muqtada al Sadr already controls a large percentage of the seats in the new Iraqi Parliament, giving his Iranian sponsors the eyes and ears they need to plan their own vision for the future of Iraq.

In reality, al Sadr and his militia are the "resident evil" of Baghdad and just as dangerous as the foreign terrorists or the Sunni insurgency.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

The Mahdi Army - Iran's Surrogate in Iraq


There will come a day when the United States largely pulls out of Iraq at the request of that nation’s leaders. If our goals are met, then a multi-party Iraqi government will be able to defend itself from outside aggressors and provide a stable, democratic environment that will protect the interests of all the various political factions.

One of the largest wild cards in the future of Iraq will remain Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a Hezbollah-like militia that has opposed the American and Coalition presence since day one. When I was in Iraq in 2004, the Mahdi Army was already building its relationship with Iran and this militia became a force to be reckoned with. Many Americans died during al Sadr’s uprisings that year.

Al Sadr’s opposition seems surprising since we liberated Iraq’s Shiites from decades of oppression under Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, such opposition isn’t surprising when we realize that Iraq’s most radical Shiites are simply an extension of the Iranian fundamentalist leaders who are the sworn enemies of America.

With Shiites comprising some 60% of the Iraqi population, this majority will surely lead the way toward the future of Iraq – whatever kind of future that may be.

This article from today’s Christian Science Monitor talks about the Mahdi Army of 2007. The above photo is Muqtada al Sadr:

* * * *

Christian Science Monitor
December 11, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Sadr Uses Lull To Rebuild Army

By Sam Dagher, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

KARBALA, IRAQ -- For more than three months, the Mahdi Army has been largely silent. The potent, black-clad Iraqi Shiite force put down its guns in late August at the behest of Moqtada al-Sadr.

The move has bolstered improved security in Baghdad, even though the US says some Mahdi Army splinter groups that it calls "criminals" or "extremists" have not heeded Mr. Sadr's freeze.

Away from public view, however, Sadr's top aides say the anti-American cleric is anything but idle. Instead, he is orchestrating a revival among his army of loyalists entrenched in Baghdad and Shiite enclaves to the south - from the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf to the economic hub of Basra. What is in the making, they say, is a better-trained and leaner force free of rogue elements accused of atrocities and crimes during the height of the sectarian war last year.

Many analysts say what may reemerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon's Hizbullah - a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region.

"He is now in the process of reconstituting the [Mahdi] Army and removing all the bad people that committed mistakes and those that sullied its reputation. There will be a whole new structure and dozens of conditions for membership," says Sheikh Abdul-Hadi al-Mahamadawi, a turbaned cleric who commands Sadr's operation in Karbala.

Sheikh Mahamadawi says each fighter would have to be vouched for by fellow fighters in good standing and would have to undergo a series of physical and character tests. "He must have high morals, strong faith, and above all, be obedient."

Sadr is also said to have created a special force called the "golden one" to cleanse the ranks of the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al-Mahdi in Arabic, from unwanted members, according to militia and police sources.

One Mahdi Army fighter, who did not wish to be named, says safe houses have been rented in Najaf for senior militiamen from neighboring Diwaniyah, where a joint Iraqi-US crackdown on the militia has been under way for months.

He says militiamen are spending their time carrying out good deeds like giving blood and sweeping streets to endear themselves again to the masses. The name of the Mahdi Army has, in many areas, become associated with killings, kidnappings, and extortion.

During the freeze, he says, he continues to be in contact with members of his unit but has returned to his day job as a hotel receptionist in Najaf, where he awaits instructions from his commanders. "There is just bound to be another war as long as the occupation remains. Our main enemy is America."

The Mahdi Army's next phase

In recent weeks, Sadrists - many dressed in black and donning white cloaks to symbolize martyrdom - have marched in Baghdad and the south. The largest rally took place in Najaf on Nov. 15, when tens of thousands of militiamen were bused in from all over Iraq to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the killing of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, their spiritual leader and Sadr's father.

They paraded through Najaf's Valley of Peace cemetery, which was the scene of some of the worst fighting between the militia and the US in 2004. Celebrants flashed victory signs and shouted anti-American slogans. Those attending received a CD showing footage of purported roadside bombings planted by the militia against US forces and militiamen in training.

Mothers of Mahdi Army fighters killed since 2004 wept in a special section of the cemetery reserved for them. Like the Hizbullah cemeteries in Lebanon, hundreds of tombstones were festooned with artificial flowers and billboards praising the heroics of the so-called martyrs.

As for Sadr's intent, his spokesman in Najaf, Salah al-Obeidi, says: "We have new visions for what the Mahdi Army will do in the next phase."

Mr. Obeidi explains that most Shiite parties have embraced the political process wholeheartedly and accept the presence of US forces, while the Sadrists, who continue to oppose it, need to keep their Army as a "national resistance force."

In his latest statement last week, Sadr said: "I tell the evil Bush, leave our land, we do not need you or your armies.... I tell the occupiers ... you have your democracy and we have our Islam; get out of our land."

And using language that could have been torn right out of the fiery speeches of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, he urged the Mahdi Army to continue to abide by his freeze order for now.

The cleric warned the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against extending the mandate of US-led multinational forces. He blasted Mr. Maliki's Dawa Party and its allies, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) and the Badr Organization, for targeting Sadrists. And he chided Iraqi security forces, many of them beholden to ISCI and Badr, for taking part in those anti-Sadrist operations.

The early history of Hizbullah, too, involved bloody internal fighting with a rival Shiite group and training by Iran before it became a skilled guerrilla group.

"Iran is definitely interested in having its own proxy political and military force in Iraq, just like Lebanon. Iran may try to wait a bit now to see who will emerge as the more dominant force," says Riad al-Kahwaji, a Dubai-based military expert on Iran. "All the indications so far are that [Iran] has invested a great deal in the Mahdi Army."

But, he adds, "it has been a bumpy start. The Mahdi Army is far from being the organized fighting machine like Hizbullah."

Shiite rivals do battle

The Mahdi Army freeze grew out of fierce battles in late August between ISCI and its affiliate, Badr, both headed by Sadr's archnemesis Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, in Karbala. In two days of fighting, more than 50 people were killed at the city's shrines during an important pilgrimage. The outside wall of the revered Imam Hussein mausoleum still bears the scars of the fighting.

Video footage of the clashes provided by Sadr's aides in Karbala shows black-clad men loyal to the cleric taunting guards, who are largely made up of Badr partisans, and then hurling shoes at them for refusing them entry into the shrine. Later, these guards are seen firing directly at throngs of pilgrims.

Mr. Maliki himself came down to Karbala at the time and gave police chief Brig. Gen. Raed Shaker, carte blanche to go after the Mahdi Army.

About 500 people were arrested at the time, including several provincial council members loyal to Sadr. General Shaker also declared publicly that the Mahdi Army was responsible for the assassination of at least 400 people in Karbala since 2004.

"These are only the bodies that we found," he said in an interview. "This is all documented. I am not doing this for any political agenda."

Umm Bassem says the Mahdi Army killed her son Bassem Hassoun, an Iraqi Army officer. She says they crippled her second son, Haidar.

"It's the fault of Sayyed [honorific] Moqtada; he encouraged them and armed them," says a tearful Umm Bassem, a nickname that means "mother of Bassem," as she clutches a portrait of her late son.

Mahamadawi, Sadr's aide in Karbala, says there may have been bad apples in the ranks of the Mahdi Army.

"We are not saying they are all angels, they are humans that can make mistakes; we have punished some and kicked out others," he says, adding that there is an intent by the government to sully the image of the Mahdi Army and finish it off. He also accuses the Karbala police of committing unspeakable crimes against the Sadrists including the killing of two children of a wanted militiaman in October and the torture of prisoners.

The assault on Sadr supporters

Anger against the police force, mixed with vows of revenge, reigns among the Daoum tribe in their village fiefdom on the outskirts of Karbala. Sixty-five of their members were among those arrested in the aftermath of the August events.

Muhammad Miri, who has been released since, lifts up his shirt to show scars on his back from what he says are from torture with wire cables. He says at least 22 prisoners were also sexually abused by police interrogators.

A police officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, says his claims are true. Widely circulated video footage also shows Hamid Ganoush, a Sadrist provincial council member, blindfolded and on his knees as he is being hit on the head with a shoe by interrogators who press him on the whereabouts of Ali Shria, a Karbala Mahdi Army leader, believed to be in Iran now.

The risk now is that these ever-deepening intra-Shiite feuds may also take on a tribal aspect.

A Baghdad-based US Department of Defense intelligence analyst, who tracks the Mahdi Army and who spoke on condition of anonymity, says intra-Shiite feuds in Iraq have always managed to sort themselves out, adding that he believes Sadr will maintain his freeze despite the rhetoric, as his paramount concern is political survival.

"It's working well. It's serving Sadr's interest well because it's solidifying his position as the clear leader ... and satisfying our desires to eliminate rogue criminal elements," he says. "I am not seeing any evidence that there is [a danger] that this is going to unravel."

Echoing recent remarks by top US military officials, he says that while there has been a decrease in roadside bombs - using Iranian armor-piercing explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) - against US troops, the militia's rogue elements still operate.

He blames recent bombings in Baghdad and mortar attacks on the Green Zone on Thanksgiving Day on these rogue elements. He also says a "massive" cache of Iranian-made arms was found in Diwaniyah recently, and on Dec. 1 a dealer of Iranian weapons was arrested in the city of Nasiriyah in southern Iraq.

"The guy was a major mover of lethal aid in his area," he says.

Some of these so-called rogue groups have also been blamed for the kidnapping of five Britons in May from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad. A group calling itself the "The Islamic Shiite Resistance in Iraq" released video footage of one of the hostages on Dec. 4 accompanied with a written statement demanding British troops leave Basra within 10 days.

Britain has pulled out from inside the city in September and now has only 4,500 soldiers left at an air base outside the city. The pullout of the bulk of this force is expected soon, leaving the Mahdi Army as the strongest armed group among its rivals in Basra.

Top US officials in Iraq have made no secret of their concern over Iranian plans to turn the Mahdi Army into another Hizbullah-like organization, pointing to their capture of a Hizbullah operative in March in Basra.

"His sole purpose in life was to come to Iraq to try to make JAM [Jaish al-Mahdi] a mirror image of Hizbullah," the Defense analyst says.

A senior official in Sadr's rival party, the ISCI, which is very close to the Iranian government, says Mr. Hakim received assurances from Iran at the highest level that they would rein in the hard-line factions within the Islamic Republic who might be supporting Sadr's militia.

"The events in Karbala embarrassed the Iranians," says the official, who requested anonymity, referring to the sanctity of the shrines to Shiite Iran. "There is a nationalist current in Iran, though, that does not want to see stability in Iraq ... this keeps us worried."

The Sadrists have long distanced themselves from Iran publicly and sought to portray themselves more as Arab nationalists.

Sadr's spokesman Obeidi says while the movement admires Iranian-backed Hizbullah, the Mahdi Army is different.

He says the US military and the Mahdi Army's Shiite rivals are trying hard to force the dismantling of Sadr's militia forming tribal councils across the Shiite south, much like the Americans did in Sunni parts of the country to combat Al Qaeda.

But, the spokesman says, this strategy isn't going to work in the south, where many of the tribesmen's sons are Mahdi fighters.

* * * *

Keep watching the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al Sadr and their partnership with Iran. When it comes to such Islamic fundamentalist relationships, all we can do is watch, wait and keep our weapons at hand.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com