Victory In Iraq - Now It's Up To The Iraqis

Me at Baghdad's Camp Victory in early 2004 

I'm a Vietnam veteran as well as a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, so I know a little about guerrilla wars. Sometimes they end well, and sometimes they don't.

You see, I remember what it felt like to sit in my living room in April, 1975, staring at the television while enemy tanks rolled into Saigon. Only then did I have the painful realization that my fellow soldiers and I had fought and bled for a lost cause.

I'm not ashamed to say I cried that day. I remembered the hardships of my own months in Vietnam's jungles, and I saw the faces of my lost friends in the dark corners of my mind. To be honest, I still see them almost every day. You know - those couple of hours in the middle of the night when sleep won't come and the mind refuses to rest. Such is the legacy of Vietnam.

Although the losses are just as painful, the story in Iraq is a different one. When our last soldiers arrive home before Christmas and Iraq's security rests in its own hands, we can honestly say we have been victorious.

There are now over thirty million people living in Iraq. Because of the sacrifice of America and its coalition partners, there is a democratic government elected by the people. Is everything perfect? Of course not. But the problems that remain can only be solved by Iraqis. Whether it is sectarian differences or problems caused by foreign terrorists, it is time for Iraq to take care of itself.

What do I fear most now that we have pulled our soldiers out of Iraq? I fear the influence of Iran, a Shiite country that provides training and equipment to radical Shiites in Iraq like Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army.

But Americans cannot stay in Iraq forever. The truth is that wherever we go, we become a lightning rod for those with ancient reasons for hating foreign intervention. It was this way in Vietnam, in Iraq, and it is also the same in Afghanistan.

We must welcome our troops home from Iraq as the victorious warriors they are. We shall help them recover both physically and mentally, and they should be proud of all they accomplished.

We shall also continue to extend the hand of friendship to the Iraqi people. While many fundamentalist Iraqis will always hate us, there are a lot of Iraqis who will never forget the generosity of America or our sacrifices on their behalf. We have done all we can to give them a chance for a free and prosperous future.

The rest is up to them...

Charles M. Grist
Author of the award-winning book My Last War: A Vietnam Veteran's Tour in Iraq

The Internet War On Terror - Beware: The Enemy May Try To "Friend" You

To those of you who enjoy social networks such as Facebook, may you heed this warning.

I recently received a “friend” request from a man in an apparent position of responsibility in Iran. Knowing that the use of sites like Facebook can be fatal in a dictatorship like the Islamic Republic of Iran, I researched the postings of this man.

One of the first things I found on his page was a video showing “Israeli Terrorism Against Palestinians.” The video appeared to show dozens of casualties, including men, women and children who had been killed or wounded – allegedly – by an Israeli attack.

Now I couldn’t find any video footage that showed Israeli civilians being murdered by Hamas rocket and mortar attacks. Nor did I see any mention that recent attacks by Israelis resulted from an endless bombardment by terrorists in the West Bank. Like all people, the citizens of Israel have the inherent right to self defense.

To the guy in Iran, the terrorists of Hamas, the fugitives of Al Qaeda, and to those who condone attacks against Israel or the United States, I suggest that you remember this very important lesson: If you wage war against us, we will seek our justice. Unlike you, we don’t try to harm the innocent. If your families are accidentally injured or killed because of the war you brought upon them, then their blood is on YOUR hands.

To my friends on the Internet, I say be careful. Don’t “friend” everyone who makes that request of you. In your desire to get along with the world, make sure you don’t invite the enemy to sit next to you in your very own living room….

Charles M. Grist

www.MyLastWar.com

Afghanistan: A Tragic Past, A Violent Present, And A Hazy Future

The global intelligence experts at Stratfor have produced an excellent essay on the past, present, and likely future of Afghanistan. If you want to understand that troubled nation, read this:

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Militancy and the U.S. Drawdown in Afghanistan

September 2, 2010
By Scott Stewart

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq has served to shift attention toward Afghanistan, where the United States has been increasing its troop strength in hopes of forming conditions conducive to a political settlement. This is similar to the way it used the 2007 surge in Iraq to help reach a negotiated settlement with the Sunni insurgents that eventually set the stage for withdrawal there. As we’ve discussed elsewhere, the Taliban at this point do not feel the pressure required for them to capitulate or negotiate and therefore continue to follow their strategy of surviving and waiting for the coalition forces to depart so that they can again make a move to assume control over Afghanistan.

Indeed, with the United States having set a deadline of July 2011 to begin the drawdown of combat forces in Afghanistan — and with many of its NATO allies withdrawing sooner — the Taliban can sense that the end is near. As they wait expectantly for the departure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan, a look at the history of militancy in Afghanistan provides a bit of a preview of what could follow the U.S. withdrawal.

A Tradition of Militancy

First, it is very important to understand that militant activity in Afghanistan is nothing new. It has existed there for centuries, driven by a number of factors. One of the primary factors is the country’s geography. Because of its rugged and remote terrain, it is very difficult for a foreign power (or even an indigenous government in Kabul) to enforce its writ on many parts of the country. A second, closely related factor is culture. Many of the tribes in Afghanistan have traditionally been warrior societies that live in the mountains, disconnected from Kabul because of geography, and tend to exercise autonomous rule that breeds independence and suspicion of the central government. A third factor is ethnicity. There is no real Afghan national identity. Rather, the country is a patchwork of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and other ethnicities that tend also to be segregated by geography. Finally, there is religion. While Afghanistan is a predominantly Muslim country, there is a significant Shiite minority as well as a large Sufi presence in the country. The hardcore Deobandi Taliban are not very tolerant of the Shia or Sufis, and they can also be harsh toward more moderate Sunnis who do things such as send their daughters to school, trim their beards, listen to music and watch movies.

Any of these forces on its own would pose challenges to peace, stability and centralized governance, but together they pose a daunting problem and result in near-constant strife in Afghanistan.

Because of this environment, it is quite easy for outside forces to stir up militancy in Afghanistan. One tried-and-true method is to play to the independent spirit of the Afghans and encourage them to rise up against the foreign powers that have attempted to control the country. We saw this executed to perfection in the 1800s during the Great Game between the British and the Russians for control of Afghanistan. This tool was also used after the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and it has been used again in recent years following the 2001 U.S. invasion of the country. The Taliban are clearly being used by competing outside powers against the United States (more on this later).

But driving out an invading power is not the only thing that will lead to militancy and violence in Afghanistan. The ethnic, cultural and religious differences mentioned above and even things like grazing or water rights and tribal blood feuds can also lead to violence. Moreover, these factors can (and have been) used by outside powers to either disrupt the peace in Afghanistan or exert control over the country via a proxy (such as Pakistan’s use of the Taliban movement). Militant activity in Afghanistan is, therefore, not just the result of an outside invasion. Rather, it has been a near constant throughout the history of the region, and it will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

Foreign Influence

When we consider the history of outside manipulation in Afghanistan, it becomes clear that such manipulation has long been an important factor in the country and will continue to be so after the United States and the rest of the ISAF withdraw. There are a number of countries that have an interest in Afghanistan and that will seek to exert some control over what the post-invasion country looks like.

The United States does not want the country to revert to being a refuge for al Qaeda and other transnational jihadist groups. At the end of the day, this is the real U.S. national interest in Afghanistan. It is not counterinsurgency or building democracy or anything else.

Russia does not want the Taliban to return to power. The Russians view the Taliban as a disease that can infect and erode their sphere of influence in countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then move on to pose a threat to Russian control in the predominately Muslim regions of the Caucasus. This is why the Russians were so active in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. There are reports, though, that the Russians have been aiding the Taliban in an effort to keep the United States tied down in Afghanistan, since as long as the United States is distracted there it has less latitude to counter Russian activity elsewhere.

On the other side of that equation, Pakistan helped foster the creation of the Pashtun Taliban organization and then used the organization as a tool to exert its influence in Afghanistan. Facing enemies on its borders with India and Iran, Pakistan must control Afghanistan in order to have strategic depth and ensure that it will not be forced to defend itself along its northwest as well. While the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban and the threat it poses to Pakistan will alter Islamabad’s strategy somewhat — and Pakistan has indeed been recalculating its use of militant proxies — Pakistan will try hard to ensure that the regime in Kabul is pro-Pakistani.

This is exactly why India wants to play a big part in Afghanistan — to deny Pakistan that strategic depth. In the past, India worked with Russia and Iran to support the Northern Alliance and keep the Taliban from total domination of the country. Indications are that the Indians are teaming up with the Russians and Iranians once again.

Iran also has an interest in the future of Afghanistan and has worked to cultivate certain factions of the Taliban by providing them with shelter, weapons and training. The Iranians also have been strongly opposed to the Taliban and have supported anti-Taliban militants, particularly those from the Shiite Hazara people. When the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, they killed 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists. Iran does not want the Taliban to become too powerful, but it will use them as a tool to hurt the United States. Iran will also attempt to install a pro-Iranian government in Kabul or, at the very least, try to thwart efforts by the Pakistanis and Americans to exert control over the country.

A History of Death and Violence

It may seem counterintuitive, but following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the casualties from militancy in the country declined considerably. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, the fatalities due to armed conflict in Afghanistan fell from an estimated 10,000 a year prior to the invasion to 4,000 in 2002 and 1,000 by 2004. Even as the Taliban began to regroup in 2005 and the number of fatalities began to move upward, by 2009 (the last year for which the institute offers data) the total was only 7,140, still well-under the pre-invasion death tolls (though admittedly far greater than at the ebb of the insurgency in 2004).

Still, even with death tolls rising, the U.S. invasion has not produced anywhere near the estimated 1 million deaths that resulted during the Soviet occupation. The Soviets and their Afghan allies were not concerned about conducting a hearts-and-minds campaign. Indeed, their efforts were more akin to a scorched-earth strategy complete with attacks directed against the population. This strategy also resulted in millions of refugees fleeing Afghanistan for Pakistan and Iran and badly disrupted the tribal structure in much of Afghanistan. This massive disruption of the societal structure helped lead to a state of widespread anarchy that later led many Afghans to see the Taliban as saviors.

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the communist government in Kabul was able to survive for three more years, backed heavily with Soviet arms, but these years were again marked by heavy casualties. When the communist government fell in 1992, the warlords who had opposed the government attempted to form a power-sharing agreement to govern Afghanistan, but all the factions could not reach a consensus and another civil war broke out, this time among the various anti-communist Afghan warlords vying for control of the country. During this period, Kabul was repeatedly shelled and the bloodshed continued. Neither the Soviet departure nor the fall of the communist regime ended the carnage.

With the rise of the Taliban, the violence began to diminish in many parts of the country, though the fighting remained fierce and tens of thousands of people were killed as the Taliban tried to exert control over the country. The Taliban were still engaged in a protracted and bloody civil war against the Northern Alliance when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. During the initial invasion, very few U.S. troops were actually on the ground. The United States used the Northern Alliance as the main ground-force element, along with U.S. air power and special operations forces, and was able to remove the Taliban from power in short order. It is important to remember that the Taliban was never really defeated on the battlefield. Once they realized that they were no match for U.S. air power in a conventional war, they declined battle and faded away to launch their insurgency.

Today, the forces collectively referred to as the Taliban in Afghanistan are not all part of one hierarchical organization under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Although Mullah Omar is the dominant force and is without peer among Afghan insurgent leaders, there are a number of local and regional militant commanders who are fighting against the U.S. occupation beside the Taliban and who have post-U.S. occupation interests that diverge from those of the Taliban. Such groups are opportunists rather than hardcore Taliban and they might fight against Mullah Omar’s Taliban if he and his militants come to power in Kabul, especially if an outside power manipulates, funds and arms them — and outside powers will certainly be seeking to do so. The United States has tried to peel away the more independent factions from the wider Taliban “movement” but has had little success, mainly because the faction leaders see that the United States is going to disengage and that the Taliban will be a force to be reckoned with in the aftermath.

Once U.S. and ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan, then, it is quite likely that Afghanistan will again fall into a period of civil war, as the Taliban attempt to defeat the Karzai government, as the United States tries to support it and as other outside powers such as Pakistan, Russia and Iran try to gain influence through their proxies in the country.

The only thing that can really prevent this civil war from occurring is a total defeat of the Taliban and other militants in the country or some sort of political settlement. With the sheer size of the Taliban and its many factions, and the fact that many factions are receiving shelter and support from patrons in Pakistan and Iran, it is simply not possible for the U.S. military to completely destroy them before the Americans begin to withdraw next summer. This will result in a tremendous amount of pressure on the Americans to find a political solution to the problem. At this time, the Taliban simply don’t feel pressured to come to the negotiating table — especially with the U.S. drawdown in sight.

And even if a political settlement is somehow reached, not everyone will be pleased with it. Certainly, the outside manipulation in Afghanistan will continue, as will the fighting, as it has for centuries.

Militancy and the U.S. Drawdown in Afghanistan is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

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With Obama's announced drawdown of troops to begin in July, 2011, we are only fighting a holding action. This means that "victory" (in the true sense of the word) is unlikely in such a short time frame.

The enemy knows this, and they will simply  wait us out.

Charles M. Grist
http://www.mylastwar.com/

Iraqi Civilians Want the New Agreement

The following article was posted on military.com. While the Iraqis will certainly be glad to run their own country, it is still annoying that the Shiites have not thanked us in a large-scale official way for pulling them out from under Saddam’s Sunni thumb.

The new agreement, which will end our involvement in Iraq by the end of 2011, still has to be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, but it will likely go through since it has the blessing of Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, the most powerful Shiite religious leader in Iraq.

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Iraqis Demonstrate in Favor of US Pact

November 19, 2008
Deutsche Presse-Agentur

BAGHDAD - More than 5,000 Iraqis demonstrated in the Iraqi city of Hillah on Nov. 18 to support the security agreement between the United States and Iraq that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from the country.

The deal sets the legal basis for the future presence of US troops in Iraq after a United Nations Security Council mandate expires at the end of the year.

Under the agreement, the deadline for the complete withdrawal of US troops is Dec. 31, 2011. More than 140,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in Iraq.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker signed the deal in Baghdad on Monday. However, it still needs parliamentary approval before it can be signed by the US and Iraqi presidents.

The demonstration in support of the security pact broke out in the centre of Hillah, 100 kilometres south of Baghdad. Clan chiefs and students were among the demonstrators, witnesses told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa.

The demonstrators carried flags and signs that said "Together for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq" and "With heart, with blood, we save you, Iraq." They also chanted slogans that urged the Iraqi government to sign the security agreement with the U.S.

Hundreds of Iraqi police and soldiers surrounded the demonstrators who walked to the city council.

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The war in Iraq may end for us by 2011, but watch the Shiite militias and the Iranians closely. The breeze of "fundamentalism" is blowing gently across the desert...

Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Withdrawal From Iraq Is Not Very Far Away

The following article discusses the problems in negotiations between Iraq and the United States on our continued presence there:

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'Deal, No Deal' on Iraq-US Troop Talks

November 07, 2008

Knight Ridder

BAGHDAD - The United States delivered Thursday what it said was the final text of the controversial accord on the stationing of U.S. forces in Iraq, but Iraq said more talks are needed before the government can accept it.

"We have gotten back to the Iraqi government with a final text. Through this step, we have concluded the process on the U.S. side," said Susan Ziadeh, the U.S. Embassy spokeswoman in Baghdad. "Iraq will now need to take it forward through their own process."

The accord, which calls for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011, has been the subject of tense negotiations for the past seven months.

According to State Department officials, the United States yielded to several important Iraqi demands, including Baghdad's proposal to inspect mail and cargo for U.S. forces in Iraq. One official said he did not know the details of how those inspections would be carried out, adding, "I don't think it's going to be overly intrusive."

He and other officials spoke on condition of anonymity, because the details of the American response were not being made public.

President Bush also accepted Iraq's request for firmer language in its call for U.S. troops to withdraw by the end of 2011, two defense officials said, although they did not know the details of the wording.

While the U.S. government signaled that it will not engage in further negotiations over the pact, which has been repeatedly delayed, the government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, indicated that Iraq expects further discussions with the United States before the process is completed.

"These amendments need meetings with the American side to reach the bilateral understanding, and the environment is positive," Dabbagh said in a statement on a government-funded television channel. "The Iraqi side needs time to give the main blocs to have their opinions, suggestions and notes on the amendments suggested by the American side."

Many Iraqi officials are now calling the status-of-forces accord, or SOFA, "the withdrawal agreement," possibly as a way of marketing it to a wary public.

The accord is controversial in Washington as well. The White House has pushed aggressively to reach the deal, but some Pentagon officials expressed concern that the concessions will set a precedent for current and future status-of-forces agreements with other countries. The United States is not believed to have agreed to another nation monitoring mail in status agreements with more than 80 other countries, for example.

Earlier this week, a senior Pentagon official who requested anonymity to speak candidly said he found it "hard to believe we could find aspects there that are acceptable" in the Iraqi proposal to search mail and cargo, adding: "What kind of precedents would we be setting?"

Administration officials said Bush sees the agreement as key to shaping his legacy on Iraq. They said Bush wanted to leave the presidency with a solidified relationship between the United States and an indisputably sovereign Iraq.

To the White House, "SOFA is a sign of success," a second U.S. defense official, who also requested anonymity to speak candidly, told McClatchy Newspapers.

That said, the Bush administration refused to accept one major Iraqi proposal, which would have given Iraq expanded legal jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers alleged to commit wrongdoing while in the country. U.S. officials have called that a "non-starter."

The agreement has to be completed by the end of this year in order to replace a U.N. mandate that provides the legal basis for the U.S. presence in Iraq.

Iraqi officials were tight-lipped Thursday about whether the changes were acceptable. The changes first must be presented to the Cabinet. If the Cabinet agrees, the draft will be presented to the Iraqi parliament. One of the main sticking points for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has been the issue of jurisdiction over U.S. Soldiers in Iraq.

Shiite Muslim officials who raised new demands when the accord was completed two weeks ago have been accused of succumbing to Iranian influence not to sign the agreement. At the time, Iraqi officials openly predicted that the government would be forced to extend the United Nations mandate. In recent days, officials have sounded more positive about the outcome.

"The next step is for the Cabinet to meet to look at the responses," Iraq's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, told McClatchy. "I hope it will be very soon."

The latest draft calls for U.S. forces to withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and withdraw from Iraq by 2011. It also lifts immunity for private U.S. contractors such as Blackwater, whose security guards were accused of uncontrolled shooting while on patrol duty, resulting in the deaths of Iraqi civilians.

It also allows for a joint U.S. and Iraqi committee to decide whether a U.S. Soldier who's committed a crime outside a U.S. base was off-duty and where he should be tried. Iraqi officials wanted to make that decision on their own, but the Bush administration has apparently rejected the demand.

President-elect Barack Obama has long advocated a U.S. withdrawal by the summer of 2010, a date that Maliki originally demanded in the agreement.

U.S. officials are pushing to get the deal done before the end of the month. If it's not done by the beginning of December, the government will have to begin the process to renew the U.N. mandate, one U.S. official in Iraq said. The parliament must approve the agreement when it's back in session next week and before it adjourns just before the end of the month for the Hajj season, when millions of Muslims make the holy pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.

"Look, the government of Iraq has debated this agreement thoroughly. ... They forwarded to us their suggested amendments. We got back to them," State Department spokesman Robert Wood said Thursday. "Now the negotiating process has come to an end."

© Copyright 2008 Knight Ridder.

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As I have emphasized before, Iraq will never permit a long-term presence of foreign troops on their soil. They will also never permit the continued occupation of bases for America's stategic purposes. There will be no Germany or Japan-styled multi-decade presence.

Those of us who served in Iraq and who came to know the Iraqi people understood this reality from the beginning. The Crusades and the British colonial occupation of the early twentieth century are still bad memories for almost all Arabs.

The Bush administration has already accepted provisions in the status-of-forces agreement that will move our forces from the cities of Iraq to military bases in mid-2009. We have also agreed to have all troops out by the end of 2011. Mr. Obama will make it happen even sooner.

Watch Muqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Army. This extremist Shiite militia is supported by Iran and its members are voicing opposition to anything that will keep Coalition forces in Iraq. Their ultimate objective is a fundamentalist theocracy like the one in Iran. Let's see what they do after the only things standing in their way are new Iraqi soldiers and police officers.

America's soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines can be proud of what they have accomplished in Iraq. In the end, the people of this troubled nation will decide for themselves how they will live in the future.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Taliban Admits Receiving Supplies From Iran

If anyone has any doubts that we are in a proxy war against Iran (both in Afghanistan and Iraq), then check out this article:

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London Daily Telegraph
September 15, 2008

Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied By Iran

By Kate Clark, in Kabul

A Taliban commander has credited Iranian-supplied weapons with successful operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The comments by the commander, who would not be named but operates in the south east of the country where there has been a surge in Taliban attacks, were a rare admission of co-operation between elements within the Iranian regime and forces fighting British and American troops in Afghanistan.

"There's a kind of landmine called a Dragon. Iran's sending it," he said. "It's directional and it causes heavy casualties.

"We're ambushing the Americans and planting roadside bombs. We never let them relax."

The commander, a veteran of 30 years who started fighting when the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan, said the Dragon had revolutionised the Taliban's ability to target Nato soldiers deployed in his area.

"If you lay an ordinary mine, it will only cause minor damage to Humvees or one of their big tanks. But if you lay a Dragon, it will destroy it completely," he said.

A "Dragon" is the local nickname for a type of weapon known internationally as an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) or "shaped charge" and has been used with devastating effect in Iraq by Iranian-backed groups. It is shaped so that all the explosive force is concentrated in one direction - the target - rather than blasting in all directions and weakening its impact.

A former mujahideen fighter who knows the Afghan arms market well and who asked to be known as Shahir said the Dragon mines came directly from Iran.

Iran has denied these allegations, but Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador in Kabul, said the British Army, which is deployed in south-western Afghanistan, had intercepted consignments of weapons which they believe were "donated by a group within the Iranian state".

The only other possible source, the arms expert said, would be Pakistan's Tribal Areas where a relatively sophisticated arms industry has grown up. "Until now," he said, "no-one in the Tribal Areas has been able to copy these mines. Both the metal and the explosives are different, very high quality and very effective, obviously not Chinese or Pakistani."

He said there were two routes for Iranian weaponry getting to the Taliban. "There are people inside the state in Iran who donate weapons. There are also Iranian businessmen who sell them."

Iranian-made weapons, he said, whether smuggled or donated, were the most popular among Taliban fighters and fetch premium prices on the open market. "A Kalashnikov rifle made in Iran costs two to three hundred dollars more than one made anywhere else" he said. "Its beauty lies in the fact that it can also fire grenades, up to 300 meters. This is something new and it's in great demand."

Iran, a theocratic, Shia Muslim state should have little common cause with the Taliban, an extremist Sunni Muslim movement which massacred hundreds of Afghan Shia civilians and killed nine Iranian diplomats when it was in power.

Only the worsening relations between Iran and America might explain the weapons supply.

Sir Sherard said Iran was playing "a very dangerous game".

He added: "I suspect some of their agencies genuinely don't know what others are up to. We've seen a limited supply of weapons by a group within the Iranian state, not necessarily with the knowledge of all other agencies of the Iranian state, sending some very dangerous weapons to the Taliban in the south."

Kate Clark's full report is on BBC2's Newsnight on Monday Sept 15 at 10.30pm, and the BBC World Service on Thursday Sept 18 at 10.10am.

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The stakes are increasing as Iran continues its aggressive confrontation with the rest of the world via its surrogate terrorist groups.

Can you imagine Ahmadinejad with a nuclear weapon?

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Mahdi Army Itches to Fight Again

Success in Iraq will depend on how the Iraqi government deals – or fails to deal – with the Shiite militias like the Mahdi Army.

To watch a comparable situation, keep your eyes on the democratic government of Lebanon that continues a shaky relationship with the radical Hezbollah terrorist militia.

By the way, both Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army are supplied, funded and trained by Iran. Iran’s ultimate goals in both Lebanon and Iraq are the establishment of fundamentalist governments like the one in Tehran.

Check out the following article:

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Philadelphia Inquirer
May 29, 2008

Dissent Arises Over Iraq Cease-Fire
A Mahdi Army leader said, "We were duped." A disagreement could restart Shiite fighting.

By Hamza Hendawi, Associated Press

BAGHDAD - An angry Shiite militia commander complained yesterday "we were duped" into accepting a cease-fire in Sadr City - remarks that pointed to a potentially damaging rift within the movement of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The May 11 truce ended seven weeks of fierce fighting in Baghdad between U.S. and Iraqi government forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, which held nearly complete control of the capital's sprawling Sadr City district.

Iraqi soldiers now have moved into most parts of Sadr City with little resistance. But the objections raised by the commander highlight apparent dissent by some Mahdi Army leaders.

A split among Sadr's followers - between those favoring a more militant path and others seeking compromise with Iraq's government - could threaten the relative calm in Baghdad and reignite Shiite-on-Shiite violence across Iraq's oil-rich south.

The commander, speaking to tribal sheikhs and lawmakers loyal to Sadr, said "we were duped and deceived" by the truce. "They are arresting many of us now."

The group had gathered in Sadr's main Baghdad office to discuss how to respond to what they consider cease-fire "violations" by Iraqi troops, such as arrests and house searches.

Some in the audience, however, took issue with the views of the commander, whose name was not made public for security reasons.

"You can be the winner without a military victory," said Falah Hassan Shanshal, a prominent Sadrist and one of two parliamentarians who attended the meeting in Sadr City, home to 2.5 million Shiites.

"We had to bow before the storm because it was uprooting everything and everyone standing in its path," he said.

Shanshal was referring to the punishing attacks by U.S. and Iraqi government forces, which used tanks, helicopter gunships, and Hellfire missiles fired from unmanned aircraft. The strikes killed and wounded hundreds and left parts of Sadr City in ruins.

The southern section of the district has been sealed off from the rest of Sadr City in an attempt to foil militia movements and rocket and mortar attacks on the U.S.-protected Green Zone.

The battles in Sadr City were part of a wider Mahdi Army backlash to a government crackdown on armed groups launched in late March in the southern city of Basra.

Sadr, who has been in Iran for at least a year, supported the Sadr City cease-fire, perhaps to save his Mahdi Army from further losses so it can continue the fight later.

But signs of opposition have been growing within the militia ranks. Last week, two Mahdi Army commanders said militiamen were divided over whether the cease-fire was in their interest.

The head of Sadr's office in Sadr City, Sheikh Salman al-Freiji, suggested the truce might collapse if "violations" by the Iraqi army continued.

"There will not be any trust built between the two sides like that," Freiji warned. "The Mahdi Army was created to defend the Iraqi people. How can you do that without fighting the occupier?"

Shanshal, the Sadrist lawmaker, was conciliatory. He blamed the Iraqi army for heavy-handed tactics but stressed that he did not want more fighting in Sadr City.

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As long as the armed radical militias remain in the shadows, ready to continue their fight, long-term peace will be difficult to achieve in Iraq.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Memorial Day 2008: We Must Never Forget

I have fought a good fight
I have finished my course
I have kept the faith.

Timothy 2:4:7

The following posting is much the same as it was when I first added it to this blog for Memorial Day in 2007:

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I remember the 18-year-old kid from Tennessee who let me use his transistor radio, the baby-faced private from North Carolina with the big grin, Staff Sergeant James, Sergeant Brezinski and Sergeant Dowjotas. There are others whose names, God forgive me, I cannot recall. All of their names are on the Vietnam wall because they gave their lives for their country.

I also remember Lieutenant King.

Late in 1970, after several months as an infantry platoon leader, I got sick as a dog one morning after we returned to the firebase. At first the medics thought it was malaria, but it was just some other type of jungle virus and I was laid up in the rear area for about a month. Unfortunately, another lieutenant was sent to take over my platoon.

When I recovered, I asked the battalion commander to re-assign me to another platoon. He said he would let me fill the next platoon leader vacancy. When the lieutenant for the second platoon of Bravo Company rotated back to the States, I politely reminded the battalion commander of his promise.

He was nice about it, but he said he was sending Lieutenant Thomas P. King to take over that platoon. I had gotten to know King from our chess games in a firebase bunker. King was a West Point graduate and a career officer who needed the field time, so the commander said I could have the next platoon.

Less than two weeks later, Lieutenant King and his men walked up on an NVA bunker complex. Along with several other soldiers, he was killed when a North Vietnamese soldier detonated a Chinese claymore mine. If I had been in command of that platoon as originally planned, I would have been the one killed.

Years later I stood in front of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. and stared at the engraving of King’s name. Only a quirk of fate put his name there instead of mine.

Now there are those from Iraq and Afghanistan who don’t have their own place in Washington, D.C. yet, but whose names will one day appear on a monument for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. They have sacrificed everything in this new war just because their country needed them.

From Bunker Hill to Baghdad, America’s warriors have given their lives to defend this nation and its allies from those who would enslave or kill our fellow citizens. On battlefields in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries throughout the world, we continue to lose our sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, fathers and mothers as they protect our way of life with honor and valor.

Those of us who have fought in America’s wars will never forget the faces of our comrades. We will remember them when they were laughing, sharing a meal, missing their families or lying dead in a body bag. They will always be in our hearts and souls.

We hope that, on this Memorial Day, all of you will remember them, too.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

It Wasn't My Fault Say the Generals

One day in 2004, my team and I stood by at the front doors of the Water Palace (Al Faw Palace) at Camp Victory. As a protective service detail, we were waiting for our general to emerge from the palace after meeting with then-commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez (pictured above).

Before our boss exited the palace, Sanchez came walking out of the doors, followed by his “Incredible Hulk”-style Army bodyguard. I saluted Sanchez and he crisply returned my salute.

At the time, all of us average soldiers believed that men like Sanchez had their fingers on the pulse of the war. Still, we were concerned with several issues whose solutions seemed fairly obvious, even to the average privates and sergeants.

The failure of CPA boss Bremer to pay for obviously critical improvements to Iraqi society bothered us all. We had invaded a nation of more than 25 million people, removed their government, their army, their police and their infrastructure, but somehow we were supposed to fix everything with only 140,000 troops. The people needed electricity, water, jobs and a host of other things. Our failure to provide these necessities resulted in a lot of hungry ex-soldiers and ex-cops joining the insurgency.

When fiery cleric Muqtada al Sadr launched his up-risings in 2004, the troops wanted to take him out along with his Mahdi Army. The CPA succumbed to political pressure from al Sadr’s fellow Shiites. Now, in 2008, the Mahdi Army is Iraq’s version of Hezbollah or Hamas and this Iranian-trained militia is still killing Americans and Iraqis.

Also in 2004, we watched our troops fight valiantly in Fallujah, only to be pulled out when a former Iraqi general under Saddam Hussein was given permission to form the “Fallujah Protective Army”. This was a force of Fallujah residents who did exactly as all of us average soldiers predicted - nothing. They gave insurgents free reign in Fallujah and refused to turn over the foreign fighters.

The soldiers always knew what should have been done in the beginning. We had faith that our military leaders would do what was necessary to succeed in Iraq, but our faith was misplaced to a large degree in those early days of the war.

We must still emerge victorious in Iraq – as long as the Iraqis continue to work with us. But now we are watching some of our former commanders, like Sanchez and other generals, try to put all of the blame on the politicians for those early strategic mistakes. Most of the blame belongs with the political leaders in Washington, but some of it does not.

Generals whose men are making the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefield must do more than “follow orders”. When it comes to the ultimate test of honor, a general has an obligation to speak up on behalf of those who are doing the fighting and dying, even if it costs that general his job. A good example of such a general of honor is Eric Shinseki, who told Congress exactly what it would take to succeed in Iraq and who was summarily shuffled off into retirement.

Like many veterans of the Iraq war, I have become tired of listening to retired generals who have become “talking heads” on the evening news. It wasn’t their fault, they say. They were only following orders, they say. Many of these generals were commanders who failed as leaders because their honor became secondary to their next promotion.

Things have changed for the better in Iraq because the military leaders, and the soldiers under them, have taken the lead in getting things done. As it should have been in the beginning, authority to make things happen has finally been delegated to all levels of command. This is much improved over those early days in the war when very little authority was granted – even to the generals.

The following article about retired Lt. General Sanchez’s new book appeared in today’s Miami Herald.

* * * *

Miami Herald
May 17, 2008

Ex-Iraq Commander Distances Self From Culpability
The former head of command in Iraq said he may have been the chief, but he was just following orders.

By Nancy A. Youssef

WASHINGTON--To hear retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez explain it, the mistakes of the Iraq war that happened while he was in command there weren't his fault. Not Abu Ghraib, not the birth of the insurgency, not the decision to let rebel cleric Muqtada al Sadr survive.

Sanchez was a soldier, and according to him, a general's job is to give advice. What the civilian leaders decide after that is out of a general's hands.

''It's our responsibility to provide the best judgment we can,'' Sanchez said in an interview with McClatchy. ``But when those decisions are made, if they are not illegal or immoral, civilian control of the military dictates that we comply.''

Sanchez argues that crafting a strategy wasn't his responsibility, even as the top commander in Iraq. That fell to the civilian leaders, such as the secretary of defense and the president.

But as part of the military's emerging counterinsurgency strategy, commanders now are calling their soldiers ''strategic corporals.'' That is, every soldier's decision is part of the broader strategy.

Captains serving in outposts throughout Iraq now are leading fiefdoms alongside local Iraqi leaders, deciding everything from who should protect the community to how local funds should be spent. Commanders now stress to corporals and captains stationed in those outposts that their decisions are part of the broader strategy.

''It's all well and good for a general to say I am not responsible for grand strategy,'' said retired Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan. ``But corporals can be strategic. They can make things happen.''

Latest book

Sanchez's comments were part of a series of interviews he's given recently to promote his new autobiography, ''Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story,'' the latest of several books by key Iraq decision-makers that seem intended to exonerate them of responsibility.

In his book, Sanchez repeatedly spells out instances in which civilian leaders made decisions that countered his recommendations.

Advice ignored

Sanchez said the key window for the United States to turn the situation around in Iraq opened with the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003.

It closed the following April, he said, when the U.S. made two key mistakes: It launched its first major offensive into Fallujah and decided not to capture Sadr, whose Shiite militia has since grown into one of Iraq's most powerful forces.

Sanchez said he advised President Bush not to go into Fallujah in April 2004 after four private security contractors were taken hostage and killed. Their burned bodies were hung from a bridge as several Iraqis celebrated beneath them, in widely-circulated photos.

Sanchez said he feared that proponents of attacking Fallujah were being driven by a knee-jerk reaction to the photos and not by any consideration of the difficulty of moving into the city, which had been a troublesome redoubt of anti-American insurgents since the day U.S. troops toppled Hussein.

He said he advised against the offensive. The president ''appreciated our caution but then ordered us to attack,'' Sanchez wrote.

That battle ended in failure less than a month later and signaled to the insurgency that the U.S. would walk away from a major fight.

That same month, the U.S. had a chance to arrest Sadr, but Sanchez said that L. Paul Bremer, then the head of the Coalition Provincial Authority, called off the operation. Sadr has been haunting U.S. efforts in Iraq ever since.

Abu Ghraib

Sanchez said that he should have known more about what was going on at the Abu Ghraib prison, where Iraqi prisoners were subjected to abuses that resulted in the courts-martial of seven low-ranking soldiers.

But even there, he said he bore no direct responsibility for what was taking place. Instead, the abuses of Abu Ghraib were a result of the Bush administration's endorsement of aggressive interrogations, which began in Afghanistan. He points out that an Army inspector general report ultimately absolved him.

* * * *

The early mistakes in Iraq do not negate the necessity to succeed in our military efforts in that country. We must never forget that the ultimate problem is, and shall be for some time, the Iranian issue. If we pull out of Iraq before the Iraqis can defend themselves, Iran will use Muqtada al Sadr to carry out a proxy takeover of Iraq.

This is the ultimate goal of the radical Shiites and such a victory would only ensure a continued river of blood throughout the Middle East.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqi Militias Must Go

Back in 2004, the Mahdi Army consisted of only a few thousand members, mostly young street hoodlums attracted to Muqtada al Sadr because his father was a well-respected ayatollah who was executed by Saddam Hussein.

Those of us working the perilous streets of Baghdad that year were disheartened when our bosses decided to leave the Mahdi Army untouched because al Sadr indicated he would turn to politics. We didn’t believe he or his militia would ever disarm and he launched two uprisings that year. Many Americans were killed or wounded by his militia thugs.

Now Muqtada’s private army is conservatively estimated to consist of around 60,000 members. That doesn’t include the sympathizers among Iraqi civilians or the family members who help sustain and equip these black-uniformed killers. It also doesn’t include the Iranian advisors who provide arms, ammunition and training to their Iraqi revolutionary brothers – just as they did in 2004.

Al Sadr owes his life and the lives of his fellow Shiites to the American and Coalition forces, but he has refused to deal with the United States. This ungrateful fundamentalist only wants to lead the ultimate Shiite theocracy he sees simmering beneath the surface of the Iraqi political landscape. Any cooperation at all is only because it is in his interests for the moment while he pursues his own agenda.

While al Sadr hides in Iran, the new Iraqi Army has done reasonably well against his militia, even though some of the fundamentalists are surely within the military’s ranks. With Sunnis working with the Coalition for the most part to steadily wipe out the foreign fighters, one of the biggest remaining issues remains the in-fighting among the Shiites. Clearly, many of these Shiites – like al Maliki – have begun to realize that a functioning democracy is the only way to prevent a bloody civil war.

We have been correct to stay the course and we must continue to do so as long as freedom-loving Iraqis work with us. American and Coalition military forces can never impose a democracy on the people of Iraq because democracy is a free-will choice of the people of any nation.

If the average Iraqi citizen wants liberty, then he must be willing to fight for it as well. The Mahdi Army and the other militias must be squashed once and for all, but the Iranian influence in Iraqi society will always remain concealed in the shadows.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iranian Boats Should Have Been Destroyed

When Iranian boats approached our ships with threats that “the ships would explode”, such imminent danger to our warships and service members was all our naval commanders needed to send the likely members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to “paradise”.

Dangerous and unpredictable countries like Iran only understand and respect strength. Indecision and a hesitancy to react could very easily be interpreted as weakness. Perceived weakness will only increase the confrontations, not reduce them.

While the warship commanders may possess information we don’t have, it still seems like the appropriate response would have been similar to the photo above.

The Reuters article below talks about the incident:

* * * *

Iranians threatened U.S. ships in Hormuz: Pentagon
Mon Jan 7, 2008 6:54pm EST
By Andrew Gray

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Iranian boats aggressively approached three U.S. Naval ships in the Strait of Hormuz, a main shipping route for Gulf oil, at the weekend and threatened that the ships would explode, U.S. officials said on Monday.

Iran dismissed U.S. concerns about the incident, saying it was a routine contact. But the Pentagon termed the Iranian actions "careless, reckless and potentially hostile" and said Tehran should provide an explanation.

"This is a very volatile area and the risk of an incident escalating is real," U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said. "It is a reminder that there is a very unpredictable government in Tehran."

Vice Adm. Kevin Cosgriff, the commander of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, which is based in the Gulf, said five Iranian fast boats moved aggressively toward the U.S. ships in international waters and their actions were "unduly provocative."

"The ships received a radio call that was threatening in nature, to the effect that they were closing on our ships and ... the U.S. ships would explode," Cosgriff told reporters at the Pentagon via videolink from his Bahrain headquarters.

The incident was the latest sign of tension between Washington and Tehran, at odds over a range of issues from Iran's nuclear program to U.S. allegations of Iranian support for terrorism and interference in Iraq.

U.S. President George W. Bush is due to travel to the Middle East this week on a trip he has said is partly aimed at countering Iranian influence.

Cosgriff said the U.S. Navy believed the Iranian boats belonged to the country's Revolutionary Guard and they were sometimes less than 500 yards (meters) from the U.S. ships.

In October, the United States designated the Revolutionary Guard Corps a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction and its elite Qods force a supporter of terrorism.

OIL PRICES ROSE

Oil prices briefly rose on the news about the confrontation as dealers weighed the threat to shipments along the key shipping route. Crude futures jumped 49 cents to $98.40 a barrel before slipping back.

In Tehran, the Iranian Foreign Ministry described the encounter as "ordinary" and said it had been resolved.

"This is an ordinary issue that happens for the two sides every once in a while and, after the identification of the two sides, the issue is resolved," Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini told Iran's official IRNA news agency.

An "informed source" from the naval force of Iran's Revolutionary Guards was quoted by Iranian state television as saying: "There were no out of the ordinary contacts between the Guards' naval force and American ships."

The source said three U.S. naval ships were asked by Guards' vessels "as usual" to identify themselves "which they did and they continued their path.

Pentagon officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said after the Iranian threats a U.S. captain was in the process of ordering sailors to open fire when the Iranian boats moved away.

According to the officials, the radio transmission from one of the Iranian ships said: "I am coming at you. You will explode in a couple of minutes."

Cosgriff said two Iranian boats also dropped floating white boxes into the water. He offered no explanation for that move but said the U.S. ships passed the boxes safely.

Cosgriff said the U.S. Navy was very mindful of the damage small craft could do to large ships. Al Qaeda militants killed 17 U.S. sailors when they rammed an explosives-laden boat into the side of the USS Cole, a destroyer, in Aden in 2000.

The incident took place about 0400 GMT Sunday, or late Saturday night in Washington, the officials said. Cosgriff said it was daylight with "decent visibility." The three U.S. ships were the USS Port Royal, USS Hopper and the USS Ingraham.

Last March, Iran seized 15 British sailors and marines in the Gulf and accused them of trespassing into Iranian waters. London maintained they were in Iraqi waters but the Britons were held for almost two weeks.

(Writing by Andrew Gray; Editing by David Storey)

* * * *

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Al Sadr's Quest for Power in Iraq

My “series” of posts on Muqtada al Sadr and the Mahdi Army continues.

Al Sadr may be trying to position himself in order to eventually declare that he is the “Mahdi” or “the guided one”. According to many fundamentalists, this individual will appear when Muslims are being oppressed throughout the world. The Mahdi will make war against those who are deemed to be oppressors. All Muslims will be joined together in peace and justice and the Mahdi will rule over all Arabs. According to believers, the Mahdi will even pray at Mecca with Jesus (“Isa” in the Quran).

Although Muqtada’s father was a high-ranking ayatollah, Muqtada has not even completed his formal religious training. This article talks about his quest for Islamic credentials:

* * * *

Iraq cleric Sadr eyes higher religious credentials

Reuters: December 14, 2007

KUFA, Iraq: Powerful Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is taking advanced Islamic studies in a bid to earn credentials that would allow him to issue religious decrees, a top aide to the young firebrand said on Friday.

Some senior figures in the Shi'ite clerical establishment view Sadr, who commands the feared Mehdi Army militia and has a bloc of legislators in parliament, as an upstart given his lack of scholarly achievement.

The anti-American cleric has a strong following among poor, urban Shi'ites across Iraq. Attaining higher religious credentials would likely enhance the influence of Sadr among majority Shi'ites, engaged in a power struggle for influence in the oil-rich south as foreign troops scale down their presence.

Senior aide Salah al-Ubaidi, speaking in the southern town of Kufa near the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf, said Sadr was looking to gain the title of "Marji", a term used for a cleric who is qualified to make religious decisions for his followers.

"Sayyid Moqtada al-Sadr is studying the Hawza like any other Shi'ite student who aims to reach the level of Ijtihad," Ubaidi told Reuters, referring to a term that describes a level that allows someone to issue religious decrees or "fatwas".

He said Sadr, who is believed to be in his 30s, was studying at Najaf, adding it was unclear how long it would take the cleric the achieve the credentials, but the process normally takes years.

Sadr's followers currently have to seek guidance on religious issues from clerics who have the necessary qualifications.

If Sadr succeeds, he could earn more respect from top Shi'ite clerics who have been unsettled by his rising following, which they believe stems from his respected father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed by suspected agents of Saddam Hussein along with two of his sons in 1999.

Ubaidi denied Sadr was developing his religious stature to push for more influence in mainly Shi'ite southern Iraq, a region rich in oil reserves.

"He has no interest in public funds," Ubaidi said.

Sadr's main mass movement Shi'ite rival is the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.

Hakim also built his reputation partly through his father Muhsin al-Hakim, one of the most prominent Shi'ite scholars of recent times. But Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has a closer relationship to traditional clerics at the top of the hierarchy than Sadr.

Sadr, who led two uprisings against U.S. forces in 2004, froze the activities of the Mehdi Army for six months in late August after some of his followers were blamed for sparking intra-Shi'ite violence at a major religious ceremony.

The U.S. military has welcomed the ceasefire and said it has helped bring down violence in Iraq.

Sadr has vowed to reorganise his militia and root out rebellious elements who are ignoring his commands and taking the law into their own hands.

(Reporting by Khaled Farhan in Najaf; writing by Mussab Al- Khairalla in Baghdad, Editing by Dean Yates and Ibon Villelabeitia)

* * * *

We must remember that the future of Iraq will ultimately be determined by Iraqis, not America and its Coalition partners.

Since Arabs have a history of following charismatic religious leaders, we should always look at the fundamentalist Islamic leaders who may be trying to position themselves as the “voice” of Islam. There are quite a few of these potential “wannabe Mahdis” including al Sadr, Osama bin Laden and the religious leaders in Iran.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Mahdi Army Spreads Fear Through Intimidation

A couple of days ago, I posted a piece on Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and the threat it poses to the future of Iraq. The American and Iraqi governments have already paid a heavy price in blood because they failed to deal with the Mahdi Army when it was a much smaller force. The ultimate price has yet to be determined.

Taliban-like threats and intimidation of the Iraqi people will not end any time soon. Muqtada al Sadr has big plans for himself and his militia. Those plans have nothing to do with democracy or the basic rights of man.

* * * *

Washington Post
December 13, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear;
Schoolgirls Told to Wear Scarves, Under Threat of Death

By Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD -- On the first day of class, two male teenagers entered a girls' high school in the Tobji neighborhood, clutching AK-47 assault rifles. The young Shiite fighters handed the principal a handwritten note and ordered her to assemble the students in the courtyard, witnesses said.

"All girls must wear hijab," she read aloud, her voice trembling. "If the girls don't wear hijab, we will close the school or kill the girls."

That October day Sara Mustafa, 14, a secular Sunni Arab, also trembled. The next morning, she covered up with an Islamic head scarf for the first time. The young fighters now controlled her life. "We could not do anything," Sara recalled.

The Mahdi Army of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is using a new generation of youths, some as young as 15, to expand and tighten its grip across Baghdad, but the ruthlessness of some of these young fighters is alienating Sunnis and Shiites alike.

The fighters are filling the vacuum of leadership created by a 10-month-old U.S.-led security offensive. Hundreds of senior and mid-level militia members have been arrested, killed or forced into hiding, weakening what was once the second most powerful force in Iraq after the U.S. military. But the militia still rules through fear and intimidation, often under the radar of U.S. troops.

"JAM is alive and well in Tobji, although they have gotten younger, like in many other areas," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska, using a military acronym derived from the militia's name in Arabic. For much of this year, his soldiers operated in Tobji.

The rise of this new generation is a reflection of the Mahdi Army's deep infiltration of society and could presage a turbulent resurgence of the militia as the U.S. military reduces troop levels. The emergence also highlights the struggle Sadr faces in his quest to control the capital and lead Iraq.

In late August, the 34-year-old cleric declared a freeze in operations, in part to exert more authority over his unruly, decentralized militia. Many followers stood down, so much that U.S. commanders give Sadr some credit for a downturn in violence this year. But some militia leaders have ignored Sadr's freeze, and their young, power-hungry foot soldiers may ultimately undermine the cleric's popular appeal.

"We have to show people we are not weak," said Ali, a 19-year-old Mahdi Army fighter in Tobji.

'I Was in Control. I Ruled'

Two years ago, Ali was unemployed. He recalled that he idolized his older cousins who were veteran Mahdi Army fighters. Like them, he was born and raised in Tobji, a wisp of a neighborhood in north-central Baghdad where every neighbor knows the other. Its official name is Salaam, or peace.

Ali and his cousins once befriended Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. But after the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra, sectarian violence shattered Tobji's tribal and social bonds. Suddenly sect was all that mattered to Ali, and the militia became his new family. He was 17.

Abu Sajjad, a 44-year-old former Mahdi Army fighter, remembered seeing a rise in disaffected, jobless recruits at the time. "They were nothing before they joined the Mahdi Army," said Abu Sajjad, who asked to be called by his nickname to protect his security. "The Mahdi Army will protect them better than their tribes or their families."

Older fighters quickly indoctrinated Ali. "They are Sunnis. We are Shia. They are not going to kick us out of Tobji," Ali recalled them saying.

Ali, tall and slim with wavy black hair, spoke on condition that his full name not be used, fearing arrest by U.S. forces and retaliation by the militia. He is trying to leave the militia and has joined the Iraqi army, which he keeps secret from his comrades. In separate interviews, Sunni and Shiite residents said that Ali was a well-known Mahdi Army member involved in several attacks.

Initially, Ali was assigned to a militia checkpoint. He searched cars and demanded that drivers give their tribal names, so he could determine their sect. "I was a teenager. I was in control. I ruled," said Ali, who during a four-hour interview wore a brown sweater and, like many Shiites, a silver ring on his left pinky. "If I told any car to stop, it would stop."

At the local Sadr office, recruits were given lessons in Shiite religion and Mahdi Army ideology, which centered on Shiite supremacy. The recruits were ordered to inform on anyone suspicious or breaking Islamic codes.

"They can convince anybody," Ali said. "If they tell you that your father is a bad man, you will be more than happy to kill your father."

Ali also worked in a barbershop. When customers discussed their lives, he took mental notes and later reported what he had heard to the Sadr office.

Four months after he joined, Ali fought his first street battle. He fired a rocket-propelled grenade into the house of a member of a Sunni tribe called the Egheidat, killing him. Ali said he felt remorse, which vanished as smiling, older fighters hugged him.

"You are a hero," one of them told Ali. "The rocket saved our lives."

Two Egheidat leaders, including Mustafa Salih, Sara's father, said that Ali was known to have fired RPGs during the battle, but they were unsure if he had killed anyone.

Mahdi Army commanders punished young fighters for disobeying orders. Offenders were taken to a room inside the Sadr office, filled with steel cables, whips and slabs of iron, where they were tortured. Ali said it was called "The Happiness Room."

Murder and Protection

On the streets of Tobji one recent day, clusters of girls headed to school in their uniforms, all wearing the hijab. The portrait of a serene Haider Hamrani, a 17-year-old militia fighter shot dead by U.S. forces, stared out from a billboard.

Young men with cellphones circled the neighborhood, which was plastered with images of Sadr. They drove mopeds on side streets or gathered on corners. Some wore jeans, others baseball caps, blending into the landscape. They were the early warning system, keeping watch for strangers and U.S. patrols.

"No one will suspect they are Mahdi Army," Ali said.

Today, more than half the militia here is under age 20, said Ali and another young fighter named Mahmoud. The new generation is heavily involved in the militia's income-generating schemes. They sell the cars of kidnap victims and rent out the houses of displaced Sunnis. The militia also demands payments from generator men supplying electricity. Each month, youths collect 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or about $4, in protection money from every household.

"The more flagrant, younger crowd tends to focus on organized crime and lining their pockets with cash," said Miska, the U.S. officer.

Many young militiamen appear to have become ruthless murderers, replacing older fighters who have been captured or gone underground. Ali said he took part in four killings, all of neighbors. After Ali informed the Sadr office that his childhood friend Wissam had joined the Iraqi army, several young militia members abducted him and his mother. First they shot Wissam. When his mother kneeled over his body, screaming and in tears, they shot her in the head, Ali and Mahmoud said.

Another neighbor, a divorced woman, was killed after Ali mentioned that he had heard on the street that she was a prostitute -- a crime in the view of the militia -- although he had no proof. One of her assassins, Ali said, was a 17-year-old named Saad, who had joined at age 15.

When young fighters are told to kill someone, Ali said, "they will kill that person the next day without hesitation."

Nearby, in the living room of his narrow two-story home, Abu Ali Hassan, a 42-year-old Sunni, has hung a portrait of Imam Ali, one of Shiite Islam's most revered figures, in case militia fighters visit. Each month, he hands them the 5,000 dinars, which he calls "extortion money."

He's noticed that older fighters have all but vanished. "They are running the neighborhood through these kids," said Hassan, a Transportation Ministry employee.

Like many areas in Baghdad, Tobji has experienced a decline in violent attacks. But most Sunnis who fled have yet to return, community leaders said. Those who remain live under constant fear that they are being monitored. This year, the militia started to deploy women as spies, Ali and other residents said.

Desperate, Hassan has befriended a few young militiamen on his street. "God forbid, if anything happens to me tomorrow, they will be useful to me," he said. "Now, they are the supreme power in our neighborhood."

Shiites as Victims

Increasingly, the militia's victims are Shiites.

Tobji's Shiite head of the local council, Abu Hussein Kamil, and another official were assassinated in August. Kamil, Ali said, had not given jobs to relatives of the militiamen and was suspected of collaborating with U.S. forces. "He was hurting his own people," Ali said.

In June, several young fighters tortured and killed a Shiite generator man because he would not give additional electricity to the house of a militia member, his family and neighbors said. "They call themselves the Mahdi Army, but they act like a gang," said Majid al-Zubaidi, 28, the man's brother. "They just want to show they are in control of everything. They want people to fear them."

"Now, both Sunni and Shia are upset with the Mahdi Army," Zubaidi said.

Abu Sajjad, the veteran fighter, said many older militiamen are also angry. The youths are tarnishing the militia's image as guardians of Shiites, he said. One day, he witnessed two young fighters on a moped drive up to a car and fatally shoot the driver, a Shiite who had publicly criticized Sadr. Abu Sajjad urged the Sadr office to punish the assailants, but nothing happened, he said.

The leaders of the office protect the shebab, as the young men are called in Arabic, Abu Sajjad said. "The shebab are their eyes in the neighborhood and are following their orders."

On another day, a 17-year-old fighter went to the Sadr office and complained that his parents had ordered him to leave the militia. The office threatened the family, said Abu Sajjad, who knows the teenager and his family.

The U.S. military has exploited this generational rift and the anger of residents, Miska said. His troops paid informers for tips that often led to raids and arrests. But some community leaders complained that the American military had also targeted moderate leaders who brought some discipline to the militia.

"It's hard to believe they can't distinguish between the good people and bad people," said Ali Khadim, 44, a prominent Shiite tribal leader. U.S. troops, he said, recently raided his own house, where his elderly parents live.

Schoolchildren 'Seduced'

Down the street from the Sadr office, the tan wall of a secondary school was covered with posters of Sadr and Imam Ali. A long black banner commemorated a Shiite holiday, as women covered in head-to-ankle abayas seemed to float by.

Inside some of Tobji's schools, young militiamen have pressured teachers to disclose exam answers and give high grades to relatives of Mahdi Army fighters. They have ordered them to give Shiite religious lessons to students, including Sunnis, according to teachers and parents.

"They have turned the schools into their safe houses," said Fadhil Hassan, who teaches at a school in Tobji that he asked not be named, fearing retaliation. A young fighter wanted by U.S. forces shows up every day, Hassan said, and sometimes hits students on the head or shoulder with a stick, separating Sunnis from Shiites.

Now, students with problems are also turning to the Mahdi Army, he added, and looking up to militiamen as role models.

"They are seduced by these young fighters," Abu Sajjad said. "When children get power and pistols, this is their biggest dream come true." By infiltrating the schools, he added, the fighters have found the most effective means of controlling Tobji. "Families will be terrified through their kids."

Following the arrests of Mahdi Army commanders, Tobji's tribes are trying to reassert themselves. But ancient rules built on honor and respect hold little sway over the new generation.

Khadim, the Shiite tribal leader, has tried to persuade several young fighters to leave. Only one did, he said.

Ali is trying to quit. He's in love with a Sunni woman from the neighborhood. If the militiamen learn of this, he fears he will be killed, he said.

Worried about his future, Mustafa Salih has added his name to a list of Sunnis keen to launch a sahwa -- or "awakening" -- protection force, like those the U.S. military has funded in other areas. The tipping point came when he saw his daughter, Sara, rush home from school in October, upset that she had to wear a hijab.

"Why plant extremist ideas in children?" Salih asked bitterly.

Today, Sara's head scarf has become a metaphor for the militia's grip on her neighborhood. "It feels like someone is choking me," she said.

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Remember that Muqtada al Sadr already controls a large percentage of the seats in the new Iraqi Parliament, giving his Iranian sponsors the eyes and ears they need to plan their own vision for the future of Iraq.

In reality, al Sadr and his militia are the "resident evil" of Baghdad and just as dangerous as the foreign terrorists or the Sunni insurgency.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

The Mahdi Army - Iran's Surrogate in Iraq

There will come a day when the United States largely pulls out of Iraq at the request of that nation’s leaders. If our goals are met, then a multi-party Iraqi government will be able to defend itself from outside aggressors and provide a stable, democratic environment that will protect the interests of all the various political factions.

One of the largest wild cards in the future of Iraq will remain Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a Hezbollah-like militia that has opposed the American and Coalition presence since day one. When I was in Iraq in 2004, the Mahdi Army was already building its relationship with Iran and this militia became a force to be reckoned with. Many Americans died during al Sadr’s uprisings that year.

Al Sadr’s opposition seems surprising since we liberated Iraq’s Shiites from decades of oppression under Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, such opposition isn’t surprising when we realize that Iraq’s most radical Shiites are simply an extension of the Iranian fundamentalist leaders who are the sworn enemies of America.

With Shiites comprising some 60% of the Iraqi population, this majority will surely lead the way toward the future of Iraq – whatever kind of future that may be.

This article from today’s Christian Science Monitor talks about the Mahdi Army of 2007. The above photo is Muqtada al Sadr:

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Christian Science Monitor
December 11, 2007
Pg. 1

Iraq's Sadr Uses Lull To Rebuild Army

By Sam Dagher, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

KARBALA, IRAQ -- For more than three months, the Mahdi Army has been largely silent. The potent, black-clad Iraqi Shiite force put down its guns in late August at the behest of Moqtada al-Sadr.

The move has bolstered improved security in Baghdad, even though the US says some Mahdi Army splinter groups that it calls "criminals" or "extremists" have not heeded Mr. Sadr's freeze.

Away from public view, however, Sadr's top aides say the anti-American cleric is anything but idle. Instead, he is orchestrating a revival among his army of loyalists entrenched in Baghdad and Shiite enclaves to the south - from the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf to the economic hub of Basra. What is in the making, they say, is a better-trained and leaner force free of rogue elements accused of atrocities and crimes during the height of the sectarian war last year.

Many analysts say what may reemerge is an Iraqi version of Lebanon's Hizbullah - a state within a state that embraces politics while maintaining a separate military and social structure that holds powerful sway at home and in the region.

"He is now in the process of reconstituting the [Mahdi] Army and removing all the bad people that committed mistakes and those that sullied its reputation. There will be a whole new structure and dozens of conditions for membership," says Sheikh Abdul-Hadi al-Mahamadawi, a turbaned cleric who commands Sadr's operation in Karbala.

Sheikh Mahamadawi says each fighter would have to be vouched for by fellow fighters in good standing and would have to undergo a series of physical and character tests. "He must have high morals, strong faith, and above all, be obedient."

Sadr is also said to have created a special force called the "golden one" to cleanse the ranks of the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al-Mahdi in Arabic, from unwanted members, according to militia and police sources.

One Mahdi Army fighter, who did not wish to be named, says safe houses have been rented in Najaf for senior militiamen from neighboring Diwaniyah, where a joint Iraqi-US crackdown on the militia has been under way for months.

He says militiamen are spending their time carrying out good deeds like giving blood and sweeping streets to endear themselves again to the masses. The name of the Mahdi Army has, in many areas, become associated with killings, kidnappings, and extortion.

During the freeze, he says, he continues to be in contact with members of his unit but has returned to his day job as a hotel receptionist in Najaf, where he awaits instructions from his commanders. "There is just bound to be another war as long as the occupation remains. Our main enemy is America."

The Mahdi Army's next phase

In recent weeks, Sadrists - many dressed in black and donning white cloaks to symbolize martyrdom - have marched in Baghdad and the south. The largest rally took place in Najaf on Nov. 15, when tens of thousands of militiamen were bused in from all over Iraq to commemorate the ninth anniversary of the killing of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, their spiritual leader and Sadr's father.

They paraded through Najaf's Valley of Peace cemetery, which was the scene of some of the worst fighting between the militia and the US in 2004. Celebrants flashed victory signs and shouted anti-American slogans. Those attending received a CD showing footage of purported roadside bombings planted by the militia against US forces and militiamen in training.

Mothers of Mahdi Army fighters killed since 2004 wept in a special section of the cemetery reserved for them. Like the Hizbullah cemeteries in Lebanon, hundreds of tombstones were festooned with artificial flowers and billboards praising the heroics of the so-called martyrs.

As for Sadr's intent, his spokesman in Najaf, Salah al-Obeidi, says: "We have new visions for what the Mahdi Army will do in the next phase."

Mr. Obeidi explains that most Shiite parties have embraced the political process wholeheartedly and accept the presence of US forces, while the Sadrists, who continue to oppose it, need to keep their Army as a "national resistance force."

In his latest statement last week, Sadr said: "I tell the evil Bush, leave our land, we do not need you or your armies.... I tell the occupiers ... you have your democracy and we have our Islam; get out of our land."

And using language that could have been torn right out of the fiery speeches of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, he urged the Mahdi Army to continue to abide by his freeze order for now.

The cleric warned the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against extending the mandate of US-led multinational forces. He blasted Mr. Maliki's Dawa Party and its allies, the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) and the Badr Organization, for targeting Sadrists. And he chided Iraqi security forces, many of them beholden to ISCI and Badr, for taking part in those anti-Sadrist operations.

The early history of Hizbullah, too, involved bloody internal fighting with a rival Shiite group and training by Iran before it became a skilled guerrilla group.

"Iran is definitely interested in having its own proxy political and military force in Iraq, just like Lebanon. Iran may try to wait a bit now to see who will emerge as the more dominant force," says Riad al-Kahwaji, a Dubai-based military expert on Iran. "All the indications so far are that [Iran] has invested a great deal in the Mahdi Army."

But, he adds, "it has been a bumpy start. The Mahdi Army is far from being the organized fighting machine like Hizbullah."

Shiite rivals do battle

The Mahdi Army freeze grew out of fierce battles in late August between ISCI and its affiliate, Badr, both headed by Sadr's archnemesis Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, in Karbala. In two days of fighting, more than 50 people were killed at the city's shrines during an important pilgrimage. The outside wall of the revered Imam Hussein mausoleum still bears the scars of the fighting.

Video footage of the clashes provided by Sadr's aides in Karbala shows black-clad men loyal to the cleric taunting guards, who are largely made up of Badr partisans, and then hurling shoes at them for refusing them entry into the shrine. Later, these guards are seen firing directly at throngs of pilgrims.

Mr. Maliki himself came down to Karbala at the time and gave police chief Brig. Gen. Raed Shaker, carte blanche to go after the Mahdi Army.

About 500 people were arrested at the time, including several provincial council members loyal to Sadr. General Shaker also declared publicly that the Mahdi Army was responsible for the assassination of at least 400 people in Karbala since 2004.

"These are only the bodies that we found," he said in an interview. "This is all documented. I am not doing this for any political agenda."

Umm Bassem says the Mahdi Army killed her son Bassem Hassoun, an Iraqi Army officer. She says they crippled her second son, Haidar.

"It's the fault of Sayyed [honorific] Moqtada; he encouraged them and armed them," says a tearful Umm Bassem, a nickname that means "mother of Bassem," as she clutches a portrait of her late son.

Mahamadawi, Sadr's aide in Karbala, says there may have been bad apples in the ranks of the Mahdi Army.

"We are not saying they are all angels, they are humans that can make mistakes; we have punished some and kicked out others," he says, adding that there is an intent by the government to sully the image of the Mahdi Army and finish it off. He also accuses the Karbala police of committing unspeakable crimes against the Sadrists including the killing of two children of a wanted militiaman in October and the torture of prisoners.

The assault on Sadr supporters

Anger against the police force, mixed with vows of revenge, reigns among the Daoum tribe in their village fiefdom on the outskirts of Karbala. Sixty-five of their members were among those arrested in the aftermath of the August events.

Muhammad Miri, who has been released since, lifts up his shirt to show scars on his back from what he says are from torture with wire cables. He says at least 22 prisoners were also sexually abused by police interrogators.

A police officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity, says his claims are true. Widely circulated video footage also shows Hamid Ganoush, a Sadrist provincial council member, blindfolded and on his knees as he is being hit on the head with a shoe by interrogators who press him on the whereabouts of Ali Shria, a Karbala Mahdi Army leader, believed to be in Iran now.

The risk now is that these ever-deepening intra-Shiite feuds may also take on a tribal aspect.

A Baghdad-based US Department of Defense intelligence analyst, who tracks the Mahdi Army and who spoke on condition of anonymity, says intra-Shiite feuds in Iraq have always managed to sort themselves out, adding that he believes Sadr will maintain his freeze despite the rhetoric, as his paramount concern is political survival.

"It's working well. It's serving Sadr's interest well because it's solidifying his position as the clear leader ... and satisfying our desires to eliminate rogue criminal elements," he says. "I am not seeing any evidence that there is [a danger] that this is going to unravel."

Echoing recent remarks by top US military officials, he says that while there has been a decrease in roadside bombs - using Iranian armor-piercing explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) - against US troops, the militia's rogue elements still operate.

He blames recent bombings in Baghdad and mortar attacks on the Green Zone on Thanksgiving Day on these rogue elements. He also says a "massive" cache of Iranian-made arms was found in Diwaniyah recently, and on Dec. 1 a dealer of Iranian weapons was arrested in the city of Nasiriyah in southern Iraq.

"The guy was a major mover of lethal aid in his area," he says.

Some of these so-called rogue groups have also been blamed for the kidnapping of five Britons in May from the Finance Ministry in Baghdad. A group calling itself the "The Islamic Shiite Resistance in Iraq" released video footage of one of the hostages on Dec. 4 accompanied with a written statement demanding British troops leave Basra within 10 days.

Britain has pulled out from inside the city in September and now has only 4,500 soldiers left at an air base outside the city. The pullout of the bulk of this force is expected soon, leaving the Mahdi Army as the strongest armed group among its rivals in Basra.

Top US officials in Iraq have made no secret of their concern over Iranian plans to turn the Mahdi Army into another Hizbullah-like organization, pointing to their capture of a Hizbullah operative in March in Basra.

"His sole purpose in life was to come to Iraq to try to make JAM [Jaish al-Mahdi] a mirror image of Hizbullah," the Defense analyst says.

A senior official in Sadr's rival party, the ISCI, which is very close to the Iranian government, says Mr. Hakim received assurances from Iran at the highest level that they would rein in the hard-line factions within the Islamic Republic who might be supporting Sadr's militia.

"The events in Karbala embarrassed the Iranians," says the official, who requested anonymity, referring to the sanctity of the shrines to Shiite Iran. "There is a nationalist current in Iran, though, that does not want to see stability in Iraq ... this keeps us worried."

The Sadrists have long distanced themselves from Iran publicly and sought to portray themselves more as Arab nationalists.

Sadr's spokesman Obeidi says while the movement admires Iranian-backed Hizbullah, the Mahdi Army is different.

He says the US military and the Mahdi Army's Shiite rivals are trying hard to force the dismantling of Sadr's militia forming tribal councils across the Shiite south, much like the Americans did in Sunni parts of the country to combat Al Qaeda.

But, the spokesman says, this strategy isn't going to work in the south, where many of the tribesmen's sons are Mahdi fighters.

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Keep watching the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al Sadr and their partnership with Iran. When it comes to such Islamic fundamentalist relationships, all we can do is watch, wait and keep our weapons at hand.

SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com