My Retirement Orders Are In!

It is now official. I have received my retirement orders which are effective on my 60th birthday of February 28, 2009.

By the way, although I have spent my somewhat disjointed post-Vietnam military career as a non-commissioned officer (i.e. sergeant to sergeant first class), my retirement orders are for “First Lieutenant Charles M. Grist II”. I will retire at my old Vietnam platoon leader’s rank. (Twenty-one year old second lieutenant Grist is pictured above in 1970 just before he left for his first war.)

Yeah, I know; if I’d had my stuff together and I’d been a little more “politically correct” and ambitious, I would have retired a general, a colonel or a sergeant major. That’s O.K. I’ve spent my Army years either leading, serving with or training average soldiers like me and I consider that both a blessing and an honor.

I have a little more time to finish all my medical stuff and get my records up-to-date. Then I will begin my terminal leave in early December. My final mobilization as a reservist will end on January 31 and I will return to the police department. After all, there are still a lot of “neighborhood insurgents” who must be dealt with.

Time marches on, but I believe I am still a long way from the finish line. After all, I am a Baby Boomer and, like the rest of my generation, I will continue to seek more of life’s great adventures.

I truly believe that some of my best years lie ahead and that many of my greatest adventures are just over the next hill.

Rangers lead the way!

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Warrior Cops Train New Iraqi Police

The following article discusses the invaluable assistance that American police officers are providing to the new Iraqi police. I am also a cop and I will return to my police department in February. I am extraordinarily proud that my fellow law enforcement officers are willing to enter the world of war to make a difference, just as they are willing to put their lives on the line back here in the States.

I met many of these DynCorp Interternational instructors when I was in Baghdad in 2004 as the training of the Iraqi police was just getting underway. Several DynCorp police contractors have been killed or wounded during their own tours and our thoughts and prayers are with them, their families and their law enforcement communities.

Regardless of what some might say, police officers are warriors too and they put their lives on the line here and overseas. When people are threatened, these brave men and women use skills that range from effective and peaceful communication to the other extreme of deadly force. They stand between us and both foreign and domestic “bad guys” and that makes them members of America's elite warrior class.

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Los Angeles Times
October 4, 2008

U.S. Civilian Cops Offer Expertise To Iraq Police Force

By Doug Smith and Saif Rasheed, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers

RAMADI, IRAQ — Like most days in the field for Atlanta cop Brian Acree, this one was shaping up as a polite but determined competition between the Army way, the Iraqi way and the Georgia way.

Acree, a towering, slow-walking, shaved-headed police investigator, was crammed into an 8-by-10 office with three U.S. soldiers, three Iraqi policemen and an interpreter. As the air conditioner weakly rumbled in the background, U.S. Army Sgt. Chai Kim lectured his Iraqi counterpart on the proper role of a logistics officer.

"They keep the numbers on the vehicles. They don't fix them," Kim said through the interpreter. "How many trucks? Who took it out? How many miles? What purpose?" Iraqi police 1st Lt. Mushtaq Talib answered dourly.

"The motor pool, they have a guy for that," he said.

"That is going to change," Kim replied. "Being a logistics officer is about money management."

Acree stayed silent. But later, he let Mushtaq know that he thought Kim might have been a little inflexible.

"You know how to get your job done and I know you know," he had the interpreter tell the young Iraqi officer.

A key assignment

Acree, on leave from his post with the Georgia state police, is in the capital of Anbar province as a civilian consultant to the Ramadi Police Department. Eighteen months after the insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq was run out of town, his job is to help rebuild a key institution in the western province.

Acree is one of about 800 civilian police officers working under a military contract with DynCorp International. Unlike the thousands of civilian contractors who have come to Iraq to supplement the military, Acree and his colleagues don't provide security services. They're here to impart their experience in urban police work to a young and inadequately trained and equipped force.

The consultants, whose pay starts at $134,000 a year, are assigned to U.S. military police units and travel in convoys of Humvees. Acree and two other DynCorp contractors bunk with a company of Marines in an abandoned warehouse on Ramadi's eastern outskirts.

The cops weren't authorized by DynCorp to give interviews, but the military police unit allowed The Times to come along for two days to observe the training program. The unit has been teaching neophyte Iraqi policemen, known as shortas, basic skills such as arrest procedures, traffic control and field communications. DynCorp runs formal classes on specialized subjects such as detective technique at the main military base, Camp Ramadi.

Acree and his roommates also make the rounds of the city's police stations to work with more senior officers, trying to improve procurement practices, discipline and accountability.

Like many of his colleagues, Acree, 37, is older than the MPs he works with and sometimes has more tolerance for the tradition-bound style of the Iraqi police, even as he pushes them toward a Western model.

Long-range view

Acree, who arrived in Ramadi in March, has made a commitment to stay in Iraq a year and expects to sign up for a second year. Because U.S. military units often deploy for less than a year, Acree was working with the Ramadi police before the arrival of the 914th Military Police, the unit he stays with, and will remain after it's gone. That, combined with his languid Southern style, gives him a longer-range view of his mission.

At times, a deep tolerance for frustration is Acree's most useful skill.

One morning, he and the MP unit commander, Staff Sgt. Jeff Klein, were dumbfounded by the timing of a request from the commander of the Adala station on the southern edge of Ramadi. The previous week, a worker using an earthmover had discovered 11 bodies in a shallow grave. An Iraqi lieutenant colonel asked Klein to send a forensic team to the scene.

Incredulous, Acree said it was far too late.

"Next time he finds a crime scene, if he needs our help, he needs to call us immediately," Acree told the interpreter.

Later, Acree told the Iraqi officer he was alarmed when he saw two mopeds enter the station without being searched.

"Ask him who searches people at the police station," Acree said. "There needs to be one on the ground and one in the tower. The guy in the tower may know the guy in the moped. But how well does he know him? He needs to at least stop him and look in the moped."

Then, catching himself, Acree acknowledged the limitation of his authority.
"Tell him I'm not demanding, just asking," he said.

Gentle persuasion

Later in the day, Acree adopted a more understanding tone when he teamed with Kim to counsel Mushtaq, the young logistics officer he obviously respected and liked. After Kim grilled Mushtaq about his job duties, Acree moved on to what he considered a more serious problem: the station's armory. AK-47 assault rifles were stored in a room at the end of a hallwhere detainees were lined up each day to wait their turn in the bathroom.

Worse, the ammunition was stored in the same room, and the shorta assigned to guard it was unarmed.

"Why do you have shortas in charge of the armory when he doesn't have a gun?" Acree asked. "I think he needs to have a Glock on his side."

"You have to be an officer to have a sidearm," Mushtaq told Kim.

Kim then instructed Mushtaq to assign his pistol to the guard each day, a prospect that put a sour look on Mushtaq's face. Noticing that Mushtaq didn't even have a holster for his gun and stowed it in his desk drawer, Acree found a way to defuse the tension.

"Ask him if he has a holster for his gun," he told the interpreter. Mushtaq shook his head.

"Tell him tomorrow I'm going to give him a holster that's mine," he said. A brightened Mushtaq then led them to the other side of the station, where the departing Marine unit had lived. It was going to be the new armory, he said. Seeing a look on Mushtaq's face that seemed to crave approval, he told the interpreter: "Tell him if I didn't like him I wouldn't be here with him."

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I am proud to be a soldier as well as a police officer and it is an honor to serve as a member of America’s warrior class.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

A Strategic Assessment of Al Qaeda

The following article from Stratfor brings us up-to-date on the status of Al Qaeda. This company has a great track record in forecasting and analyzing international military and political issues:

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Stratfor:

AL QAEDA AND THE TALE OF TWO BATTLESPACES

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

Over the last year or so, a lot of debate has arisen over the physical strength of al Qaeda. Some experts and government officials believe that the al Qaeda organization is now stronger than at any time since the 9/11 attacks, while others believe the core organization has lost much of its leadership and operational capability over the past seven years. The wide disparity between these two assessments may appear somewhat confusing, but a significant amount of the difference between the two can be found in the fundamental way in which al Qaeda is defined as an entity.

Many analysts supportive of the view that al Qaeda has strengthened tend to lump the entire jihadist world into one monolithic, hierarchical organization. Others, like Stratfor, who claim al Qaeda's abilities have been degraded over the years, define the group as a small vanguard organization and only one piece of the larger jihadist pie. From Stratfor's point of view, al Qaeda has evolved into three different -- and distinct -- entities. These different faces of al Qaeda include:

The core vanguard group: Often referred to by Stratfor as the al Qaeda core, al Qaeda prime or the al Qaeda apex leadership, this group is composed of Osama bin Laden and his close trusted associates. These are highly skilled, professional practitioners of propaganda, militant training and terrorism operations. This is the group behind the 9/11 attacks.

Al Qaeda franchises: These include such groups as al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although professing allegiance to bin Laden, they are independent militant groups that remain separate from the core and, as we saw in the 2005 letter from al Qaeda core leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there can be a great deal of tension and disagreement between them and the al Qaeda core. These regional franchises vary in size, level of professionalism and operational capability.

The broader grassroots jihadist movement: This group includes individuals and small cells inspired by al Qaeda but who, in most cases, have no contact with the core leadership.

Stratfor's Current Assessment of al Qaeda

We believe, as we did last summer, that the core al Qaeda group has weakened and no longer poses the strategic threat to the U.S. homeland that it did prior to 9/11. However, this does not mean it is incapable of re-emerging under less pressured circumstances.

On the franchise level, some groups -- such as AQIM, the Yemen franchises and the franchises in Pakistan and Afghanistan -- have gained momentum over the past few years. Others -- such as those in Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the Sinai Peninsula and Morocco -- have lost steam. In our estimation, this ebb and flow has resulted in a constant threat on the franchise level, though the severity has migrated geographically as groups wax and wane in specific regions. The franchises have done little to expand their operations outside of their regions of interest and to conduct attacks against the "far enemy" -- that is, attacks in the United States or Europe.

At the grassroots level, homegrown jihadists have posed a fairly consistent, though lower-level, threat. In the past, we have said that these jihadists think globally, but act locally. While there are far more grassroots jihadists than there are militants in the al Qaeda franchises and vastly more than in the small al Qaeda core, the grassroots jihadists tend to be highly motivated, but poorly equipped to conduct sophisticated terror attacks.

Beyond the Physical Battlefield

We believe that any realistic analysis of al Qaeda's strength must assess more than a basic head count of militants willing and able to conduct attacks. As we have noted previously, there are two battlespaces in the war against jihadism: the physical and the ideological. Although the campaign against al Qaeda has caused the core group to become essentially marginalized in the physical battlespace, the core has undertaken great effort to remain engaged in the ideological battlespace.

In many ways, the ideological battlespace is more important than the physical battlespace in the war against jihadism, and in the jihadists' war against the rest of the world. It is far easier to kill people than it is to kill ideologies. We have recently seen this in the resurgence of Bolivarian Revolution ideology in South America, despite the fact that Simon Bolivar, Karl Marx and Ernesto "Che" Guevara are long dead and buried. Ideology is the decisive factor that allows jihadists to recruit new fighters and gather funding for militant and propaganda operations. As long as the jihadists can recruit new militants, they can compensate for the losses they suffer on the physical battlefield. When they lose that ability, their struggle dies on the vine. Because of this, al Qaeda fears fatwas more than weapons. Weapons can kill people -- but fatwas can kill the ideology that motivates people to fight and finance.

We are not the only ones who believe the ideological battlespace is critical. A video released earlier this month by al Qaeda mouthpiece As-Sahab entitled "The Word is the Word of Swords," one of al Qaeda's leading religious authorities, Abu Yahya al-Libi emphasized this point from within the network.

In the video, al-Libi said the jihadist battle "is not waged solely at the military and economic level, but is waged first and foremost at the level of doctrine." He also said that his followers are in a war against an enemy that "targets all strongholds of Islam and invades the minds and ideas in the same way it invades lands and dares to destroy beliefs and meddle with the sacred things in the same way it dares to spill blood."

Interestingly, although the video recording is dedicated to detailing the preparations for the attack on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, the bulk of the 64-minute video addresses the ideological war against al Qaeda and how "true Islam" has been undermined by leaders such as King Abdullah and the Saudi religious establishment.

In an ironic twist, the progress of the combatants is easier to assess in the ideological rather than physical battlespace -- largely because most militants plotting terror attacks attempt to stay invisible until they launch their operations, while the ideological battle is for the most part conducted in plain sight.

One such visible indication on the ideological battlefield was a book written by al Qaeda's number two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, which was released in March. The book -- known as "The Exoneration" -- is a long response to a book written by Sayyed Imam al-Sharif. Also known as Dr. Fadl, al-Sharif is an imprisoned Egyptian radical and a founder (with al-Zawahiri) of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Published in 2007, al-Sharif's book, "Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World," provides theological arguments that counter many of the core jihadist teachings. Included among those teachings is the concept of takfir, or the practice of declaring a Muslim to be an unbeliever in order to justify an attack against him. Al-Sharif also spoke out against killing non-Muslims in Muslim countries and attacking members of other Muslim sects.

Al-Sharif was a significant player in the development of the jihadist theology that shaped the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and eventually, through al-Zawahiri and other EIJ members who became influential members of al Qaeda, al-Sharif's concepts became instrumental in shaping the ideology of jihadism as promulgated by al Qaeda. One of his books, "The Essentials of Making Ready for Jihad," was reportedly required reading for all new jihadist recruits at al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The renunciation of jihadist ideology by such a pivotal figure was a significant threat -- one serious enough to spur al-Zawahiri's refutation.

The Saudi ulema or Muslim scholars and former jihadist ideologues are not the only people assailing the ideology of jihadism. Of course, Western figures, such as Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders have been highly critical of jihadism. But these outsiders have little ability to sway Muslim opinion on the street -- a critical objective in fighting the ideological battle. In recent years, however, we have seen more Muslim figures speak out against jihadism, which they believe is a perversion of Islam. However, criticism is not without danger. Figures such as Egyptian political analyst Diaa Rashwan have been threatened with death because of their criticism of al Qaeda and jihadist ideology.

In addition to the previously discussed video, As-Sahab has released two other lengthy videos this month. The first, to commemorate the 9/11 anniversary, was called "The Harvest of Seven Years of Crusades." The second, called "True Imam," was released Sept. 29. Essentially, it was a tirade against the government of Pakistan and a tribute to Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who was killed in the July 2007 storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad by the Pakistani military.

Overlap

Sometimes, things that emerge in the ideological battlespace can provide indications of important developments in the physical battlespace.

For example, one of the As-Sahab videos featured clips of Mustafa abu al-Yazid (aka Sheikh Said al-Masri). An Egyptian al Qaeda military commander, al-Yazid had reportedly been killed in an Aug. 8 operation in Bajaur. But since al-Yazid makes reference in the video to the Aug. 18 resignation of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, he obviously was not killed 10 days earlier.

Two others noticeably absent from these three videos were Osama bin Laden and Adam Gadahn. Bin Laden, who has not been heard from since a May 18 audio message, is once again rumored to be dead. Gadahn may also be dead, according to rumors that he was killed in a January airstrike in Pakistan's North Waziristan agency in which senior al Qaeda military commander Abu Laith al-Libi was killed. Gadahn, who has appeared in several al Qaeda video messages since emerging on the scene in 2004, has been conspicuously absent from the organization's propaganda since the January strike.

Typically, al Qaeda has been fairly forthcoming in "declaring the martyrdom" of fallen commanders like al-Libi. The death of a central figure such as bin Laden, however, could be seen as severely detrimental to the jihadist world's morale. Therefore, the group could be motivated to conceal his death. If bin Laden is still alive, however, we anticipate a message from him by the U.S. presidential elections Nov. 4, given his appearance before the 2004 presidential elections.

It would be somewhat out of character, however, for al Qaeda to avoid publicizing the death of a lesser figure such as Gadahn. With all the rumors circulating about jihadists seeking to use European-looking operatives in attacks against the West, one wonders if the silence regarding the American-born jihadist's fate is designed to keep U.S. authorities in suspense -- or if it is a real indication that Gadahn is alive and has left his post in the ideological battlespace in order to go operational on the physical battlefield.

Of course, the fate of these individuals, even a central figure such as bin Laden, is not nearly as important as the fate of the ideology. And we will continue to focus on the ideological battlefield for significant developments there.

One place that needs to be watched carefully is Pakistan, where events like the Red Mosque operation and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto have potentially sown the seeds for a ripe ideological harvest for both sides. It will be important to watch and see if the Marriott bombing will, as some claimed, prove to be a watershed event that marks a change in public opinion capable of rallying popular support against the jihadist ideology in Pakistan.

This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with
attribution to www.stratfor.com.

Copyright 2008 Stratfor.

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Check out the Stratfor website – good stuff..

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Heroic Marine Denied the Medal of Honor

It is wrong to deny the Medal of Honor to a man who multiple witnesses said pulled an insurgent grenade under his body and gave his life to save his buddies.

If sacrificing your life under these circumstances warranted the Navy Cross, then that award certainly should be upgraded to the Medal of Honor.

This appalling injustice must be corrected and this brave Marine honored appropriately. Here is the Associated Press article about Sergeant Rafael Peralta:

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Hero Marine Won't Get Medal of Honor

By CHELSEA J. CARTER
AP

SAN DIEGO (Sept. 18) - A Marine sergeant singled out by President Bush for throwing his body on a grenade to save his comrades in Iraq will receive the prestigious Navy Cross rather than the nation's highest military award, military officials said.

The family of Sgt. Rafael Peralta, who was posthumously nominated for the nation's highest military honor, told the North County Times of Escondido, Calif., they were disappointed he was not receiving the Medal of Honor.

"I don't understand why if the president has been talking about him," his mother, Rosa Peralta, told the newspaper, which was the first to report the bestowing of the Navy Cross.

Rosa Peralta said she was informed during a meeting with Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski that a committee could not agree on awarding the Medal of Honor to her son, who Marine Corps officials say was first wounded by friendly fire. She said the general mentioned the friendly fire aspect as part of her son's death during the discussion.

Marine Corps spokesman Mike Alvarez confirmed the meeting, saying only that it was a personal briefing between Natonski and Rosa Peralta to inform her that the secretary of the Navy would award the Navy Cross posthumously for extraordinary heroism.

The Navy Cross is the second highest honor for combat heroism a Marine can receive.

The secretary of the Navy's public affairs office in Washington, D.C., did not immediately return an after-hours telephone call Wednesday seeking comment.

Headquarters Marine Corps spokesman Maj. David Nevers told The Associated Press that the Navy Cross for Peralta "is not bestowed lightly."

Nevers said only 23 sailors and Marines out of the thousands who have served in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan have received the Navy Cross.

"The awarding of a medals of valor is a methodical process and carefully conducted to ensure the sacrifice and service of our Marines and sailors is appropriately honored," he said.

Peralta was shot several times in the face and body during a house-to-house search in Fallujah on Nov. 15, 2004, during some of the fiercest fighting of the war.

According to a report by a Marine combat photographer who witnessed the act, Peralta lay wounded on the floor of a house and grabbed a grenade that had been lobbed by an insurgent. He absorbed the blast with his body, dying instantly.

In 2005, Natonski, then-commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, ordered an investigation to determine the source of a bullet fragment recovered from Peralta's body.

"Following multiple and exhaustive reviews, the evidence supports the finding that Peralta was likely hit by 'friendly fire,'" the Marine Corps said Wednesday in a press release. "This finding had no bearing on the decision to award the Navy Cross medal."

Bush cited Peralta's heroism in a Memorial Day speech in 2005, saying the Marine "understood that America faces dangerous enemies, and he knew the sacrifices required to defeat them."

Peralta, who was assigned to Hawaii's 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, moved to San Diego from Tijuana as a teenager. He was 25.

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Please contact your Congressional representatives and urge them to award the Medal of Honor to this great American warrior.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Taliban Admits Receiving Supplies From Iran

If anyone has any doubts that we are in a proxy war against Iran (both in Afghanistan and Iraq), then check out this article:

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London Daily Telegraph
September 15, 2008

Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied By Iran

By Kate Clark, in Kabul

A Taliban commander has credited Iranian-supplied weapons with successful operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The comments by the commander, who would not be named but operates in the south east of the country where there has been a surge in Taliban attacks, were a rare admission of co-operation between elements within the Iranian regime and forces fighting British and American troops in Afghanistan.

"There's a kind of landmine called a Dragon. Iran's sending it," he said. "It's directional and it causes heavy casualties.

"We're ambushing the Americans and planting roadside bombs. We never let them relax."

The commander, a veteran of 30 years who started fighting when the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan, said the Dragon had revolutionised the Taliban's ability to target Nato soldiers deployed in his area.

"If you lay an ordinary mine, it will only cause minor damage to Humvees or one of their big tanks. But if you lay a Dragon, it will destroy it completely," he said.

A "Dragon" is the local nickname for a type of weapon known internationally as an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) or "shaped charge" and has been used with devastating effect in Iraq by Iranian-backed groups. It is shaped so that all the explosive force is concentrated in one direction - the target - rather than blasting in all directions and weakening its impact.

A former mujahideen fighter who knows the Afghan arms market well and who asked to be known as Shahir said the Dragon mines came directly from Iran.

Iran has denied these allegations, but Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador in Kabul, said the British Army, which is deployed in south-western Afghanistan, had intercepted consignments of weapons which they believe were "donated by a group within the Iranian state".

The only other possible source, the arms expert said, would be Pakistan's Tribal Areas where a relatively sophisticated arms industry has grown up. "Until now," he said, "no-one in the Tribal Areas has been able to copy these mines. Both the metal and the explosives are different, very high quality and very effective, obviously not Chinese or Pakistani."

He said there were two routes for Iranian weaponry getting to the Taliban. "There are people inside the state in Iran who donate weapons. There are also Iranian businessmen who sell them."

Iranian-made weapons, he said, whether smuggled or donated, were the most popular among Taliban fighters and fetch premium prices on the open market. "A Kalashnikov rifle made in Iran costs two to three hundred dollars more than one made anywhere else" he said. "Its beauty lies in the fact that it can also fire grenades, up to 300 meters. This is something new and it's in great demand."

Iran, a theocratic, Shia Muslim state should have little common cause with the Taliban, an extremist Sunni Muslim movement which massacred hundreds of Afghan Shia civilians and killed nine Iranian diplomats when it was in power.

Only the worsening relations between Iran and America might explain the weapons supply.

Sir Sherard said Iran was playing "a very dangerous game".

He added: "I suspect some of their agencies genuinely don't know what others are up to. We've seen a limited supply of weapons by a group within the Iranian state, not necessarily with the knowledge of all other agencies of the Iranian state, sending some very dangerous weapons to the Taliban in the south."

Kate Clark's full report is on BBC2's Newsnight on Monday Sept 15 at 10.30pm, and the BBC World Service on Thursday Sept 18 at 10.10am.

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The stakes are increasing as Iran continues its aggressive confrontation with the rest of the world via its surrogate terrorist groups.

Can you imagine Ahmadinejad with a nuclear weapon?

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Getting Better in Iraq – Notes from a Soldier Who’s Been There, Done That

The following article was written by a retired Army officer and veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom and he tells it like it is:

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Washington Post
September 14, 2008
Pg. B4

This Time, Things Are Looking Up

By John A. Nagl

BAGHDAD--When I retired from the Army in June, my comrades in arms laughed at my summer vacation plans: another August in Iraq.

But I had unfinished business here. When my unit left Iraq in September 2004, one of my battle captains presented us with coffee mugs to celebrate our return home. The sardonic inscription: "Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003-2004: We were winning when I left." We weren't, and we knew it. We had lost 22 men and more than 100 had been wounded during our combat tour. The decline of the U.S. project in Iraq over the following two years made it all too easy to believe that their sacrifices had been for naught.

I've played the history over and over in my mind. Early mistakes by U.S. officials -- disbanding the Iraqi army and firing almost all the civil servants needed to run a society -- provided tinder for the Sunni insurgency. Things worsened as U.S. commanders withdrew our forces from the cities to large, comfortable bases from which they commuted to war. By the time my unit left, the Sunni insurgency that had erupted in Fallujah in the summer of 2003 had spread to the heart of Baghdad. Sunni and Shiite militias were pushing Iraq to the brink of full-scale civil war. And the pages of Army Times magazine were filled with the faces of fallen friends.

But studding this bleak narrative were signs of hope. As early as 2003, some of Iraq's minority Sunnis came to understand that their future lay not in resisting U.S. forces but in working with them. After neglecting Sunni tribes for years, our military began paying some to break ranks with the radicals of al-Qaeda in Iraq, leading to the Anbar Awakening of late 2006.

Enter the "surge" and a new U.S. strategy: to protect Iraqis by living among them. Military units left the comfort of their bases and, with counterparts from the maturing Iraqi army and police, manned the smaller encampments that dotted the country's cities and provinces. U.S. casualties also surged as we cleared Baghdad and surrounding communities in the summer of 2007.

Then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki moved against Shiite militias -- first in Basra in March 2008, then in the massive Shiite neighborhood of Baghdad known as Sadr City. Operations continue in Mosul and Diyala, and so far the success is undeniable.

Route Irish, which runs from Baghdad International Airport to the International Zone, used to be the most dangerous road in the world. When I drove down it last month, I saw flowers being planted in newly rebuilt medians, a touch that would have made the late Lady Bird Johnson smile. Guard rails -- which we'd had to tear down to prevent IEDs from being hung behind them -- are being reinstalled.

Walking through the famous Dora market in Baghdad, I felt naked without a weapon. But then I reminded myself that I was safe, protected by the Sons (and Daughters) of Iraq. I visited a packed athletic club started by a Dora entrepreneur with a micro-loan from my West Point classmate, Lt. Col. Tim Watson. Festooned with posters of a young Arnold Schwarzenegger, the gym has a waiting list for membership. The deputy manager of the bank in Dora, who was sporting gaudy costume jewelry rather than an abaya, was happy to see us but made it clear that she didn't have time to chat; the line of women waiting for pension payments stretched out the door.

Everyone I talked to, Iraqis and Americans alike, stressed that the security gains are fragile and reversible; there were two car bombs and a suicide vest attack in Mosul three days after our visit. But the improvements in Baghdad and Basra are striking, with increasingly competent Iraqi security forces on every street corner -- although they will continue to need our advice and assistance for some years to come.

I am no cheerleader for the war in Iraq. We've made horrible mistakes that cost the lives of too many of my friends, American and Iraqi. It took us too long to learn from our errors and adopt an effective counterinsurgency strategy, and even now the war is far from won.

But the way ahead is becoming clearer, with a road map provided by men such as Col. Dominic Caracillo, a brigade commander in the 101st Airborne whose men patrol a patch south of Baghdad that used to be called the Triangle of Death. The soldiers now laughingly refer to it as the "Triangle of Love." A year ago, there were as many as 50 attacks every week; now there are just a few. Caracillo is overseeing a drawdown of U.S. forces; his brigade of about 4,000 soldiers is shipping out, to be replaced by a task force of fewer than 1,000. This force will not conduct counterinsurgency operations, but will support the newly created 17th Division of the Iraqi army. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Ali Jassim Mohammed Hassen al-Frejee, faces his own challenges: He's short of helmets and body armor, and he'd sure like to have some heavy artillery of his own rather than having to rely on ours. Still, as Caracillo says, Ali's forces are "good enough for the enemy they have to face."

So they are -- as long as we continue to back them with air support, intelligence and U.S. combat units, whose numbers are steadily diminishing. Iraq will need American advisers for years to come. For starters, it takes five years to produce a competent fighter pilot or tank company commander. Moreover, Iraq faces significant external security threats, as well as the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Shiite militias and Sunni insurgent groups. But U.S. forces will increasingly be able to turn combat over to the Iraqis, allowing the United States to scale back its involvement significantly.

When I came home from Iraq in 2004, we weren't winning. Four years later, the situation has changed dramatically. I can scarcely bring myself to say it out loud, but this time, we were winning when I left.

John A. Nagl, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an operations officer in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. He helped write "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual."

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We’re getting there, but we can’t ease up. The Obama “quitter” solution won’t work; the McCain way will allow us to leave Iraq in victory.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

NEVER FORGET - SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001

Our prayers are with the families and victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. We also stand solidly behind the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who are still seeking justice for these brutal attacks.

May God bless the heroes of September 11th as well as the brave men and women who are serving on battlefields throughout the world in the relentless War on Terror.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Marine Reservist Uses Science to Defeat IEDs

As a "Warrior Citizen" or member of the reserve forces of the United States, I have been proud to serve my country as both an Army warrior and as a police officer "warrior" on the street.

During my time in the military, I have also had the pleasure of working with reservists and/or National Guardsmen from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. All are dedicated professionals who have TWO jobs - civilian and military.

This story from the Boston Globe tells a great story of a Marine reservist whose civilian talents helped develop a system to detect IEDs before they could hurt our troops:

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Boston Globe
September 10, 2008

Reservist's Science Talent Lights Safer Way In Iraq

By Peter Schworm, Globe Staff

For seven months, Marine Sergeant Jason Cox patrolled near Fallujah, Iraq, from the turret of a Humvee, a gunner for a squad whose greatest fear was the unseen. Roadside bombs were the gravest threat, and often went undetected until it was too late.

So Cox, a graduate student in chemistry at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, put his scientific background to the test, designing a groundbreaking device that used infrared imaging to detect improvised explosives from a safer distance. With the help of other members of his unit, Cox worked during his few off-hours to modify existing thermal-imaging equipment to identify specific light characteristics, then tested the technique on patrols.

Able to identify remotely detonated devices from more than 200 yards, Cox's system proved an immediate success and marked a critical advance against the bombs. Cox's research, conducted during his tour in 2006, has now spurred the Marines to purchase new detection technology that incorporates Cox's findings.

Cox, a five-year reservist in the Marine Corps and a Worcester resident, was recently honored for his work with the US Navy and Marine Co rps Achievement Medal. The award recognizes Cox's "initiative, perseverance, and total dedication to duty," which honored "the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service."

Cox, a 27-year-old who returned in 2006 after his tour and is researching pharmaceuticals at WPI, said his brainstorm was born of intuition and necessity. "This particular threat was very dangerous, and infrared and night goggles couldn't see it," he said, describing a specific type of explosive widely used against American troops at the time in and around Fallujah. "I became curious if there was another way to image things, and we found a way to make them really stand out."

The device allows military personnel to locate roadside bombs' triggering systems, which are almost impossible to see with the naked eye or other imaging techniques, by recognizing differences in thermal expansion, or how materials swell when heated. The technique is mainly used at night.

Cox's breakthrough earned him instant popularity among his fellow Marines, as well as some good-natured mockery of his bookish leanings. But Cox said he has been touched by the military's gratitude and takes great pride in helping protect other service members.

His platoon commander, Staff Sergeant Chris Singley, said Cox's system is used throughout Iraq and has doubtlessly saved lives.

"The biggest thing he did is create standoff distance," Singley said. "Instead of seeing it at the last minute, we were able to have some warning."

For his thesis adviser, Venkat Thalladi, Cox's discovery showed the value of scientific expertise on the front lines. Cox's work paid immediate dividends, he said.

"With pharmaceuticals, it could be one year, two years, or 10. There's no way to tell," said Thalladi, an assistant chemistry professor. "Here is a person who with simple deductive logic saved lives in real time."

Cox, who grew up in Southborough, received his bachelor's degree in 2005 and had entered graduate school when his unit was deployed to Iraq. Upon his return, he resumed his studies and is working toward his degree while serving in the reserves.

Like many who serve in combat, Cox struggled with the transition back to civilian life. For a time he drank heavily, he said, and last December was charged with assault and battery for his involvement in a bar fight. The charges were continued without a finding and will be dismissed if he stays out of trouble, Cox said.

He said he has worked to help other returning veterans adjust to the home front. While he deeply regrets what happened, Cox said the incident also provided a wake-up call.

"That was a silver lining," he said. "I realized I had a problem."

Married with a 4-month-old daughter, he is savoring life at home, but would proudly serve a second tour. "I enjoy working in the lab," he said. "But I enjoy being a Marine equally."

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America could never fight or win any war without the courage and dedication of its Warrior Citizens.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Opinions Vary on Iraq Troop Withdrawal Options

I know it's been awhile since my last posting (sorry about that). I have been traveling again, but it looks like that is slowly coming to an end. My pre-retirement medical exams, etc. may keep me in the Orlando area until I begin my terminal leave. We shall see.

Both Americans and Iraqis are debating when and under what circumstances American troops will begin to withdraw from Iraq. The following New York Times article offers some interesting perspectives, but some of the Iraqis who were interviewed have political agendas for their groups:

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New York Times
September 9, 2008
Pg. 6

Should U.S. Forces Withdraw From Iraq?

By Stephen Farrell

BAGHDAD — As Iraqi and American diplomats negotiate how long and under what circumstances American troops will remain in Iraq, Iraqis are also debating the issue.

For Iraqis, as for Americans, the answer is far more complex than a simple “stay” or “go.” For both it is about blood, treasure, pride, dignity and a nation’s sense of itself and its place in the world.

But a lot more Iraqi blood than American has already been spilled, and stands to be spilled again, if the politicians get it wrong.

On the streets of Iraq, the questions being asked about the continuing American presence are about sovereignty, stability and America’s intentions in Iraq’s past, present and future: How many American troops will stay? How quickly will they go? If they stay, where will they be based? To do what? With what powers? And under what restrictions?

For the most part, Iraqis’ views fall into three categories. One group, which includes many followers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and some intensely nationalist Sunni Arabs in parts of the country that have suffered the worst since the invasion, simply want the Americans to leave, period. They say no amount of American effort now can make up for the horrors of the occupation, including the destruction of society and the killing of innocent civilians.

A second group takes a similarly dim view of the occupation, but worries that the brief period this year of improving security in Iraq will be vulnerable if the Americans abruptly withdraws. They say that the United States has a moral obligation to remain, and that continued presence of the occupiers is preferable to a return to rule by gangs and militias.

A third group worries that without a referee, Iraq’s dominant powers — Kurds in the far north and Shiites in the center and south — will brutally dominate other groups.

The Americans are not the first to face such quandaries in Iraq. In August 1920, only two years after his declining colonial power had emerged from the devastation of World War I, the British secretary of war, Winston Churchill, wrote (but did not send) a letter to his prime minister that contained this assessment of Mesopotamia:

“It seems to me so gratuitous that after all the struggles of war, just when we want to get together our slender military resources and re-establish our finances and have a little in hand in case of danger here or there, we should be compelled to go on pouring armies and treasure into these thankless deserts.”

A millennium and a half earlier, in A.D. 694, the Umayyad provincial governor Al-Hajjaj also faced a fractious Baghdad. His response to one angry crowd was a speech learned by all Iraqi schoolchildren: “I see heads before me that are ripe and ready for the plucking, and I am the one to pluck them, and I see blood glistening between the turbans and the beards.” The turbans melted away.

Five years later, Al-Hajjaj faced a rebellion in a troublesome region to his east, which forced him to move troops from Iraq. That rebellion was in Kabulistan, now part of Afghanistan, a historical parallel that drew a wry smile from Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Iraq, when it was pointed out to him last month. General Petraeus will soon move up the chain of command to take over the Central Command region, making him responsible for an area that covers both Iraq and what was Kabulistan.

Names and governments change, but there is nothing new under the Mesopotamian sun.

The debate goes on. Following are some Iraqi perspectives on whether and how American troops should stay in their country.

Opinions of the Iraqis

The Choice Is Not Ours: America Wants to Stay

I don’t expect that the Americans will leave Iraq because they reached the maximum level of political influence in the region. America is controlling the future of energy, so I believe it’s not to America’s benefit for it to leave Iraq. -- ISMAIL KABABCHI, 38, a restaurant worker in central Baghdad

America will not leave Iraq. I think my grandsons’ grandsons will watch Uncle Sam and his blue jeans. The idea that America will depart is a kind of delusion because America came for its interests in Iraq. Iraq represents the most important treasure in the struggle among the superpowers for it includes plenty of wealth in addition to its important geographic location. In the long run, America will not leave Iraq because it reached the treasure of the world. -- SAID AL-MAJMAYI, 50, a painter in Baquba

Or Maybe It Doesn’t

I expect that the Americans will leave Iraq sooner or later because they can’t control the security situation. I expect their departure within the next few months because of the achievements of the Iraqi security forces and the Awakening in terms of security and stability. That will help the American forces leave Iraq and save the rest of their dignity before the situation turns bad again like between 2004 and 2005. -- ABU ABDUL QADER AL-JUMAYLI, 60, a retired army officer in Falluja

The withdrawal is coming, no doubt. America has lost its influence in Iraq to a very great and dangerous degree. The No. 1 country in the world didn’t imagine that it would become a toy in the hand of radical parties and armed groups, or some powers which will ally with America at daytime and conspire against it at night. -- MATEEN OMAR OJI, 32, a teacher in Kirkuk

America Must Leave Iraq Now

We want to push them out immediately. We don’t need them, and we don’t want them. We have two governments, the Iraqi and American governments. We are confused about who we need to obey, the Americans or Iraqis. And both the American and Iraqi governments are hurting the Iraqi people. -- ABDUL RAHMAN HAMED HUSSEIN, a social worker in Abu Dshir, south of Baghdad, who follows the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr

I want them to leave because they caused destruction for us, they have robbed us and they never gave us any of what they had promised to give us. If a civil war breaks out after their departure, it would be their doing. It’s going on now because of them. They are inflaming it. Iraqis have proved that they are not being seduced by the American actions. Their departure is the beginning of the road toward stability. What ever happens after their withdrawal, it will be finished within a year. -- MUHAMMAD SNAD, 36, an electrical technician in Mosul

We Don’t Love the Americans, But Withdrawal Is Worse

I am not with the coalition forces’ withdrawal from Iraq currently, because chaos and destruction will be all over Iraq. Even before the Americans came, we used to have genocide, destruction and wars. We know that the Americans came for their own benefit, yet they are our only solution. -- NISREEN HASSAN, 25, a teacher in Sulaimaniya

The presence of the American forces will make Iraq a regional and international power. If the Americans withdraw, Iraq will be subject to domination from neighboring countries which support terrorism in Iraq to protect their interests, so the departure of the American forces doesn’t serve Iraq’s interest. -- ABD MUHAMMAD AL-BEDEER, Samawa

If It’s Not the Americans, Someone Else Will Take Over

The coalition forces are the best solution to Iraq’s situation, they are just like a strong dam against the outside and the inside enemies and even the neighboring countries. They are all wolves — the Arabs, the Persians and the Turks. -- JALEEL MAHMOOD, 31, Sulaimaniya

Staying is the best thing for Iraq. If the Americans depart, half of Iraq will go to the Kurds and Iran will take the other half. We need a safety valve. America occupied Iraq and must solve the problems before its departure. America’s departure will increase the problems. -- AMJAD SALAH, 34, a driver in Basra

The Dream Deferred: Please Go, Just Not Yet

I don’t want them to leave right now, but I don’t want to see them here forever. Sooner or later the Americans have to leave Iraq or understand that our policy differs from their policy. They have to recognize the sovereignty of Iraq. I’d love to keep good relations with America rather than telling bad stories to my kids about it. -- HUDA HANI, 33, a Shiite employee of the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad

I’m against the Americans’ withdrawing before we have a fully independent government and security forces. I witnessed many terrible things with the Americans, and I don’t want the same thing to happen with the next generations. It would be better for both sides to have a scheduled withdrawal. -- MUHAMMAD MAHDI, 28, a Sunni graduate of the College of Arts who now works as a taxi driver in Baghdad

No one accepts the residence of the occupier, but the withdrawal should be studied well and not randomly. Things are getting better now, and we don’t want anything to affect that. The Americans are probably one of the reasons behind the previous chaos, but their quick withdrawal will generate bigger chaos. -- SALIM MUHAMMAD, 40, Najaf

Saying No and Meaning Yes

All of them declare in public that they are against the Americans remaining in Iraq. They demand Iraqi liberation. They always raise the same slogan: Independence for Iraq. But in private sessions or meetings they are always telling me and other reporters that the Americans must stay, and that if they leave right now it would be a big mistake. The reasons for this political hypocrisy are like a disease. Most of the Iraqi politicians suffer from it. Their aim is to maintain their reputation in the public eye. -- TAREQ MAHER, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad

In public we say we do not want American troops, but our hearts say they should stay in Iraq until we become a state of institutions based on democracy and dialogue, not violence. Most of our recent leaders are tiny in the political world and the Americans want to teach them how to be leaders. Really we need them to stay more. They are a fence against Iran’s ambitions toward Iraq. -- AHMED HASOON, 38, a teacher in Basra

Never Mind the Troops, I’m Leaving Iraq

At night in all seasons, especially in summer, it is so very, very hot because we are suffering from electricity shortages and water shortages. So many times I have to buy my baby’s milk from the black market. The American forces have been here for such a long time, and still it is not stable and nothing is sure. Sometimes I feel that I should leave Iraq and claim asylum or refugee status, so that later on I would be lucky enough to get another nationality, which would make me feel respectable and that I have some rights. As an Iraqi now I cannot help my country improve. But maybe later on with a new nationality I would be able to come back and do something. Only then will my voice be heard. -- ANWAR ALI, an employee of The New York Times in Baghdad who is seeking asylum in the United States

Reporting was contributed by Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Kirkuk; Riyadh Mohammed, Ali Hameed, Mohamed Hussein and Anwar J. Ali from Baghdad; and Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Mosul, Salahuddin Province, Falluja, Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Najaf, Karbala, Basra and the Kurdish-administered northern region of Iraq.

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We will continue to negotiate the terms of our troop drawdown. Hopefully the Iraqis will work with us to make sure that the pace does not risk losing the security gains we have made together.

However, in the end it is their country. When they decide they don't want us there, we will have no choice but to leave.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Mahdi Army Influence Weakened By the Surge

I've been busy at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but I'm glad to see all the reports about the improvements in Iraq because of the surge.

The following story was in the New York Times and it talks about the declining influence of Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. Unfortunately, these fundamentalist Shiite militiamen will alway be in the shadows because they are supported, trained and financed by their Iranian mentors.

We will eventually draw down our troop levels in Iraq (as the Iraqi government is able to assume more responsibility), but we must keep our eyes on these thugs from Sadr City and be ready to swat them like flies should they re-emerge:

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New York Times
July 27, 2008
Pg. 1

Shiite Militia In Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb

By Sabrina Tavernise

BAGHDAD — The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative, milestone for stability in Iraq.

It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.

Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki struck another blow this spring, when he led a military operation against it in Baghdad and in several southern cities.

The shift, if it holds, would solidify a transfer of power from Mr. Sadr, who had lorded his once broad political support over the government, to Mr. Maliki, who is increasingly seen as a true national leader.

It is part of a general decline in violence that is resonating in American as well as Iraqi politics: Senator John McCain argues that the advances in Iraq would have been impossible without the increase in American troops known as the surge, while Senator Barack Obama, who opposed the increase, says the security improvements should allow a faster withdrawal of combat troops.

The Mahdi Army’s decline also means that the Iraqi state, all but impotent in the early years of the war, has begun to act the part, taking over delivery of some services and control of some neighborhoods.

“The Iraqi government broke their branches and took down their tree,” said Abu Amjad, a civil servant who lives in the northern Baghdad district of Sadr City, once seen as an unbreachable stronghold for the group.

The change is showing up in the lives of ordinary people. The price of cooking gas is less than a fifth of what it was when the militia controlled local gas stations, and kerosene for heating has also become much less expensive. In interviews, 17 Iraqis, including municipal officials, gas station workers and residents, described a pattern in which the militia’s control over the local economy and public services had ebbed. Merchants say they no longer have to pay protection money to militiamen. In some cases, employees with allegiances to the militia have been fired or transferred. Despite the militia’s weakened state, none of the Iraqis interviewed agreed to have their full names published for fear of retribution.

In a further sign of weakness, Shiite tribes in several neighborhoods are asking for compensation from militia members’ families for past wrongs.

The changes are not irreversible. The security gains are in the hands of unseasoned Iraqi soldiers at checkpoints spread throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods. And local government officials have barely begun to take hold of service distribution networks, potentially leaving a window for the militia to reassert itself.

The militia’s roots are still in the ground, Abu Amjad said, and “given any chance, they will grow again.”

A Criminal Enterprise

At the peak of the militia’s control last summer, it was involved at all levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, private minibus services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice factories, and even collecting rent from squatters in houses whose owners had been displaced. The four main gas stations in Sadr City were handing over a total of about $13,000 a day, according to a member of the local council.

“It’s almost like the old Mafia criminal days in the United States,” said Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. Talley, an Army engineer rebuilding Sadr City’s main market.

Um Hussein, a mother of 10 in Sadr City, the largest Shiite district in the capital and one of the poorest, said her family’s fuel bill had dropped so far that she could afford to buy one of her daughters a pair of earrings with the savings. Others interviewed listed simpler purchases that had now become possible: tomatoes, laundry detergent, gasoline.

One young man said that even though his house was right across from a distribution center that sold cooking gas, he was not allowed to buy it there at state prices, but instead was forced to wait for a militia-affiliated distributor who sold it at higher prices.

“We had to get our share of the cooking gas from Mahdi Army people,” Um Hussein said. “Now, everything is available. We are free to buy what we want.”

Before, the Mahdi Army controlled the 12 trucks that made daily deliveries of cooking gas canisters for the district, because the leader of the Sadr City district council, who was affiliated with the militia, was the one who handled the trucks’ documents.

“We had no idea when they were coming or where they were going,” the council member said, referring to the trucks.

Those who questioned the militia’s authority were dealt with harshly. A gas station worker from Kadhimiya recalled a man in his 60s being beaten badly for refusing to pay the inflated gas price last year. The Sadr City council member described his relationship with the militia by touching his hand to his face.

“I was kissing them here, here and here,” he said pointing to his right cheek, his left cheek and then his forehead.

A spokesman for the movement in Sadr City, Sayeed Jaleel al-Sarkhy, defended the Mahdi Army, saying in an interview that it was not a formal militia and denying the charges that it had taken control of local services. He said the militia had been infiltrated by criminals who used the name of the Mahdi Army as a cover.

The Mahdi Army is an army of believers,” he said. “It was established to serve the people.”

An employee in the Sadr City local government who oversees trash collectors — daily laborers whose salaries he said were controlled by the militia — said that had long stopped being true.

“I am sick all over,” he said. “I am blind. I’ve got a headache. I’ve got a toothache. My back hurts. All of this is from the Mahdi Army.”

Signs of Weakness

A month after Mr. Maliki’s military operation, strange things started to happen in Shuala, a vast expanse of concrete and sand-colored houses in northern Baghdad that was one of the Mahdi Army’s main strongholds. Militia members suddenly stopped showing up to collect money from the main gas station, a worker there said.

A member of the Shuala district council said: “They used to come and order us to give them 100 gas canisters. Now it’s, ‘Can you please give me a gas canister?’”

Then, several weeks later, 11 workers, guards and even a director, all state employees with ties to the militia, were transferred to other areas. Employees’ pictures were posted so American and Iraqi soldiers could identify impostors.

The Iraqi Army now occupies the militia’s old headquarters in Shuala. Soldiers set up 18 checkpoints around the neighborhood, including at the gas station. When the militia opened a new office, soldiers put a checkpoint there, too, said an Iraqi major from the unit based there. Iraqi soldiers recently distributed warning notices to families squatting in houses whose rent had been collected by the Mahdi Army until May.

In Sadr City, the authorities closed the militia’s radio station. The leader of the district council was arrested by the American military. Cooking gas delivery documents must now be approved by three officials, not just one, the council member said.

Another sign of weakness is the growing number of financial settlements between powerful Shiites and Mahdi Army members’ families over loved ones who were killed by the militia. In Topchi, a Shiite neighborhood in western Baghdad, a handwritten list of militia members’ names was taped up in the market this month, with the warning for their families to leave town. Several of their houses were attacked.

Some militia members’ families went to the local council to ask for help. They found none. Mahdi militiamen killed four local council members over several weeks last fall.

“I told them this isn’t good, they must not be blamed,” the council member said. Even so, “if your brother has been killed, this is the time for revenge.”

Now neighborhoods are breathing more freely. A hairdresser in Ameen, a militia-controlled neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, said her clients no longer had to cover their faces when they left her house wearing makeup. Minibuses ferrying commuters in Sadr City are no longer required to play religious songs, said Abu Amjad, the civil servant, and now play songs about love, some even sung by women.

“They lost everything,” said the Sadr City government employee. “The Sadr movement has no power now. There is no militia control.”

Lingering Fears

The Mahdi Army might be weak, but it is not gone.

Majid, a Sadr City resident who works in a government ministry, said several Iraqi Army officers in his area had to move their families to other neighborhoods after Mr. Maliki’s military operation because the militia threatened them. Bombs are still wounding and killing American soldiers in the district. And early this month, one Iraqi officer’s teenage son was kidnapped and killed, his body hung in a public place as a warning, said Majid, who gave only his first name because he feared reprisals.

“People are still afraid of the Mahdi Army,” he said. “You still get punished if you talk bad about them.”

While most of the Iraqi soldiers at the new checkpoints seem loyal to the government, others have sympathies closer to the militia. A friend of Majid’s was obliged to pay a steep tribal settlement, after telling an army patrol about his neighbor, a militia member. The patrol had been infiltrated and leaked the tip to the neighbor.

“They are still trying to influence things,” General Talley said, though his overall assessment was that their control was receding.

The shift comes at a crucial moment: Iraqis will vote in provincial elections in December. The weakening of the Sadrists in national politics clears the stage for the group’s most bitter rival — a Shiite party led by another cleric, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. One of the party’s members, Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, a sheik and a member of Parliament, is arranging state aid for Sunni families willing to move back to Topchi.

The timing was not missed by the Sadr movement’s spokesman, who said the government had recently warned the group to vacate its office. He blames Mr. Hakim’s party for the attempts to marginalize his movement, whose members have also been targets of a political crackdown in southern Iraq.

“Some parties are occupying large buildings in Jadriya,” he said, referring indirectly to the headquarters of Mr. Hakim’s party. “That’s what makes us suspicious. Why only us?”

He added, “The main motive is to exclude the Sadr movement from politics.”
One indicator of whether the new gains will hold is whether local governments can truly fill the gap that the militia left and deliver services effectively and consistently.

General Talley said his unit had recently spent $34 million to help reconstruct a major market in Sadr City. But the district council has gotten bogged down in arguments over who has the right to disburse $100 million that Mr. Maliki promised Sadr City after the military operation. The district council was given 90 days to come up with projects. More than 30 days have passed and not one proposal has been submitted, council members said.

“To be honest with you, I find it very slow,” said Haidar al-Abadi, an adviser to Mr. Maliki who said that funds had been held back because militia-affiliated companies had gotten involved. “There’s a danger this slowness could backfire.”

The militia is painting its response on Sadr City walls: “We will be back, after this break.”

The Iraqi Army is painting over it.

Reporting was contributed by Mohammed Hussein, Tareq Maher, Campbell Robertson, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Alissa J. Rubin.

* * * *

Great article; surprised it was in the New York Times....

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

Iraqis Want a Timetable for Troop Withdrawal

It was only last month that I posted my feelings about why the Iraqis will never permit us to maintain military forces in Iraq over the long term: (http://americanranger.blogspot.com/2008/06/one-day-iraqis-will-send-us-home.html).

The following article was in today's Washington Post:

* * * *

Washington Post
July 8, 2008
Pg. 1

Maliki Suggests U.S. Troop Timetable

Iraqi Premier's Remarks Reflect Political Plight

By Sudarsan Raghavan and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, July 7 -- Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has for the first time suggested establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, a step that the Bush administration has long opposed.

Maliki raised the idea Monday during a visit to the United Arab Emirates, where he spoke with Arab ambassadors about a security pact being negotiated to determine the future U.S. military role in Iraq.

"The current trend is to reach an agreement on a memorandum of understanding either for the departure of the forces or a memorandum of understanding to put a timetable on their withdrawal," Maliki said, according to a statement released by his office. "In all cases, the basis for any agreement will be respect for the full sovereignty of Iraq."

The comments reflect the political dilemma confronting Maliki and other members of his Shiite-led government. Their primary rival in upcoming provincial elections, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, is a leading critic of the American presence who has long called for a timetable, a position that is widely popular among Iraq's majority Shiites.

The talks on the security pact have also raised concerns across the Iraqi political spectrum -- and the broader Arab world -- about preserving Iraq's sovereignty and preventing a long-term American presence. Framing the agreement as a memorandum of understanding, possibly including a timetable, may make it more politically palatable, analysts said.

Nasar al-Rubaie, a senior Sadrist lawmaker, welcomed Maliki's suggestion of a timetable, saying that Iraq's armed forces could take over security duties within a year. "This is an important step in the right path," Rubaie said.

White House spokesman Tony Fratto characterized the Maliki statement as consistent with the goals of the Bush administration. "The prime minister is reflecting a shared goal that we have, which is that as the Iraqi forces become a more self-reliant force, we'll see reductions in U.S. forces," Fratto said.

The Bush administration has said that a timetable would play into the hands of enemy forces who would lie low until U.S. troops were gone. Instead, top military and administration officials have said that withdrawal decisions must be based on conditions on the ground. Most of the additional "surge" forces sent to Iraq last year are due to pull out by the end of this month, leaving about 140,000 U.S. troops.

Indeed, Sadiq al-Rikabi, a top political adviser to Maliki, said any timetable would be conditioned on the ability of Iraq's security forces to secure the country, something the government has long said. "In that case, American forces should return home," Rikabi said, adding that there were no discussions so far of specific dates for a U.S. withdrawal.

Rikabi and a U.S. official in Baghdad who spoke on the condition of anonymity said friendly negotiations on the security pact were continuing. Still, the proposal of the memorandum of understanding suggested that the two sides were far from reaching a long-term agreement, which U.S. officials had hoped would be signed by the end of this month. A U.N. mandate authorizing the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq expires Dec. 31.

At the Pentagon, spokesman Bryan Whitman said negotiations were being handled by the State Department but reiterated the need for a conditions-based approach. "Timelines tend to be artificial in nature," he said, "and in a situation where things are as dynamic as they are in Iraq, I would tell you that it's usually best to look at these things as they are on the ground."

In recent weeks, Maliki has spoken in strong terms to domestic and regional audiences, only to have his remarks softened for U.S. consumption by his own advisers or U.S. spokesmen. After he said last month that the negotiations were at a "dead end," officials in Baghdad and Washington explained that Maliki was referring to early U.S. drafts that had since been updated.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has said he will decide by September -- when he is due to relinquish his command to Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno -- whether additional withdrawals will be possible before year's end.

The timetable issue is a sharp point of disagreement between the presumptive presidential nominees. Republican Sen. John McCain supports the administration position and has said that a withdrawal timetable would endanger recent security gains in Iraq. Democratic Sen. Barack Obama has criticized the Maliki government for dragging its feet on political reconciliation and said that a timetable would force movement.

Although Obama has long pledged to begin immediately withdrawing combat troops at a rate of one to two brigades a month, completing the process within 16 months, he has recently tempered his position with a promise to consult with U.S. commanders on the ground before taking any action.

The negotiations began in March over two U.S.-drafted agreements that in Iraq have been discussed as a single pact. The first is a status-of-forces agreement that would define the legal protections and responsibilities of U.S. troops; the second is a "strategic framework" that would govern the overall U.S.-Iraq political and military relationship.

Last week, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that progress was being made in the negotiations but that many hurdles remained. He said any agreement most likely would last only one or two years and be subject to legislative scrutiny.

If an agreement could not be reached, Zebari indicated that an interim arrangement would be necessary because U.S. troops "cannot stay in Iraq without a legal authorization." It was unclear whether any memorandum of understanding would need approval from Iraq's parliament.

Fratto, the White House spokesman, also said there is a substantial difference between Maliki's call for a timetable and similar calls from congressional Democrats, since the latter would serve to limit the options of Bush as commander in chief.

Bush and Republican lawmakers have regularly condemned any talk of a timetable for a drawdown of U.S. troops.

In remarks last month, for example, Bush praised a new war funding bill because it did not include "an artificial timetable of withdrawal from Iraq."

DeYoung reported from Washington. Staff writer Dan Eggen in Washington, special correspondents Zaid Sabah and Saad al-Izzi in Baghdad and other Washington Post staff in Iraq contributed to this report.

* * * *

We can never forget that it’s not about what America or its leaders want to do; it is about the path the Iraqis choose with regard to their own nation and their own future. (Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is pictured above.)

We may not be pleased with the final agreement with regard to the status of foreign forces in Iraq, but we must accept the wishes of that sovereign government.

After all, isn't their liberty and freedom of choice what we've been fighting for?

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

The Tragedy of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)

I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.

Warrior Ethos

After I returned from Iraq in late 2004, I was patrolling the streets as a cop in Central Florida. One afternoon, along with other officers, I was dispatched to a shooting. As we arrived at the apartment complex, a man met us and said his room-mate had shot himself.

Not exactly sure what awaited us, another officer and I entered the apartment – handguns at the ready – to search the rooms one-by-one. As we reached one bedroom door, there was a note taped above the door handle. With the other officer covering me, I pushed open the door.

The young man was lying on his back in bed and blood was splattered across the wall behind his head. One hand was on his chest, but the other was out to his side. Next to that hand was a forty-five automatic handgun. The bullet had entered below his chin and traveled through his head until it exited the top of his skull.

Not knowing yet whether we were dealing with a homicide or a suicide, we secured the scene and waited for the detectives to arrive. While we waited, I made a quick visual survey of the apartment and what I found made my heart begin to tighten with sadness. The note on the door was a suicide note from the ex-soldier and that note was also displayed on the computer screen in the man’s room. He was only 24 years old.

On the bedroom dresser were several souvenirs from Iraq: old Iraqi money with pictures of Saddam Hussein, photographs of his fellow soldiers in the desert, his Global War on Terror Expeditionary Medal and other special things that only an American G.I. would bring home. On the fireplace mantle in the living room, the young veteran’s helmet sat quietly in its desert-camouflage cover.

I have experienced many scenes of death as a police officer, from natural ones to gruesome homicides. Some of these people died because it was simply their time, such as the elderly woman who died at her kitchen table as she clutched her asthma medication.

Suicides are among the saddest deaths because the victims managed to fool their co-workers, their friends, the professional counselors and even their families. Many who knew them saw the sadness, the frustration or the despair, but those closest to them never really believed these seemingly-strong family members or acquaintances could really take their own lives.

As a war veteran who has seen his share of death and who has lost friends and comrades to whatever enemy we faced at the time, I am saddened that fellow soldiers could hurt themselves without at least trying to talk to one of us. Among all people, we are the ones who most understand the reasons for their pain. They are our comrades and they are part of us. Why won’t they let us help them?

This young man was only 24, but he had so much he could have given the world. He experienced the very worst of mankind, but he also saw that even good can come from the tragedy of war – the gift of liberty to those who were oppressed and hope for the pursuit of happiness among those who knew so little joy.

Had he found the courage to live, he could have taught others what he learned at war and one day his own children would have witnessed the depth of his experience. His act of pure selfishness robbed his family of his presence, but the world will never learn the lessons that are now buried forever in the depths of his anguished soul.

The following article appeared in the El Paso Times today and it tells the story of another young veteran who gave much to the world, but whose life ended because of post-traumatic stress disorder that led to a drug overdose.

A heroic photo of Specialist Joseph Dwyer appears above and our sympathies go out to his family:

* * * *

Overdose kills ex-Fort Bliss soldier

By Stephanie Sanchez / El Paso Times
Article Launched: 07/07/2008 12:00:00 AM MDT

Former Fort Bliss Army Spc. Joseph Dwyer, whose photograph depicting him carrying a wounded boy to safety during the first days of the ground war in Iraq became a symbol of the U.S. Army, died late last month of an overdose at home in North Carolina, Army officials and police said Sunday.

Officials with the Pinehurst Police Department in North Carolina said no one would be available to talk about the ex-soldier's death until today, but Jean Offutt, a Fort Bliss spokesperson, said Fort Bliss officials were aware of the former soldier's death. The Army Times reported the day Dwyer died that he had apparently taken pills and inhaled the fumes from an aerosol can.

"He was certainly a hero. ... He did have some difficulty dealing with it," Offutt said. She added that Dwyer was treated at Beaumont Army Medical Center. "It is certainly a tragedy."

In 2003, Dwyer returned to Fort Bliss after serving four months in Iraq with the 3rd Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment. A native of Mount Sinai, N.Y., he had joined the Army as a medic two days after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, according to El Paso Times archives.

During his tour in Iraq, an Army Times photographer captured Dwyer as he helped a young boy to safety after his family was caught in the crossfire of a battle near Faysaliyah, Iraq. The photo ran in newspapers nationwide, including the El Paso Times.

In October 2005, Dwyer's friends told the El Paso Times he had returned from the war a different person. At first he was a religious man, but then problems including drinking, sniffing inhalants and nightmares started occurring, his friends said. Dwyer suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, they said.

Dwyer was involved an incident in early 2005 in which he crashed his car and said he saw a box he thought was a bomb in the middle of the street, his friends told the El Paso Times. In October 2005, he was arrested for shooting up his East El Paso apartment in which the police SWAT team negotiated with him for more than three hours. No one was hurt.

Offutt said Dwyer's death should make people aware of PTSD symptoms. Details of Dwyer's mental-health history and treatment at Beaumont Army Medical Center were not available Sunday.

"He served his country," Offutt said. "It is unfortunate that these things sometimes happen to soldiers when they return. Our thoughts are with his family, spouse and children."

Valerie Miller Topp, a friend of Dwyer's, said she met him when Dwyer's wife, Matina, was pregnant with their daughter in 2005.

"When I first met him he was heavily medicated. ... He didn't really talk much," she said. "As the pregnancy progressed he began to open up and talk more. They were just a really nice couple."

Miller Topp said Dwyer said the couple moved to North Carolina from El Paso in 2006.

"He (Dwyer) said, 'I just want to go fishing. I don't want anything to do with violence, guns or war. I just want to meet my daughter and go fishing,'" she said.

Stephanie Sanchez may reached at ssanchez@elpasotimes.com; 546-6137.

* * * *

I would ask that war veterans of any era never give up, never quit and that they seek help to deal with the memories that seem too painful to endure.

Remember my fellow veterans, when you wore that uniform you were one of the finest citizens and warriors of your generation. You were taught to be strong in the face of adversity, to endure any hardship and to solve whatever problem rose to face you.

You may no longer serve in the active military, but the essence of the warrior is still within you. Never forget your warrior training, your mental strength, that steely resolve and the natural courage that led you to fight alongside your comrades, your buddies and those who were the best friends you will ever have.

You would never quit on your fellow soldiers in combat; do not quit on yourself now. If you need help, please ask for it, but giving up must never be an option...

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com

One Unit’s Last Mission in Afghanistan

The following article from the Wall Street Journal is an excellent “war correspondent’s” story about what it was like to accompany a group of soldiers on their last patrol before returning to the States. (The above photo shows other soldiers in Afghanistan.):

* * * *

Wall Street Journal
July 5, 2008
Pg. 1

The Last Patrol

U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, Set to Leave, Are Called Back For One More Mission. Will Their Luck Run Out?

By Michael M. Phillips

NARAY, Afghanistan -- It's 4 a.m., and a slender crescent moon casts a pale light over Spc. Sean Geer. He has nine bottles of water and 10 loaded rifle magazines strapped to his body armor. He has a bandana tied under his helmet to soak up the sweat. He has removed the pointer and middle fingers from his glove to give him a better feel for the trigger.

"Ready for a fun one?" Spc. Geer radios in hushed tones to a buddy. It's another patrol, and one of the other cavalry scouts jokes that this war feels like a barroom fight where you can't cry uncle.

"Enjoy your cigarettes," says a lieutenant. "Then we'll go."

Sean Geer's war is supposed to be over. But it's going to be a long, hot day.

Few war stories disturb soldiers more than the one about the man who gets hit just before he's due to go home. Not far from here, an Army medic was killed by a hidden bomb days before he was to leave. An officer in Spc. Geer's squadron, 1-91 Cavalry, stepped on a land mine within weeks of the end of his combat tour, shattering his foot.

On Sunday, Spc. Geer and his fellow scouts thought such worries were behind them. They were back in camp cleaning their gear. Sergeants were collecting night-vision goggles, ammunition and the grenade launcher. They were waiting for the helicopter ride that would start them on their journey home.

Then this comes along: The colonel needs someone to do a mission. He hands it to the captain and the captain calls the lieutenant. The lieutenant tells the sergeants and before long, the scouts know their war is on again.

They all know it stinks, but what can they do? What began as an effort to topple the Taliban government has become a drawn-out guerrilla war, and there's always another patrol -- another insurgent to be killed or another heart to be won.

The seven-year conflict has become a growing concern to Pentagon brass, rivaling the war in Iraq. Taliban insurgents have intensified attacks in the east and the south, making June the deadliest month so far for the U.S.-led coalition. The government of Hamid Karzai still struggles to exert its authority, and the lawless tribal areas bordering Pakistan have become a haven for militants. The Pentagon said this week that it is extending the tour by an extra month of 2,200 Marines sent to Afghanistan this spring to bolster coalition forces.

Spc. Geer's new orders come at a moment when he's rethinking the war. Right after he arrived in the country, he thought constantly about being shot. His mother died when he was 10 years old. When the fighting gets crazy, he drops to his knee, drinks some water and asks her to look out for him: "Tell the people who don't know I love them that I do."

At 16 years old, he dropped out of high school in Ventura, Calif., worked in a coffee shop, fixed hot rods and ran with the drug crowd. By 19 he had had enough. He got his diploma and joined the Army. Now 22 and just over a year away from the end of his enlistment, he's planning a career as an entrepreneur. He and another scout are in the middle of starting an online clothing company with T-shirts that reflect their combat experience. One shows the outline of a soldier scaling a mountain in front of a faded American flag.

"There's got to be more out there," Spc. Geer says. "We've got to be able to do more with our lives than fight this war."

When he gets word the platoon has one more patrol, he trusts his buddies to cover his back. First Platoon, Bulldog Troop hasn't lost a man during 14 months in combat, 14 months of humping heavy gear up and down steep mountains, 14 months of firefights with an enemy who's never quite in view.

That evening, First Lt. Henry "Hank" Hughes IV, the platoon leader, briefs the men. The 24-year-old comes from a long military line. One ancestor was a captain in the Philadelphia militia in the Revolutionary War. His great grandfather served in World War I, his grandfather in World War II and his father in Bosnia. His mother was a captain in the signal corps.

The lieutenant studied English and film at Boston University, where he developed a fondness for French films. He used to think of himself as something of a pacifist, but joined the Army knowing full well he'd end up at war. Now he commands 26 men, most of them not much younger than himself. Only one of his scouts has been wounded in action; Spc. Thomas Alford was shot through the jaw and neck. At his insistence, he was back with the platoon three months later.

On a white board, the lieutenant sketches the snaking curves of the Kunar River, which runs close to the Pakistan border, and draws the contours of the ridge that overlooks the village of Nangal, a couple of miles south of the Army base. In June, insurgents left the villagers an anonymous note warning them against educating women. Shortly afterwards, someone set fire to the girls' school there. When the villagers rushed to put it out, they were shot at from the ridges above town.

The Afghan government, wanting to cement its ties in the village, has dispatched the Afghan National Army to drive to Nangal, chat with local elders and hand out pens, paper and other school supplies. Lt. Hughes's platoon is going along to help protect against insurgent attacks; the Americans have heavier weapons and can call in air and artillery support, if needed.

With half of his men, Lt. Hughes will leave at dawn and go on foot to the ridge overlooking the town. The other half, in heavily armed Humvees, will escort the Afghan troops and stay outside the village to maintain security.

After the scouts leave the briefing, Lt. Hughes turns to his platoon sergeant. "Too easy," he says.

"Every plan is easy until the first shot is fired," replies Sgt. First Class Michael Burns, 38, of Fort Wayne, Ind. "Then it all goes to hell."

In Monday's pre-dawn light, Lt. Hughes, Spc. Geer and the other scouts set out past the razor wire. The lieutenant cheerfully greets the Afghan security guards at the front gate, and in a loud, clear voice says the name of a town far down the valley, well beyond Nangal, in case they're working for the other side, too.

The troops walk down the dirt road in a staggered column, leaving enough room between men so a hidden bomb or lucky mortar shot would kill only one of them. They move silently, except for the crunch of boots on rock. They pass a few bearded herders hissing at their goats.

At a quarter to five the scouts turn right up the steep hillside. Generations of farmers have built waist-high stone walls on the slope, turning it into a giant staircase of narrow terraces for planting crops. The men zigzag arduously up the terraces, reaching down to hoist each other up when the walls get higher and the rocks looser.

As they climb, a single gunshot sounds in the distance.

"You hear that?" asks Spc. Justin Jones, 24, of Jasper, Ala. It's his job to call in artillery fire if the scouts get into trouble.

"Yeah -- probably over the ridge," Spc. Geer says. It's impossible to tell where it came from, where it went or if it had anything to do with them. They trudge on.

The men have spent months carrying heavy loads in the high Hindu Kush mountains. But in recent weeks they've spent more time at the main squadron base and have lost some of their edge. As they walk, Lt. Hughes notices a young girl bounding up the terraces with her goats.

"There's the embarrassing part," he says. "An 11-year-old girl is going to pass us."

At 5:30 a.m., the sun emerges over the mountain peaks. Spc. Matthew Short, a 21-year-old from Winter Haven, Fla., reaches the top of the 900-foot ridge. He looks over, expecting to see Nangal below. It isn't there.

"We're on the wrong spur," he yells to the lieutenant.

Hundreds of yards of open ground lie between this ridge and the next. Lt. Hughes leaves half the patrol to provide cover while he, Spc. Geer, Spc. Short and two others press ahead.

Twenty-five minutes later, the men reach the top. The village still isn't in sight. The lieutenant orders the men on the first ridge to join them.

"Whose idea was it to walk anyway?" Lt. Hughes asks Spc. Geer.

"Word on the street is that it was yours, sir," the specialist answers.

Spc. Geer finishes a bottle of water, takes out his knife and slices it up. He has heard around camp that the insurgents are short of canteens and he doesn't want to help them out by leaving plastic bottles around.

Spc. Short and the lieutenant pull out their maps to figure out what has gone wrong. As best they can make out, either the maps are wrong or the satellite coordinates they were given are wrong. In any case, they have no other choice than to keep climbing.

"It never ends," gasps Spc. Short, as he tops the third ridge and sees two more ahead, like pleats in a skirt.

"It's alright," says Spc. Austin Nenneman, a 21-year-old radio operator from Sacramento, Calif. "We're almost out of this place."

A goat trail cuts steeply across the front of the fifth ridge. The lieutenant reaches the top first, and finds a sweeping view of Nangal and, sprouting from the hard, brown soil, wild marijuana. "There's weed all over here," he says when Spc. Short reaches the crest.

"Weed and surfboards?" Spc. Short asks hopefully.

The hilltop is fortified with stone trenches and bunkers, apparently built when Afghan guerillas fought the Soviets decades ago. The lieutenant puts a machine gunner on either end of his position. Riflemen overlook the village, which consists of a dozen of so flat houses.

Sgt. Michael Harrington, 28, from Muskegon, Mich., jokingly asks the lieutenant for permission to fire his grenade launcher. "It's the last mission," he pleads.
"Stop saying it's the last mission," Spc. Geer snaps.

At 7:30 a.m., the soldiers watch the Humvees carrying the other half of the platoon alongside the Kunar River road, spouting plumes of dust. The Afghan soldiers arrive soon after in tan pickup trucks.

Lt. Hughes and his men are watching the ridgelines for attackers when the river valley fills with a deep, thudding boom. Moments later there's a loud whiz from above. The big guns back at the base are firing artillery rounds into the mountains to the north. The shells can travel almost 19 miles, too far for the scouts to hear them crash back to earth.

Spc. Geer takes up a position behind a tumbledown rock wall, looking towards the river. His arms are a canvas of tattoos. His mother's death date is tattooed onto his neck with a winged heart and a cross. "Mom," it says.

Under the left sleeve of his camouflage fatigues, from shoulder to elbow, is a blue Virgin Mary, surrounded by roses and $100 bills. "Forgive me Father, for blood will spill," it says.

Spc. Geer says the tattoo symbolizes his guilt and his aspirations. "I'm sorry for what I've done here, and I'd like to be a business professional once I get out," he says.

After a few hours, the lieutenant receives word that the Afghan soldiers and their Humvee escort have safely returned to base. Just before 11 a.m., the scouts start back down the hill. As he jumps down the dried terraces, Spc. Geer thinks about the price of war; the killing bothers him as much as the dying.

"I wish there were another way to do this, but there's not," he says. "Death is the only language they understand."

The troops head for the road this time, making their way past stone houses and surprised farmers. A one-eyed man with a thick white beard walks by. "Salaam aleikum," Spc. Geer says, the traditional Arabic phrase meaning "'peace be with you." The man smiles and waves.

At noon, after eight hours and 3,000 feet of climbing, the scouts return to base. They drop in the shade, most of them too tired to strip off their sweat-soaked body armor.

* * * *

We must never forget that the War on Terror is being fought on multiple fronts throughout the world. Keep our troops in your prayers.

Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com