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| The Taliban "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) on guerrilla warfare When The biggest mistake we made was not using the full power of the Instead, we began to fight a guerrilla war in a country that was only slightly above the stone age. The average Afghan was tribal and really only cared about those in his family or village. He was incapable of understanding the lofty ideals of Jeffersonian democracy. As in wars past, our presence in Because the Afghan war quickly became a politicians' war (as in Our troops have performed in a heroic manner in every way. As in Iraq and Vietnam, they have made friends, shown the people the best that America has to offer, and they have killed, wounded, or imprisoned thousands of bad guys. But, in the end, America cannot be involved in nation building in a place like Afghanistan. When we leave, it will be the strong who will survive. That may very well mean the Taliban, their buddies in Al Qaeda, the drug lords, or a combination of all of them. The culture of corruption is part of the Afghan way of life. Only the Afghans themselves can ever change that. Afghanistan is another of America's "half wars". We may prosecute such wars with good intentions, but when we have no endgame, we are stepping into one of those infamous quagmires. We cannot "impose" democracy on people who don't really understand what it is. And we certainly can't fight a war without a clear definition of victory. We went to Afghanistan to get Al Qaeda, but we let ourselves get sucked into the vortex of a guerrilla war where the definition of victory is lost in the fog and mist of those mountain valleys. Now all we can do is maintain the status quo until Obama's withdrawal date, and the Taliban and Al Qaeda will wait patiently for us to leave. After all, they've been doing this type of thing for thousands of years. About the time I arrived in Vietnam, America had begun withdrawing under President Nixon's "Vietnamization" plan. As we conducted our patrols in the jungle, we wondered who would be the last soldier to die in Vietnam. The troops in Afghanistan are probably asking themselves the same thing. Charles M. Grist www.MyLastWar.com |
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Monday, April 4, 2011
Afghanistan - America's Decade In A "Half War"
Friday, September 3, 2010
Afghanistan: A Tragic Past, A Violent Present, And A Hazy Future
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Militancy and the U.S. Drawdown in Afghanistan
September 2, 2010
By Scott Stewart
The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq has served to shift attention toward Afghanistan, where the United States has been increasing its troop strength in hopes of forming conditions conducive to a political settlement. This is similar to the way it used the 2007 surge in Iraq to help reach a negotiated settlement with the Sunni insurgents that eventually set the stage for withdrawal there. As we’ve discussed elsewhere, the Taliban at this point do not feel the pressure required for them to capitulate or negotiate and therefore continue to follow their strategy of surviving and waiting for the coalition forces to depart so that they can again make a move to assume control over Afghanistan.
Indeed, with the United States having set a deadline of July 2011 to begin the drawdown of combat forces in Afghanistan — and with many of its NATO allies withdrawing sooner — the Taliban can sense that the end is near. As they wait expectantly for the departure of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan, a look at the history of militancy in Afghanistan provides a bit of a preview of what could follow the U.S. withdrawal.
A Tradition of Militancy
First, it is very important to understand that militant activity in Afghanistan is nothing new. It has existed there for centuries, driven by a number of factors. One of the primary factors is the country’s geography. Because of its rugged and remote terrain, it is very difficult for a foreign power (or even an indigenous government in Kabul) to enforce its writ on many parts of the country. A second, closely related factor is culture. Many of the tribes in Afghanistan have traditionally been warrior societies that live in the mountains, disconnected from Kabul because of geography, and tend to exercise autonomous rule that breeds independence and suspicion of the central government. A third factor is ethnicity. There is no real Afghan national identity. Rather, the country is a patchwork of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and other ethnicities that tend also to be segregated by geography. Finally, there is religion. While Afghanistan is a predominantly Muslim country, there is a significant Shiite minority as well as a large Sufi presence in the country. The hardcore Deobandi Taliban are not very tolerant of the Shia or Sufis, and they can also be harsh toward more moderate Sunnis who do things such as send their daughters to school, trim their beards, listen to music and watch movies.
Any of these forces on its own would pose challenges to peace, stability and centralized governance, but together they pose a daunting problem and result in near-constant strife in Afghanistan.
Because of this environment, it is quite easy for outside forces to stir up militancy in Afghanistan. One tried-and-true method is to play to the independent spirit of the Afghans and encourage them to rise up against the foreign powers that have attempted to control the country. We saw this executed to perfection in the 1800s during the Great Game between the British and the Russians for control of Afghanistan. This tool was also used after the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and it has been used again in recent years following the 2001 U.S. invasion of the country. The Taliban are clearly being used by competing outside powers against the United States (more on this later).
But driving out an invading power is not the only thing that will lead to militancy and violence in Afghanistan. The ethnic, cultural and religious differences mentioned above and even things like grazing or water rights and tribal blood feuds can also lead to violence. Moreover, these factors can (and have been) used by outside powers to either disrupt the peace in Afghanistan or exert control over the country via a proxy (such as Pakistan’s use of the Taliban movement). Militant activity in Afghanistan is, therefore, not just the result of an outside invasion. Rather, it has been a near constant throughout the history of the region, and it will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future.
Foreign Influence
When we consider the history of outside manipulation in Afghanistan, it becomes clear that such manipulation has long been an important factor in the country and will continue to be so after the United States and the rest of the ISAF withdraw. There are a number of countries that have an interest in Afghanistan and that will seek to exert some control over what the post-invasion country looks like.
The United States does not want the country to revert to being a refuge for al Qaeda and other transnational jihadist groups. At the end of the day, this is the real U.S. national interest in Afghanistan. It is not counterinsurgency or building democracy or anything else.
Russia does not want the Taliban to return to power. The Russians view the Taliban as a disease that can infect and erode their sphere of influence in countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then move on to pose a threat to Russian control in the predominately Muslim regions of the Caucasus. This is why the Russians were so active in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. There are reports, though, that the Russians have been aiding the Taliban in an effort to keep the United States tied down in Afghanistan, since as long as the United States is distracted there it has less latitude to counter Russian activity elsewhere.
On the other side of that equation, Pakistan helped foster the creation of the Pashtun Taliban organization and then used the organization as a tool to exert its influence in Afghanistan. Facing enemies on its borders with India and Iran, Pakistan must control Afghanistan in order to have strategic depth and ensure that it will not be forced to defend itself along its northwest as well. While the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban and the threat it poses to Pakistan will alter Islamabad’s strategy somewhat — and Pakistan has indeed been recalculating its use of militant proxies — Pakistan will try hard to ensure that the regime in Kabul is pro-Pakistani.
This is exactly why India wants to play a big part in Afghanistan — to deny Pakistan that strategic depth. In the past, India worked with Russia and Iran to support the Northern Alliance and keep the Taliban from total domination of the country. Indications are that the Indians are teaming up with the Russians and Iranians once again.
Iran also has an interest in the future of Afghanistan and has worked to cultivate certain factions of the Taliban by providing them with shelter, weapons and training. The Iranians also have been strongly opposed to the Taliban and have supported anti-Taliban militants, particularly those from the Shiite Hazara people. When the Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, they killed 11 Iranian diplomats and journalists. Iran does not want the Taliban to become too powerful, but it will use them as a tool to hurt the United States. Iran will also attempt to install a pro-Iranian government in Kabul or, at the very least, try to thwart efforts by the Pakistanis and Americans to exert control over the country.
A History of Death and Violence
It may seem counterintuitive, but following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the casualties from militancy in the country declined considerably. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database, the fatalities due to armed conflict in Afghanistan fell from an estimated 10,000 a year prior to the invasion to 4,000 in 2002 and 1,000 by 2004. Even as the Taliban began to regroup in 2005 and the number of fatalities began to move upward, by 2009 (the last year for which the institute offers data) the total was only 7,140, still well-under the pre-invasion death tolls (though admittedly far greater than at the ebb of the insurgency in 2004).
Still, even with death tolls rising, the U.S. invasion has not produced anywhere near the estimated 1 million deaths that resulted during the Soviet occupation. The Soviets and their Afghan allies were not concerned about conducting a hearts-and-minds campaign. Indeed, their efforts were more akin to a scorched-earth strategy complete with attacks directed against the population. This strategy also resulted in millions of refugees fleeing Afghanistan for Pakistan and Iran and badly disrupted the tribal structure in much of Afghanistan. This massive disruption of the societal structure helped lead to a state of widespread anarchy that later led many Afghans to see the Taliban as saviors.
Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the communist government in Kabul was able to survive for three more years, backed heavily with Soviet arms, but these years were again marked by heavy casualties. When the communist government fell in 1992, the warlords who had opposed the government attempted to form a power-sharing agreement to govern Afghanistan, but all the factions could not reach a consensus and another civil war broke out, this time among the various anti-communist Afghan warlords vying for control of the country. During this period, Kabul was repeatedly shelled and the bloodshed continued. Neither the Soviet departure nor the fall of the communist regime ended the carnage.
With the rise of the Taliban, the violence began to diminish in many parts of the country, though the fighting remained fierce and tens of thousands of people were killed as the Taliban tried to exert control over the country. The Taliban were still engaged in a protracted and bloody civil war against the Northern Alliance when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001. During the initial invasion, very few U.S. troops were actually on the ground. The United States used the Northern Alliance as the main ground-force element, along with U.S. air power and special operations forces, and was able to remove the Taliban from power in short order. It is important to remember that the Taliban was never really defeated on the battlefield. Once they realized that they were no match for U.S. air power in a conventional war, they declined battle and faded away to launch their insurgency.
Today, the forces collectively referred to as the Taliban in Afghanistan are not all part of one hierarchical organization under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Although Mullah Omar is the dominant force and is without peer among Afghan insurgent leaders, there are a number of local and regional militant commanders who are fighting against the U.S. occupation beside the Taliban and who have post-U.S. occupation interests that diverge from those of the Taliban. Such groups are opportunists rather than hardcore Taliban and they might fight against Mullah Omar’s Taliban if he and his militants come to power in Kabul, especially if an outside power manipulates, funds and arms them — and outside powers will certainly be seeking to do so. The United States has tried to peel away the more independent factions from the wider Taliban “movement” but has had little success, mainly because the faction leaders see that the United States is going to disengage and that the Taliban will be a force to be reckoned with in the aftermath.
Once U.S. and ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan, then, it is quite likely that Afghanistan will again fall into a period of civil war, as the Taliban attempt to defeat the Karzai government, as the United States tries to support it and as other outside powers such as Pakistan, Russia and Iran try to gain influence through their proxies in the country.
The only thing that can really prevent this civil war from occurring is a total defeat of the Taliban and other militants in the country or some sort of political settlement. With the sheer size of the Taliban and its many factions, and the fact that many factions are receiving shelter and support from patrons in Pakistan and Iran, it is simply not possible for the U.S. military to completely destroy them before the Americans begin to withdraw next summer. This will result in a tremendous amount of pressure on the Americans to find a political solution to the problem. At this time, the Taliban simply don’t feel pressured to come to the negotiating table — especially with the U.S. drawdown in sight.
And even if a political settlement is somehow reached, not everyone will be pleased with it. Certainly, the outside manipulation in Afghanistan will continue, as will the fighting, as it has for centuries.
Militancy and the U.S. Drawdown in Afghanistan is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
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With Obama's announced drawdown of troops to begin in July, 2011, we are only fighting a holding action. This means that "victory" (in the true sense of the word) is unlikely in such a short time frame.
The enemy knows this, and they will simply wait us out.
Charles M. Grist
http://www.mylastwar.com/
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Counterterror Strategy for Afghanistan & Pakistan - From the Warrior Legacy Institute
The Warrior Legacy Institute is sometimes described as a "people's think tank" and it offers a perspective on the strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This release also includes a link to their website which has videos and other information. This is presented here as simply another source of information for all of us as we watch the critical days ahead in the War on Terror:
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For immediate release:
October 22, 2009
Warrior Legacy Institute releases layperson's guide to Counterterror strategy for Afghanistan & Pakistan
There is an important debate underway about what strategy we should pursue in Afghanistan. This decision is important for all Americans, but many don't have a very good understanding of both the Population-Centric Counterinsurgency strategy advocated by Gen. McChrystal and a Counterterrorism strategy. The Warrior Legacy Institute (WLI) releases a paper today on Counterterror that doesn't require a military background to understand. This is a complement to the paper we released last week on Population-Centric Counterinsurgency. We are also releasing two short videos on these topics. Both the papers and videos are designed for you and anyone you want to share them with. They were produced for you and anyone you want to share them with. We believe that educating the public about the choices will allow them to make informed decisions about what they think is best.
The Warrior Legacy Institute (WLI) is a “people's think tank” designed to take the most important national security issues and explain them in simple language to the American people. The papers are designed for those who have an interest in what our strategies actually are, but who do not have a deep knowledge of military affairs. The papers and companion videos can be found here.
The debate about what our plan for Afghanistan should be is happening now, WLI believes all Americans should have a clear understanding of the specifics under consideration.
Cordially,
Jim
Jim Hanson
Director, Warrior Legacy Institute
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Charles M. Grist
www.MyLastWar.com
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Taliban Moves Closer to Pakistan's Nukes
Other than the ominous march of Iran toward nuclear weapons, the next greatest fear is that the Taliban - who were run out of Afghanistan in 2003 by the United States - will someday get hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
Sadly, the Pakistani leadership still believes their greatest threat is India, when the disease within their borders is the bigger danger.
Here is a good article from David Ignatius:
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Moment of Truth in Pakistan
By David Ignatius
Sunday, May 3, 2009
President Obama convened a crisis meeting at the White House last Monday to hear a report from Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had just returned from Pakistan. Mullen described the worrying situation there, with Taliban insurgents moving closer to the capital, Islamabad.
"It had gotten significantly worse than I expected as the Swat deal unraveled," Mullen explained in an interview. He was referring to a truce brokered in February in the Swat Valley, about 100 miles north of Islamabad. The Pakistani military had expected that the cease-fire would subdue Taliban fighters in Swat. Instead, the Muslim militants surged south into the district of Buner, on the doorstep of the capital.
Listening to Mullen's report at the White House were two senior officials -- Defense Secretary Bob Gates and special envoy Richard Holbrooke -- who were serving in government back in 1979, when a Muslim insurgency toppled the Iranian government, with harmful consequences that persist to this day. The two policy veterans "made the argument that it's worth studying the Iran model," recalls a senior official who took part in the White House meeting.
This was Pakistan week for the administration's foreign policy team, behind the self-congratulatory hubbub over the first 100 days. At a news conference Wednesday, Obama said that he was "gravely concerned about the situation in Pakistan." He said his biggest worry was that "the civilian government there right now is very fragile."
The challenge in Pakistan is eerily similar to what the Carter administration faced with Iran: how to encourage the military to take decisive action against a Muslim insurgency without destroying the country's nascent democracy.
And there's a deeper psychological factor, too: how to exercise U.S. power effectively without triggering a backlash from a proud and prickly Muslim population that is scarred by what it sees as a history of American meddling.
"My experience is that knocking them [the Pakistani government and military] hard isn't going to work," said Mullen. "The harder we push, the further away they get." For the crackdown on the Taliban to be successful, he said, "it has to be their will, not ours."
What encourages U.S. officials is that recent events have been a wake-up call for a Pakistani elite in denial about the Taliban threat. One top civilian official said that he was less worried now than three weeks ago, because the military and civilian leaders in Islamabad have realized the danger they face. The Pakistani military has begun an effort to push back the Taliban, with mixed results. The Taliban responded fiercely to an assault Tuesday in Buner and seized three police stations, kidnapping dozens of police and paramilitary troops.
"My biggest concern is whether [the Pakistani government] will sustain it," Mullen said. He has told his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, that "we are prepared to assist whenever they want." During his recent visit, Mullen toured two Pakistani counterinsurgency training camps and came away impressed.
Mullen said that he hopes the Pakistanis will adopt a classic three-part counterinsurgency strategy -- clearing areas of Taliban control, holding those areas with enough troops so that the local population feels secure and then building through economic development, with U.S. help.
Politically, the United States is looking increasingly to former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whose Muslim League dominates the crucial Punjab region. Officials note that 60 percent of the Pakistani population lives in Punjab and that Sharif's popularity rating there is over 80 percent.
President Asif Ali Zardari is far weaker, politically, and that worries the administration. He'll visit Washington this week to discuss the crisis with Obama.
U.S. officials are exploring ways to reduce the political strain on Zardari caused by U.S. drone attacks on al-Qaeda sanctuaries in the tribal areas. Pakistanis protest these attacks as violations of sovereignty, even though they had been blessed in secret by Zardari's government. This tension could be eased by some public formula for dual control. Explains a senior Obama administration official: "We're looking at how we might find some common way ahead where utilization of the asset could benefit the Pakistanis."
The growing crisis mentality in Washington poses its own threat to a sound Pakistan policy. It could produce red-hot American rhetoric and a corresponding U.S. impatience -- and that, in turn, would only make the Pakistanis more uneasy. Success depends on Islamabad's recognition that it's their problem and that they must act decisively.
The writer is co-host of PostGlobal, an online discussion of international issues. His e-mail address is davidignatius@washpost.com.
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As all these fundamentalist Muslims inch their way toward nuclear weapons, the world gets a little scarier every day.
Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com
Thursday, February 19, 2009
America Faces New Challenges in Afghan War
With two members of the C.O.B.R.A. Team on the ground in Afghanistan (Aaron Self – Cobra Two; Chad Higginbotham – Cobra Three), I am keeping close tabs on this important front in the war on terror. In the following Associated Press article, the top commander in Afghanistan says the insurgents have fought us to a stalemate.
This doesn’t mean our soldiers aren't winning the battles; it means we don’t have enough soldiers to seize and hold critical areas. It also means we must deal with the humanitarian issues, increase the pace of the training for the Afghan military and police, and solve the problem of the safe havens in Pakistan.
Yes, it is a messy situation.
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Afghan War at Stalemate, McKiernan Says
February 19, 2009
Associated Press
WASHINGTON - The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan offered a grim view Wednesday of military efforts in southern Afghanistan, warning that 17,000 new troops will take on emboldened Taliban insurgents who have "stalemated" U.S. and allied forces.
Army Gen. David McKiernan also predicted that the bolstered numbers of U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan - about 55,000 in all - will remain near those levels for up to five years.
Still, McKiernan said, that is only about two-thirds of the number of troops he has requested to secure the war-torn nation.
McKiernan told reporters at the Pentagon on Wednesday that the extra Army and Marine forces will be in place by the summer, primed for counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban but also ready to conduct training with Afghan police forces.
McKiernan said what the surge "allows us to do is change the dynamics of the security situation, predominantly in southern Afghanistan, where we are, at best, stalemated.
"I'm not here to tell you that there's not an increased level of violence, because there is," he said.
The 17,000 additional troops, which President Barack Obama approved Tuesday to begin deploying this spring, will join an estimated 38,000 already in Afghanistan.
Another 10,000 U.S. Soldiers could be headed to Afghanistan in the future as the Obama administration decides how to balance its troop levels with those from other nations and the Afghan army. The White House has said it will not make further decisions about its next moves in Afghanistan until it has completed a strategic review of the war, in tandem with the Afghan government.
Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, said Wednesday that the foreign ministers of those countries will travel to Washington next week to meet with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other officials as the U.S. formulates a policy review.
Appearing on "The NewsHour" on PBS, Holbrooke was asked how the Obama administration sees victory in Afghanistan. "First of all, the victory, as defined in purely military terms, is not achievable, and I cannot stress that too highly," he said. "What we're looking for is the definition of our vital national security interests."
Holbrooke described his recent trip to the region and the delegations coming to Washington as "a manifestation of a new, intense, engaged diplomacy designed to put Afghanistan and Pakistan into a larger regional context and move forward to engage other countries in the effort to stabilize this incredibly volatile region."
Whatever the outcome of the review, McKiernan said, "we know we need additional means in Afghanistan, whether they are security or governance-related or socioeconomic-related."
The estimated level of 55,000 troops needs "to be sustained for some period of time," he said, adding that could be as long as three to five years.
Some of the 17,000 U.S. troops soon headed overseas will be training Afghanistan police while battling insurgents as the nation's August elections approach. They include an Army combat brigade from Washington state and a Marine expeditionary brigade made up of troops from Camp Lejune in North Carolina and Camp Pendleton in southern California.
McKiernan said they would be sufficient for what he believes needs to be done through summer, when the fighting tends to be heaviest.
With the added ground troops, McKiernan said it's possible the military will scale back airstrikes that have been blamed for civilian casualties and angered the Afghan population.
The Taliban insurgents, some of whom have worked in concert with al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, have increasingly focused on what McKiernan described as small-scale attacks on government targets, police and official convoys. Last week militants launched a bold strike on government buildings in downtown Kabul.
McKiernan said the number of insurgents has not grown, but they are "very resilient" and "they have continuously adapted their tactics."
"We're not going to run out of people that either international forces or Afghan forces have to kill or capture," McKiernan said.
Ultimately, the conflict will be solved not by military force - but through the political will of the Afghan people, the general said.
"The insurgency is not going to win in Afghanistan," McKiernan insisted. "The vast majority of the people that live in Afghanistan reject the Taliban or other militant insurgent groups. They have nothing to offer them. They do not bring any hope for a better future."
Robert H. Scales, a retired Army two-star general who visited southern Afghanistan last October as a military adviser, said in a telephone interview Wednesday that he agrees there is essentially a stalemate in that area, which is a traditional stronghold for the Taliban movement. But he said that does not mean U.S. and allies forces are losing.
"It's reached the point where neither side has gained an advantage," Scales said, adding that he believes the south - particularly in the opium-producing Helmand Province - is the area with the greatest potential for U.S. gains against the Taliban, especially with more U.S. forces due to deploy there.
The rising violence in Afghanistan is conducted by militants who operate out of sanctuaries in Pakistan tribal regions along the border of the two nations. McKiernan called the stability of both countries "a regional challenge" and credited Pakistan with trying harder to secure the border.
"It's not enough; we need to do more," McKiernan said. "But it is a start."
He called it "in our vital national security interest to succeed" in Afghanistan.
"It's a country that is absolutely worth our commitment," McKiernan said. "And it's a region that is absolutely worth the commitment of the international community to ensure that it's stable at the end of this."
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We extend our support and encouragement to our fellow warriors who are risking everything for America in the cities, villages, hills and mountains of Afghanistan.
Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com
Saturday, November 29, 2008
Islamic Terrorists Murder More Innocents in Mumbai
We extend our sympathies to the innocent victims of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai (Bombay), India. This brutal assault is just more evidence that the War on Terror is a world-wide struggle – the first world war of the twenty-first century. (The above photo is from the Associated Press.)
Islamic fundamentalist terrorists are cowardly thugs who slither around like snakes on behalf of a new and vicious type of fascism. Sadly, this threat against innocent men, women and children will surely continue throughout the world for many years to come.
Although tensions have increased between India and Pakistan because of these attacks, it makes no sense to believe that the government of Pakistan had anything to do with it. The Pakistanis have enough problems with terrorists in their own country. Although we may discover that these killers were based or trained in Pakistan, I can’t believe the Islamabad government is complicit in any way.
This is an interesting article from the Associated Press on who the bad guys in this incident may be:
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Clues point to domestic terrorists in India
By PAISLEY DODDS
Associated Press
LONDON -The attack on India's financial capital bears all the trademarks of al-Qaida — simultaneous assaults meant to kill scores of Westerners in iconic buildings — but clues so far point to homegrown Indian terrorists, global intelligence officials said Thursday.
Spy agencies around the world were caught off guard by the deadly attack, in which gunmen sprayed crowds with bullets, torched landmark hotels and took dozens of hostages.
"We have been actively monitoring plots in Britain and abroad and there was nothing to indicate something like this was about to happen," a British security official told The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of his work.
Britain is the former colonial power in India and Pakistan and closely monitors terrorist suspects in those countries.
In some ways, the attack illustrated just how fluid terror tactics have become since Sept. 11 — and how the threat has become more global. Al-Qaida's leaders on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border still provide inspiration but groups are becoming increasingly local.
The group that claimed responsibility, Deccan Mujahideen, was unknown to global security officials. The name suggested the group was Indian.
One of the suspects reportedly called an Indian television station, speaking the main Pakistani language of Urdu, to demand the return of Muslim lands. That was a reference to Kashmir, territory claimed by both India and Pakistan.
But Ajai Sahni, head of the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management who has close ties to India's police and intelligence, said the attack was a departure from past assaults waged over Kashmir. Other such attacks had targeted Indian legislators, not Westerners.
Security officials said it was too soon to make a connection to Pakistan.
"It would be premature ... to reach any hard-and-fast conclusions on who may be responsible for the attacks, but some of what we're seeing is reminiscent of past terrorist operations undertaken by groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed," a U.S. counterterrorism official said on condition of anonymity, referring to Pakistani militant groups linked to al-Qaida who have fought Indian troops in Kashmir.
Another British security official told the AP on condition of anonymity that the attack doesn't look to have been directed by al-Qaida's core leadership, which has been weakened by the deaths of several leaders and key operatives in recent months.
Al-Qaida's core leadership is believed to be fewer than 100 people now, said Rohan Gunaratna, author of "Inside Al-Qaida" and a terrorism expert at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore.
The British security official said it appeared the attack was inspired by Islamic extremist ideology and al-Qaida propaganda popular among radicalized youths. Many of the attackers in the Mumbai assault were young. Gunaratna said he believed the group that carried out Wednesday's attack was the Indian Mujahideen, responsible for past attacks in Mumbai.
The word "Deccan" refers to a plateau in southern India. "Mujahideen" refers to holy warriors.
"The earlier generation of terrorist groups in India were mostly linked to Pakistan," Gunaratna told the AP. "But today we are seeing a dramatic change. They are almost all homegrown groups. ... They are very angry and firmly believe that India is killing Muslims and attacking Islam."
British-based Jane's Information Group said it thought the attackers could be Indian but that taking hostages suggested a wider anti-Western agenda.
"Until now, terrorist attacks in India have targeted civilians, often in busy market or commercial areas, and in communally sensitive areas with the intention to foment unrest between Hindu and Muslim communities," said Urmila Venugopalan, Jane's South Asia analyst.
"This stands in contrast to the national issues that appeared to motivate Indian Mujahideen," Venugopalan said.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blamed "external forces" but stopped short of blaming Pakistan. Both are nuclear-armed countries.
In September, a massive suicide truck bomb devastated the Marriott Hotel in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, killing at least 54 people, including three Americans and the Czech ambassador.
"This type of terrorism is spreading, through Pakistan and now India, but we were all surprised by such a large-scale attack like this," said Wajid Hassan, Pakistan's High Commissioner in London. "This is no coincidence that this type of attack happened so soon after the bombing of the Marriott Hotel. People from all countries are being paid to fight this al-Qaida war. This is a war that goes beyond any nationality."
Sahni, however, said "very preliminary investigations and intelligence information would suggest that some groups based in Pakistan are the most likely.
"If there is Indian participation, it's most likely to be Students' Islamic Movement of India," he said, referring to a radical student group banned in India in 2001.
Indian intelligence officials were also investigating whether Mumbai's criminal underworld could be involved.
"It's a possibility," Sahni said. "When we say Mumbai underworld we're talking of Dawood Ibrahim."
Ibrahim is one of India's most wanted men and also the alleged mastermind behind bombings in Mumbai in 1993 that killed 257 people. He has reportedly fled Mumbai, and police now believe he lives in Pakistan. Pakistani officials have denied this.
Associated Press writers Pamela Hess in Washington, Gregory Katz and David Stringer in London, Lee Keath in Cairo and Muneeza Naqvi in New Delhi contributed to this report.
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President Bush has indicated his support for India in the investigation of these attacks. Hopefully, we can act as a bridge to get India and Pakistan to work together.
Charles M. Grist
www.TheCobraTeam.com
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com
Monday, June 16, 2008
Militant Attacks From Pakistan Must Be Stopped
Afghanistan’s leader has threatened to send soldiers into Pakistan to fight militants. He is only doing what he must to protect his country.
If Pakistan won’t deal with these insurgents, either the Afghans or the Coalition must do so:
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New York Times
June 16, 2008
Pg. 6
Karzai Threatens To Send Soldiers Into Pakistan
By Carlotta Gall
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan threatened on Sunday to send soldiers into Pakistan to fight militant groups operating in the border areas to attack Afghanistan. His comments, made at a news conference in Kabul, Afghanistan, are likely to worsen tensions between the countries, just days after American forces in Afghanistan killed 11 Pakistani soldiers on the border while pursuing militants.
“If these people in Pakistan give themselves the right to come and fight in Afghanistan, as was continuing for the last 30 years, so Afghanistan has the right to cross the border and destroy terrorist nests, spying, extremism and killing, in order to defend itself, its schools, its peoples and its life,” Mr. Karzai said.
“When they cross the territory from Pakistan to come and kill Afghans and kill coalition troops, it exactly gives us the right to go back and do the same,” he said.
Mr. Karzai repeated that he regarded the Pakistani government as a friendly government, but he urged it to join Afghanistan and allied nations to fight those who wanted to destabilize both countries, and to “cut the hand” that is feeding the militants.
The prime minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gilani, said the border was too long to prevent people from crossing, “even if Pakistan puts its entire army along the border.”
“Neither do we interfere in anyone else’s matters, nor will we allow anyone to interfere in our territorial limits and our affairs,” The Associated Press quoted Mr. Gilani as having said.
Mr. Karzai named several militant leaders, including Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistani who has sent scores of fighters and suicide bombers to Afghanistan, and Maulana Fazlullah, a firebrand militant leader from the Swat Valley. Both men have recently negotiated peace deals with the Pakistani government, but vowed to continue waging jihad in Afghanistan.
“Baitullah Mehsud should know that we will go after him now and hit him in his house,” Mr. Karzai said.
The president also taunted the leader of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar, calling him a Pakistani, since he has been based in this country since fleeing Afghanistan in 2001.
“And the other fellow, Pakistani Mullah Omar, should know the same,” Mr. Karzai said. “This is a two-way road in this case, and Afghans are good at the two-way-road journey. We will complete the journey and we will get them and we will defeat them. We will avenge all that they have done to Afghanistan for the past so many years.”
“Today’s Afghanistan is not yesterday’s silent Afghanistan,” he warned. “We have a voice, tools and bravery as well.”
Mr. Karzai’s comments came two days after Taliban fighters assaulted the main prison in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, blowing up the mud walls, killing 15 guards and freeing about 1,200 inmates. It is not known if the fighters received assistance from outside Afghanistan.
Mr. Karzai has adopted a tougher stance in recent months toward Pakistan and even toward foreign allies like the United States and Britain, a shift that analysts say is driven by political concerns at home, with presidential elections due next year.
He says Pakistan has been giving sanctuary to militants for several years and his frustration has grown as the threat has grown. He has often accused the premier Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, of training and assisting militant groups, to undermine his government and maintain a friendly proxy force for the day that United States and NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
His relations with the president of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, have deteriorated over the years, amid mutual recriminations that the other side was not doing enough to curb terrorism. Mr. Musharraf always denied that the Taliban was operating from Pakistani territory and accused Mr. Karzai of failing to put his own country in order.
Mr. Karzai has welcomed the electoral victories of the secular, democratic parties in Pakistan, since he had longstanding good relations with the late Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan Peoples Party, and in particular with another coalition partner, the Awami National Party.
In a recent interview, Mr. Karzai expressed optimism that relations between the countries would improve under the new government, in particular because of its opposition to militant Islamism.
Yet Afghanistan has watched Pakistan’s peace deals with militant groups with concern and has protested that cross-border infiltration has already increased.
In southern Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai said, British commanders reported that 70 percent of the Taliban fighters killed in recent fighting in the Garmser district were from Pakistan, and 60 percent were Pakistanis.
Mr. Karzai complained that the Pashtuns, the ethnic group that lives on both sides of the border, have been used by the Inter-Services Intelligence and have suffered the most at the hands of the militants. Mr. Karzai is an ethnic Pashtun and spoke out for his fellow tribesmen in Pakistan as well as in his own country.
The militants “have been trained against the Pashtuns of Pakistan and against the people of Afghanistan, and their jobs are to burn Pashtun schools in Pakistan, not to allow their girls to get educated, and kill the Pashtun tribal chiefs,” Mr. Karzai said.
“This is the duty of Afghanistan to rescue the Pashtuns in Pakistan from this cruelty and terror,” he said. “This is the duty of Afghanistan to defend itself and defend their brothers, sisters and sons on the other side.”
Sangar Rahimi contributed reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan.
* * * *
Charles M. Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
With Al Qaeda Safe Havens, What Do They Expect?
"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) on guerrilla warfare
The following article in today’s New York Times emphasizes once again that the Al Qaeda problem will never go away as long as the terrorists have safe havens in which to recruit, train and equip new “holy warriors”.
Our troops did a magnificent job in routing the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, our self-imposed and “politically correct” rules of engagement have now put us on the defense, trapped within the borders of that country.
We won’t enter the tribal regions of Pakistan to squash the Al Qaeda bases, but the enemy continues to make its own rules. Their leaders are free to casually sip tea, read the Quran and plan their next terror attacks in safety.
The initiative belongs to them…
* * * *
New York Times
December 4, 2007
U.S. Senses A Rise In Activity By Al Qaeda In Afghanistan
By Thom Shanker
KABUL, Afghanistan, Dec. 3 — American military and intelligence officials are detecting early signs that Al Qaeda may be increasing its activities in Afghanistan, perhaps even seeking to return to its former base of operations, a senior Defense Department official said Monday.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates arrived in Kabul late Monday for meetings with government leaders and military commanders to discuss how to speed economic and political development at a time of increasing violence.
The senior Defense Department official, aboard Mr. Gates’s plane, said, “We are seeing early indicators that there may be some stepped-up activity by Al Qaeda.” No details were offered.
The official cautioned, “It’s pretty hard to pull trends out of a few indications,” but added that even tentative evidence of increased Qaeda activity in Afghanistan “is something we are concerned with.”
The official spoke on standard rules of anonymity to discuss intelligence on Al Qaeda and Mr. Gates’s agenda before the secretary’s third trip to Afghanistan during his first year in office.
Mr. Gates, in brief comments before landing in Kabul, said he was interested in how combat operations could be better woven into a “comprehensive development strategy” to include accelerated economic and political development.
“One of the clear concerns we all have is that in the last two or three years there has been an increase in the overall level of violence,” Mr. Gates said, adding that the rise in attacks and bombings was notable in southern Afghanistan, which had served as the Taliban’s spiritual base.
“I am not worried about a backslide as much as I am about how we continue the momentum going forward,” he added.
Officials said Mr. Gates also planned to assess whether the recent political turmoil in neighboring Pakistan had given greater freedom of movement to Taliban and Qaeda forces in tribal areas along the Afghan border.
Pentagon and military officials said the higher number of attacks and roadside bombings could be attributed to increased money for the insurgency from foreign sources and profits from domestic poppy production. The officials also attribute the increase in violence to the sanctuary provided in tribal areas of Pakistan that has allowed the Taliban and Al Qaeda to regroup.
Mr. Gates spent most of Monday in Djibouti, in eastern Africa, to inspect one of the most unusual missions in the American military. The operation, called Task Force Horn of Africa, has not captured or killed a single terrorist or foreign fighter, yet it is viewed by Pentagon officials as a model military deployment.
The task force’s mission is to apply the “soft power” Mr. Gates advocated in a Nov. 26 speech at Kansas State University, when he said American counterterrorism efforts required not only combat operations, but also a broader range of economic development and diplomacy.
American combat personnel in Djibouti train regional armed forces to strengthen their own counterterrorism abilities. Combat engineers build schools and hospitals and dig wells in an effort to promote stability and prevent terrorists from taking root.
In his first trip to Djibouti, Mr. Gates visited Camp Lemonier, a former French Foreign Legion compound that is home to the 2,000 troops in the task force and support missions. The operation is already shaping the way the Pentagon will organize its efforts in coming years.
The American military is organizing a new Africa Command, the first American combatant command dedicated solely to Africa. The lessons learned from the operation in Djibouti will shape the command’s emphasis on defense as well as on diplomacy and development, according to senior Pentagon officials.
The mission was first devised to trap terrorists expected to flee Afghanistan along traditional smugglers’ routes down the Persian Gulf, into the Arabian Sea and past the Horn of Africa.
But the overlapping ground, maritime and air patrols across the region appear to have deterred the use of that route.
American intelligence and military officers say Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups continue to move through the region, with small numbers believed to be operating in ungoverned parts of Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen.
* * * *
The only path to victory in war is to turn the enemy’s offense into the enemy’s defense. As long as we remain on the defense in any war, we are simply reacting to the enemy’s tactics and he is the one who chooses when and where the next battles will be fought.
Such is the nature of guerrilla war…
SFC Chuck Grist
www.AmericanRanger.blogspot.com
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
Safe Havens for Terrorists?
Yesterday, the 19th, I heard from my Army Reserve unit and I was updated regarding my pending mobilization. I am still on the list to return to active duty during the first part of January, 2007; however, I can’t help but believe that most units in the military are waiting to find out what the President’s new plan will be. Only then will they know how they will be expected to use their soldiers.
Upon my return from Iraq in October, 2004, like many veterans, I felt guilty leaving both my comrades and my new Iraqi friends behind. Sitting in safety back in the States, it remained important to me to stay tuned in to what was happening in Baghdad.
In Vietnam we faced an enemy who was able to train, equip and re-group in the sanctuaries of Laos and Cambodia. Even when America invaded Cambodia in 1971 to “clean out” those North Vietnamese camps, we were the ones accused by the anti-war crowd of “invading” Cambodia. No mention was made of the illegal use of those countries by the enemy to wage their war.
A similar situation has arisen in the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars, with insurgents and their supporters using Syria, Iran and Pakistan for the same purpose: to recruit, train, equip and re-group for attacks against us in Iraq.
I wrote the following article for the Orlando Sentinel and it appeared on December 19, 2004:
SAFE HAVENS FOR TERRORISTS?
Once upon a time, the United States was fighting a war in a far-off country. The enemy soldiers were skilled insurgents fighting to advance their own agenda. They used neighboring countries as safe havens from which they could funnel arms, ammunition and soldiers into the war zone. After mounting attacks against innocent civilians and Americans, they would run back over the border to hide and to re-supply. Then they would return to wage war again – on their terms.
While the insurgents could make use of these other countries in that bloody war long ago, the Americans could not. For political reasons, the American military fought its ground war only in the war-torn country, until it was finally decided that enough was enough. American troops invaded Cambodia, taking a terrible toll on the enemy, rousting him from his hiding places, killing many of his soldiers and capturing tons of equipment and supplies. Though the North Vietnamese had not been criticized for their “invasion” of Cambodia, a double standard of the time accused the Americans of an “illegal” invasion.
There is gathering evidence that some of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni henchmen are based in Syria. With that government’s likely support, these old friends of Saddam are sending arms, ammunition and insurgents into Iraq to kill and maim both Iraqis and Americans. Further evidence suggests that the Iranian Shiite government is also supporting – with men and arms – efforts by Shiite insurgents to destroy the hope of freedom in Iraq.
Although, there is little disagreement that the war in Iraq could have been managed better all along, our commitment to the Iraqi people must remain firm. We turned their lives upside down in the process of liberating them. Now that the going is getting tough, as it always does in war, we must remember that we have no choice but to endure.
President Bush said in the beginning that we would go after the terrorists wherever they chose to hide. He said that if you support or harbor terrorists you were also the enemy. Those statements were inspiring and led to the liberation of tens of millions of people in Afghanistan and Iraq. The bill for the purchase of that liberation has been paid, and is still being paid, with the lives of gallant American and coalition soldiers as they continue to do a magnificent job.
Still, the world is watching the level of our nation’s resolve. Will America cave in or stay the course? As a soldier who has served in both Vietnam and Iraq, I pray we will not stop until victory is sure.
Soon, the Bush administration will have to decide how to handle the insurgent bases in Syria, Iran or other countries. Most soldiers would agree that the only way to win a war is to turn the enemy’s offense into the defense. We have progressed from fighting an offensive war to liberate Iraq to fighting a defensive war – our decisions have become reactive, not proactive. This is certainly a recipe for disaster, if not failure. If we are to prevail, we must go after the insurgents wherever they are.
There is one very good reason that we have not had a terrorist attack in this country since Sept. 11, 2001. We have put the terrorists on the run and they have learned that it is difficult to wage war from a hole in the ground. We must not let them find new safe havens in Syria, Iran or any other country that chooses to mock our efforts at defeating terrorism. Our enemies must never forget that, if they hurt our citizens or support those who do, we will hunt them down and capture or kill them, and we will do it relentlessly, no matter how long it takes and no matter where we have to go.
Most of all, we do not need another black wall in Washington filled with the names of warriors who gave their lives for a politically abandoned cause. This war must be won, regardless of the cost, and America’s sons and daughters must never again die in vain.
SFC Chuck Grist
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